

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED), 50TH INFANTRY
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96250

25 September 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

Commanding General
173d Abn Bde
ATTN: S3/MED
APO 96250

In accordance with Brigade Regulation Number 335-8, the following report is submitted.

1. General: This report covers the 1st Bn (M), 50th Inf operations within A/O COCHISE GREEN from 5 April to 17 August 68.
2. Name of Operation: COCHISE GREEN.
3. Type of Operation: Search and Destroy.
4. Date of Operation: 5 April to 17 August 68.
5. Location: Bong Son Plains, Vinh Than Mountains, Central Coastal Plains and Highlands, Binh Dinh Province, RVN.
6. Control or Command Headquarters: 1st Bn (M), 50th Inf, 173d Abn Bde.
7. Reporting Officer: John B Carter LTC, INF, Commanding.
8. Task Organization:
 - a. A Co 1/50
 - b. B Co 1/50
 - c. C Co 1/50
 - d. Scout Plat 1/50
 - e. TF Control:
 - (1) HAC 1/50
 - (2) SVC Co 1/50

(Handwritten note)
COCHISE GREEN

9. Supporting Forces:

- a. 7/13 Arty
- b. 7/15 Arty
- c. 1/69 Armor
- d. 4/60 Arty
- e. 61st Avn Co
- f. 173d Engr
- g. FAC Det, 173d Abn Bde (21st TASS)
- h. 504 MP Det
- i. 173d EOD
- j. TAC Air Support: Tactical air was used during all major contacts in close support of ground elements. TAC Air responded satisfactory on immediates. Reaction time ranged from 20-45 minutes before aircraft were on station. Preplanned airstrikes were used on hard targets acquired through intelligence sources. Normally all pre-planned airstrikes whether for LZ preps or on hard targets went in as scheduled unless it had to be directed to another part of the AO due to a change in tactical situation.

10. Intelligence: Enemy units operating in our area of operations during the period 5 April 68 to 17 August 68, were comprised of approximately 90% NVN and 10% SVN. There were 2 main units in which we made the most frequent contacts. They were the 22d NVA and 2d VC Regiments. However, the Bn did have a few small contacts with elements of the XC 11 Guerilla Bn and the 9th Bn, 18th Regiment. These enemy units were not at full strength. They were however believed to be combat ready. It was believed that the 22d NVA Regiment and the 2d VC Regiment were capable of sustained combat for approximately 3-4 hours before resupply was necessary. During April 68, our intelligence indicated that these units were performing resupply and training missions. The prime reason for these 2 missions was for the upcoming May general offensive.

a. The order of battle for the above mentioned units are as follows:

(1) 22d Regiment:

(a) 7th Battalion - CO Nguyen Van Luven Sr CPT.

1. Estimated Strength: 125

2. Location: Nui Goo Cahi (BR8774)

(b) 8th Battalion - CO Xuong Sr CPT.

- 1. Estimated Strength: 232
 - 2. Location: Nui Goo Trat (BR8782)
 - (c) 9th Battalion - CO Xung Sr CPT.
 - 1. Estimated Strength: 240
 - 2. Location: BR8372
- (2) 2d Regiment:
 - (a) 93d Battalion - CO Nhon (Probably Sr CPT)
 - 1. Estimated Strength: 215
 - 2. Location: 506 Valley Area (BR8674)
 - (b) 95th Battalion - CO Van, MAJ
 - 1. Estimated Strength: 200
 - 2. Location: Southern Nui Mieu (BR9874)
 - (c) 97th Battalion - CO Vinh, CPT
 - 1. Estimated Strength: 140
 - 2. Location: Southwest of 506 Valley (BR8473)
- (3) 18th Regiment:
 - (a) 7th Battalion - CO Tuong, CPT
 - 1. Estimated Strength: 200
 - 2. Location: BR988539
 - (b) 8th Battalion - CO Vo Van Quy
 - 1. Estimated Strength: 175
 - 2. Location: BR943525
 - (c) 9th Battalion - CO Wung, Sr CPT
 - 1. Estimated Strength: 200
 - 2. Location: BR740630
- (4) XC 11 MF Battalion - CO unk - Location: BR947955
 - (a) 1/XC 11 - CO unknown

1. Estimated Strength: Unknown

2. Location: BR916042

(b) 2/XC 11 - CO unknown

1. Estimated Strength: Unknown.

2. Location: BR883948

(c) 3/XC 11 - CO unknown

1. Estimated Strength: Unknown

2. Location: BR789973

- b. **Enemy Situation:** The 22d NVA and the 2d VC Regiment had generally the same missions. They were to harass and overrun military installations. They were to take Phu My (D) Hq and liberate the surrounding area. The XC 11 Guerrilla Bn's mission was harassment of QL 1, and assassination of GVN officials. The 18th NVA Regiment's mission was to liberate the Quin Nhon area. After the three major contacts in May, intelligence indicated that the enemy sustained heavy casualties, and his medical supplies were badly exhausted. This caused him to place heavy emphasis on obtaining medical supplies. Working on this intelligence, the 1/50 concentrated on searching all hamlets and vehicles in our area. Medical supplies captured were enroute to supply a Regiment. Personnel shortages was another problem for these Regiments.
- c. **Terrain Analysis:** Land form consists of heavily vegetated mountains and slopes. The valleys consist of rice fields and medium hard ground with some vegetation. Mechanized operations in the valleys were possible with little difficulty. Operations in the high ground could only be conducted on foot.
- d. **Counterintelligence:** 172d and 525th MI proved to be our greatest sources of information.
- (1) Generally locate enemy units.
 - (2) Obtain their operational plans.
 - (3) Receive up to date Order of Battle and Logistics of enemy units.
- e. **Ammunition:** The enemy employed S/A, A/W, 57mm Recoilless, RPG 2 and RPG 7 rockets, 60mm and 82mm mortars.
- f. **Explosives:** The use of plastic explosives in their anti-personnel and anti-tank mines was used frequently; however, in some isolated cases black powder was used. Another type mine employed was unexploded artillery and mortar rounds.

- g. **Clothing:** NVA units generally wore khaki or green fatigues, VC units wore basically black pajamas with the pant legs rolled up to form makeshift shorts.
- h. **Food:** In April, 1/50 captured enemy rice caches totalling over 50 tons was uncovered. During April and after the May battles, the mission of most VC/NVA units was to gather rice from the local population in order to feed their units.
- i. **Medical:** The 600th NVA Field Hospital took care of most casualties for the above mentioned units. Due to a lack of proper medical supplies, medical facilities and sterilized equipment, it is believed that many patients died of gangrene, or other complications due to wounds.

11. Mission: To close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him or repel his assault by fire, close combat and counter attack within assigned A/O during operation COCHISE GREEN.

12. Concept of Operation: The 1st Bn (M), 50th Inf conducted operations in assigned areas of operation within AO COCHISE GREEN from 5 April to 17 August 68. The 1/50 employed three organic rifle companies and one scout platoon during all operations. Maximum utilization was made of supporting fires and all other FVMAF during operations.

13. Execution: On 5 April, this battalion was detached from the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div and attached to the 173d Abn Bde. There was no change in the area of operation except that the name was changed from AO PATRICK to AO COCHISE GREEN.

- a. At the beginning of operation COCHISE GREEN, this Battalion was conducting operations along the beach and in the Nui Mieu Mountains. Enemy activity was at a minimum at the time. Reports of enemy units and caches in the mountains led to the deployment of B/1-50th into the Nui Mieu Mountain range. A/1-50th and C/1-50th conducted operations along the beach. Co B operated inland and farther to the west. Operations for the month of April were conducted totally within the Crescent area.
- b. Initial enemy ground activity was light for the month of April, but enemy mining operations was on the increase during latter phases of the operation.
 - (1) On 6 April, B/1-50th found 3 dead NVA soldiers who had apparently been killed by H&I fire during the night. The location was in the vicinity of BR985741; also, they found 1 AK-47 rifle and 4 inches of documents.
 - (2) On 11 April, one APC from Co C/1-50th was destroyed by a mine of undetermined size at BR834578, with no casualties.
 - (3) On 13 April, C/1-50th had a man step on a mine of unknown size vic BR839977. Friendly casualties were 1 US KHA and 3 US WHA.

- REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
- (4) On 15 April, A/1-50th had one APC destroyed by a mine of unknown size. One road wheel and all of the hatches were blown off. Friendly casualties were 7 WHA.
 - (5) On 19 April, C/1-50th wounded and captured 1 VC at BR957826. At 1055 hours, Co C engaged 2 more VC, killing both.
 - (6) On 20 April, C/1-50th killed 1 VC spotted from the air trying to evade vic BR955855. At 1040 hrs a man from B/1-50th stepped on a land mine killing him and wounding 2 others.
 - (7) On 30 April, the second platoon of A/1-50th made contact with an enemy element of undetermined strength. Friendly casualties were 4 US WHA.

c. A considerable increase in enemy activity took place during the latter part of May. Three major battles were initiated by the enemy. Operations were conducted in the Crescent area and in the NW Phu My Plains.

- (1) On 2 May, C/1-50th engaged an enemy force of undetermined strength trying to evade to the NE of the Dam Trao Lake. 3 NVA wearing khaki uniforms and web gear were KIA.
- (2) Battle of An Bao.
 - (a) The 5th of May brought the first major contact of the month. At 0145 hours, LZ Salem received approximately 6 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and light S/A fire for a 5 minute period. Results were 3 ARVN WHA with negative assessment of enemy casualties.
 - (b) At 0315 hours, LZ Ollie sustained a ground attack from the south by an unknown size enemy force. A platoon of C/1-50th with tanks of B/1-69 Armor employing cannister rounds, repulsed the attack with negative friendly casualties. The enemy employed S/A, A/W, M-79, B40 rockets, flamethrowers, and mortars in their attack. Contact was broken at 0325 hrs with negative assessment of enemy casualties.
 - (c) A/1-50th was given the mission of S/C vic BR9079. Intelligence indicated that an enemy artillery battalion and regimental CP was working in the area. The enemy's mission was unknown at the time.
 - (d) At 1146 hours, A/1-50th made contact with an estimated 2 NVA battalions employing S/A, A/W, B40 rockets, 57mm recoilless and 82mm mortar fire. Contact was initiated by the enemy as the company was establishing a perimeter. A volley of recoilless rifle and rocket fire was directed at the APCs which almost immediately disabled 5 of the 9 vehicles in the perimeter. A ground assault was initiated by the enemy immediately following the initial volley. The main attack

came from the high ground to the SW. Automatic, S/A, and AT fire came from the SE, NE, and NW. The ground assault continued against the dismounted survivors of Company A who had set up a small perimeter NE of the burning vehicles.

- (e) C/1-50th and B(-) 1/69 were sent into the contact area at 1212 hours. Co C arrived moments before the enemy appeared set to overrun the small perimeter and successfully thwarted the enemy attack long enough to evacuate the survivors to the east. The tanks from B(-) 1/69 were in contact well before they reached the initial area of contact and had to fight their way through the enemy to where A and C 1/50 were pinned down. Once the forces were joined, contact was broken.
 - (f) B/1-50th was brought into the area to reinforce the units and a counterattack was launched. Fighting was still heavy and spread over an 800 meter front at times. Contact was continued until 1930 hours.
 - (g) A/1-50th was moved back to LZ Uplift and C and B 1/50 with B(-) 1/69 set up on FOB at BR925806. At 0332 hours, 6 May, the FOB site began receiving moderate to heavy S/A fire. At 0350 hours, they reported receiving B40 rockets and several 82mm mortar rounds. Artillery began firing close in defensive fires. At 0445 hours, the attack ceased.
 - (h) Total casualties for the contact were 22 US KIA, 93 US WHA. Equipment losses were 5 M113A1 destroyed, 1 UH1C gunship destroyed and 3 helicopters damaged. Enemy losses were 117 KIA and 5 RPG-2, 3 AK-47, 2 SKS and several B40 rockets CIA.
 - (i) A chieu Hoi stated that he was a member of the 97th Bn, 2nd VC Regiment, 3rd NVA Division. He further stated that 3 Battalions were involved in the attack against A/1-50th. The other two Battalions involved in the attack were the 7th and 9th Battalions, 22nd NVA Regiment.
- (3) On 061420 May, LZ Uplift received 3 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle fire. At 1921 hours, LZ Uplift received 15-20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 6 US WHA.
- (4) Battle at Trung Hoi (2):
- (a) On 11 May, B and C 1/50 with a platoon from B 1/69 were sent to the southern end of the 506 valley on a S/C mission. Intelligence indicated that the enemy may have moved to that location following the battle of 5 May.
 - (b) At 1344 hours, the elements came under attack with an estimated NVA Battalion vic BR874735. The enemy initiated contact with a ground attack similar to the engagement of

5 May. B and C 1/50 were separated by 600-700 meters when the contact was initiated against both elements. Company C reported that the enemy was probing from all directions. Both companies were brought under fire with S/A, A/W, AT, and 82mm mortars. Company B's position became untenable as enemy assault waves swept into the perimeter from the southwest. All organic and supporting weapons were brought to bear on the assaulting troops. The order was given for Co B's withdrawal toward Co C which was in a delaying position covering the withdrawal. The companies reorganized at BR895719 for Dustoff, resupply, and to link up with the 1/69 reinforcements enroute from LZ Uplift.

- (c) At 1610 hours, the unit moved out on the counterattack. One platoon of tanks had arrived to reinforce. The units advanced without contact to BR878727, where they again came under heavy enemy fire at 1648 hours.
 - (d) At 1830 hours, the companies moved to BR882720 for additional resupply. When resupply was effected, the unit displaced to BR880723 for an FOB location. No further enemy activity followed.
 - (e) It was estimated that this battle cost the enemy over 200 of his men, although only 61 bodies were found. It was apparent the following day that the enemy had policed the contact area extremely well during the night. Friendly losses in the battle were 3 US KHA and 40 US WHA.
- (5) On 130729 May, an APC from C 1/50 hit a pressure detonated mine of unknown size at BR894716, resulting in 1 US WHA and one road wheel destroyed.
- (6) The period following the contact on 11 May until 25 May showed a sharp decrease in enemy activity in the AO. There were instances of units receiving 10-40 rounds of sniper fire, but a large contact was not made with enemy forces.
- (7) Battle at Trinh Van (1):
- (a) Following the contact of 11 May, indications were that the enemy had left the area only temporarily. On 25 May, companies B and C 1/50 moved into the area in which they had had contact on 11 May. At 1106 hours, both companies came under heavy fire from the west, NW, and NE vic BR874728. AT, A/W, S/A and mortars were fired on the friendly position. Unlike the attacks of 5 and 11 May, the enemy did not assault, but instead fought from well fortified, well camouflaged positions. Co B attempted to maneuver and flank the enemy and attack to the northwest, but enemy mortars and rocket fire were too effectively registered in the area.

- (b) Companies B and C moved to BR 883720 to receive required Dustoff and resupply. They were also to be reinforced by the Scout platoon and tanks from A 1/69. When they arrived at that location, they received heavy mortar and rocket fires from the south. The companies then moved to BR891722 while airstrikes were directed into the area. At that location, they secured an LZ, effected Dustoff, and received resupply.
- (c) At 1612 hours, the companies moved out to the west and advanced without incident until they reached the initial area of contact. They then received heavy fire from 3 directions.
- (d) Due to a limited maneuver capability in that area and the fact that darkness was closing in, the companies moved to a location vicinity BR903710 and set up an FOB. Contact was broken at 1905 hours, and no contact was made that night.
- (e) The following morning, the units again swept through the area of contact meeting only little resistance from snipers. No significant enemy activity or engagements followed.
- (8) On 26 May, an APC from B 1/50th hit a 105mm pressure detonated mine vicinity BR876722. The mine blew the roadwheels and track off of one side of the vehicle. Casualties were 6 US WHA.
- d. During the month of June, enemy activity decreased sharply from the activity in May.
- (1) On 020835 June, a platoon from A 1/50 was engaged by an estimated company sized enemy force vicinity BR925797. They engaged the enemy with artillery and organic weapons. Contact was broken at 0915 hours. Results of the contact were 1 US KHA and 3 US WHA. There was no assessment of enemy casualties.
- (2) On 041610 June, A 1/50 found an SKS hidden in a hedge row vicinity BR 976863. A thorough search of the area was made. The company found 2 NVA hiding in a tunnel. The NVA threw a grenade out of the tunnel but it rolled back in, killing them both. Resulting casualties were 2 NVA KIA.
- (3) Between 4 June and 16 June there was little enemy activity in the AO. This period was characterized by sniper incidents along highway 1 and in the area the units of the 1/50 operated. No large contact was made with the enemy during this time. One US WHA was received during the period due to sniper fire. No assessment of enemy casualties was made following the sniping incidents.
- (4) On 16 June, C 1/69 had two tanks hit mines to the north and northeast of the Nui Mieu mountains vicinity BR 995802 and CR 005820. Both tanks were moved to the first location and were secured by an element from the Scout Platoon. Co A 1/50 then moved into the area to secure the vehicles when it became

apparent that they could not be removed that evening. At 1940 hours, A 1/50 reported receiving SA, AW, B40 and 82mm mortar rounds from the south. Artillery and gunships were called into the area and Spooky was brought on station at 2030 hours. There were no friendly casualties and negative enemy casualties.

- (5) On 171550 June, a VTR from 1/50 hit a 155mm and 8 inch artillery mine, pressure detonated vic BR 905724. Two road wheels and a track were blown from the VTR. Casualties were 2 US WHA.
 - (6) On 212050 June, a platoon of C 1/50 spotted a VC meeting of 30-40 individuals with weapons vic BR 920166. The VC opened fire with M-60's, AK-47's, and small arms fire. The platoon began adjusting artillery and 81mm fire into the area. Contact was broken at 2115 hours. There were no friendly casualties, while the VC suffered 1 confirmed KIA. There was negative assessment on the damage done by the artillery.
 - (7) On 250603 June, a platoon from A 1/50 engaged VC vic BR 982792. One VC was KIA and 2 were WIA.
 - (8) The lack of enemy activity during most of June supported the intelligence reports that battalion had received during the month of June. These reports indicated that the NVA were moving to the north and west either for resupply and recuperation or were moving into new AO's entirely.
- e. During the month of July, two major joint operations were conducted in the Soui Ca Valley. The first operation began 3 July.
- (1) On 5 July, B 1/50 engaged 4 armed individuals at BR 826605 with SA and 81mm mortar. Results are unknown. Late in the day, Co B engaged 7 individuals at BR 837591 with 81mm mortars and artillery. There was no assessment of enemy casualties.
 - (2) On 10 July, a man from B 1/50 stepped on an unidentified type bobytrap at BR 828596. Casualties were 1 US KHA and 1 US WHA.
 - (3) On 11 July, Co A 1/50 operating back in the Crescent area captured 1 NVA at BR 934851. POW had been wounded in the ankle in an earlier incident.
 - (4) On 12 July, A 1/50 at BR 937868 made contact with an undetermined size enemy force resulting in 2 US WHA. Medevac was called and received fire from BR 932849 wounding the pilot and causing minor damage to the aircraft. The mission was completed without further incident.
 - (5) On 13 July, 2 men from A 1/50 were KHA as a result of a pressure detonated mine.
 - (6) On 17 July, A 1/50 had one APC damaged by a mine at BR 930838. Casualties were 4 US WHA, 1 ARVN KHA, 4 ARVN WHA.

- (7) On 19 July, A 1/50 engaged and killed 2 VC/NVA trying to break through a cordon vic BR 947824.
- (8) On 20 July, B 1/50 captured 1 VC near the coast at CR 003006, an M-26 was thrown into the tunnel resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 set of web gear CIA. Document found indicates that he may have been a platoon leader.
- (9) On 21 July, B 1/50 captured 1 VC near the coast at CR 003803.
- (10) On 22 July, B 1/50 observed 1 individual run into a tunnel at CR 003806, an M-26 was thrown into the tunnel resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 set of web gear CIA. Document found indicates that he may have been a platoon leader.
- (11) On 25 July, the second major joint operation in the Soui Ca Valley with the 41st AKVN was begun. C 1/50 while traveling into the Soui Ca from highway 1 sighted 3 NVA evading the company to the south vic BR 825576. The company captured two of the NVA, 1 B40 rocket launcher and 1 AK-47.
- (12) At 260330 July, the 1/50 CP at FSB Catskill (BR 814598) received 12 to 15 rounds of B40 fire, 8-10 rounds of mortar, and a heavy volume of SA and AW fire from the north. Fire was returned with organic weapons and artillery. Contact was broken at 0340 hours. Friendly losses were 4 US WHA, 1 APC moderately damaged, and 1 APC with extensive damage to the suspension system.
- (13) At 272220 July, an LP from C 1/50 observed 3 individuals walking past the perimeter with weapons and engaged with small arms. 1 NVA was KIA and 1 B40 rocket launcher was CIA. At 280210 July, FSB Catskill received 6-8 mortar rounds and SA fire from the west. Counter mortar fire was returned with unknown results. Contact ended at 0215 hours. Friendly losses were 1 US KHA and 3 US WHA.
- (14) On 31 July, B 1/50 located a large natural cave complex at BR 748646. In the complex the company found \$150,000 in US currency and 935,000 piasters, 1 ton of rice, 1 35mm kit round, and 200 pounds of documents. The rice was destroyed and all of the captured material was extracted.
- (15) The Scout platoon killed 1 NVA with webbed gear at 311125 July, vic BR 782608. Another body was found at BR 812604. A B40 rocket launcher was recovered with 3 B40 rockets.
- f. From 1 August to 17 August, enemy activity was again at a minimum. The 1/50 completed the joint operation in the Soui Ca Valley and prepared to move to AO Walker.
- (1) On 1 August, B 1/50 at BR 748646 found 1 typewriter, 1 Russian

SMG, 1 75mm recoilless rifle round and 40 pounds of documents. Also on 1 August, B 1/50 found the body of another NVA soldier at BR 747640.

- (2) At 030039 August, A 1/50 observed movement to their front and engaged. 1 VC fell but was seen being dragged off by two other individuals.
- (3) On 7 August, one APC from C 1/50 hit a mine vic BR 824577 resulting in 3 US WHA.
- (4) On 9 August, gunship engaged 1 individual with AW fire at FSB Catskill. VC was WIA CIA.
- (5) It was on 9 August that the 1/50 completed its operations in the Soui Ca Valley and returned to LZ Uplift. From 9 August to 17 August the Battalion prepared for, and completed the move to An Khe and AO WALKER.

14. Combat Services Logistic and Administration:

- a. Personnel. Battalion personnel administration, management, and actions were handled for the reporting period with little problem at the Battalion Headquarters at Landing Zone Uplift. Telephone communications with the Brigade Adjutant General section expedited all personnel action. Unit strength fluctuated with action against the enemy. The month of May presented the largest strength problem in that a large number of personnel were lost as battle casualties. However, replacement flow returned the unit to standard operating strength within 3 weeks of the first large losses. All personnel records were maintained at the Brigade rear area in Camp Radcliff.
- b. Maintenance. Maintenance procedures were performed during the reporting period with emphasis on keeping the maximum of equipment operational at all times. As a result, approximately 90 percent of all combat vehicles were operating in the field. Problems experienced were lack of repair parts and the necessity of performing 3rd echelon maintenance in order to keep equipment operational. For example, the Battalion maintenance section changed numerous M113A1 engines and transmissions during the reporting period. There was little difficulty in performing many recovery and 2nd echelon maintenance tasks in the field with the rifle companies.
- c. Medical. During the reporting period the Battalion Aid Station treated all casualties, regardless of unit, from the operational area and all routine sick calls from this unit. This mission required that the aid station act in the capacity of a clearing station, a mission that it was not fully equipped to perform. However, support from an ambulance platoon of the 55th Medical Group expedited treatment and flow of all casualties. A notable need at the aid station was a blood facility to treat serious battle casualties. This was requested but never obtained.

d. Casualties - Friendly:

	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>August (18)</u>		<u>Total</u>
KIA	5	18	1	5	0	-	29
WHA	26	160	5	29	8	-	228
MHA	0	2	0	0	0	-	2

e. Casualties - Enemy:

	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>August (18)</u>		<u>Total</u>
KIA (BC)	13	207	5	5	3	-	233
WIA						-	
POW	0	1	0	4	4	-	9
					(1 returnee)	-	1
Captured:							
SA		5	1	3	2	-	11
C/S		9	0	1	1	-	11

f. Logistics.

- (1) Class I: Considered satisfactory.
- (2) Class II & IV: At times PSP was not available, patches for air mattresses were not available at times. Supply of other II & IV items were considered satisfactory.
- (3) Class III: No problems were incurred in the Class III supply.
- (4) Class V: Aside from the restrictions incurred by the ASR, the only other problem related to Class V was the use of the 4.2 inch VT fuses and the high dud rate which was subsequently corrected by a class given by the 3rd Bn 319th Arty.
- (5) Resupply of the units of the Battalion was conducted by organic trucks and helicopters. The breakdown of the helicopter resupply missions are as follows:
 - (a) Normal Resupply:
 1. Ammunition: 75 sorties.
 2. Class I and Water: 149 sorties.
 3. Personnel: 40 sorties.
 4. Fuel: 24 sorties.
 - (b) Emergency Resupply: Ammunition resupply: 7 sorties.
 - (c) Backlog: 87 sorties.
- (6) Normal resupply was affected through the Battalion's Admin/

Log Net whereas emergency resupply was effected through the Command Net.

- (7) In addition to maintaining the basic load of ammunition on hand, the battalion also maintained on hand materials to construct a fire support base. These items were prepared for sling-load and consisted of the following:
- (a) 7 bales of concertina wire.
 - (b) 20 bundles of 6 ft engineer stakes.
 - (c) 30,000 sandbags.
 - (d) PSP and/or timber for support of overhead cover.
- (8) It has been the experience of this unit during combat assaults to carry the following supplies and equipment as a basic combat load:
- (a) Knucksack (essential for sustained operation).
 - (b) 4 quarts of water (2 quart canteen being most desirable).
 - (c) Poncho.
 - (d) Poncho liner.
 - (e) Air mattress.
 - (f) 10 sandbags per individual.
 - (g) 1 D-handled shovel per squad.
 - (h) 1 entrenching tool per two men.
 - (i) 3 days supply of malaria tablets by medics.
 - (j) Iodine tablets (at least one bottle per squad).
 - (k) 2 to 3 pairs of socks per individual.
 - (l) 2 to 3 batteries for PRC-25 radio.
 - (m) 1 cleaning kit per 2 like weapons.
 - (n) 2 days supply of rations (2/3 C rations and 1/3 LRP rations).
 - (o) Individual weapons.
 - (p) 2 M-60 machine guns per platoon.
 - (q) At least 20 magazines for each M-16 rifle.

- (r) Additional 400 rounds 5.56mm ammunition in rucksack.
- (s) 200 rounds 7.62mm linked ammunition per individual except M-79 gunners and RTO's. M-60 gunner should carry at least 1000 rounds.
- (t) M-79 gunners carry from 30 to 40 rounds each.
- (u) 1 smoke round per individual.
- (v) 4 smoke rounds per RTO.
- (w) 4 smoke rounds per Platoon Leader.
- (x) 1 flashlight per squad.
- (y) 4 M-26 fragmentation grenades per individual.
- (z) 1 claymore per 2 men.
- (aa) 1 trip flare per man.

15. Special Equipment and Techniques:

APC's were used in most of our operations, and gave the Battalion an added degree of mobility and fire power. However, the APC does not negate the need for ground security. These vehicles are an effective tool on the battlefield when employed properly; they become a liability however, when employed as a fighting vehicle and when troops and commanders lean on them for security. Exploit the APC's mobility, firepower and communication but avoid using it as a tank.

Bobby G Davis
 BOBBY G DAVIS
 MAJ, Infantry
 S-3

1 Incl - Lessons Learned

LESSONS LEARNED

Item: Security at a halt.

Discussion: Leaders are at times reluctant about placing security elements away from the main unit when stopping for short periods of time. It is extremely important that leaders clear any area that they plan to stop in no matter what the duration of the halt may be. On 5 May, a company from this battalion, stopped to eat without sending out clearing patrols, a local security in the form of OPs. The company was attacked shortly after they stopped and lost 5 APCs in the first few minutes of battle. This cost the unit over half of its mobility and fire power.

Observation: All personnel in leadership positions should be made aware of the absolute necessity of providing security for any size element anytime it becomes necessary to stop. Clearing patrols should be sent out around the location and outposts must be posted in all cases. This subject should be covered, with examples in all combat training programs for personnel due to come to or presently in the Republic of Vietnam.

Item: Establishing a Fire Support Base (FSB).

Discussion: During operations in July and August this organization undertook the mission of establishing a FSB in order to provide artillery support for units operating in the Vinh Than Mountains. Because the 1st Bn (M), 50th Infantry did not have an experience factor to aid in the planning and execution of this task, priority tasks was often overloaded and less important functions were performed.

Observation: Each unit should prepare an SOP assigning priorities so that progress in building a FSB can move from critical to less critical tasks capitalizing on continuity of effort.

Bobby O. Davis
BOBBY O. DAVIS
MAJ, Infantry
S3

Incl 1