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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED), 50TH INFANTRY
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96250

29 May 1968

SUBJECT: After-Action Report - The Battle of An Bao

1. (U) Operation: Cochise
2. (U) Period Covered: 5-7 May 1968
3. (U) Location: My Loc (V), Phu My District, Binh Dinh Province, RVN.
4. (U) Command HQ: 1st Bn (M), 50th Inf, 173d Airborne Brigade.
5. (U) Reporting Officer: Captain Richard P Guthrie, 1st Bn (M), 50th Inf
6. (C) Task Organization: Co A (-), B, C, 1/50 Inf, Co B, 1/69 Tank Battalion.
7. (C) Supporting Forces:
C Btry, 7/13 Artillery
B Btry, 7/15 Artillery
FAC Det, 173d Abn Bde
Avn Section, 173d Abn Bde
8. Intelligence:
 - a. For several days prior to 5 May, our own sources and those of neighboring friendly units indicated the presence of an enemy unit somewhere in the Southwestern Crescent foothills. On 4 May, the reports stated that a unit (Regimental CP and Arty Bn, designation unknown), was located vicinity coordinates BR895784.
 - b. Further local enemy activity took place in the form of a very unsuccessful probe on LZ Ollie on the night of 4 May. A composite platoon of tanks and APC's positioned at Ollie after dark quickly sent the would-be attackers on their way.
9. Mission: Co A (-) conducts reconnaissance in Force vicinity BR895783.
10. Concept of Operations: Co A minus 1 platoon securing LZ Uplift moves north on highway QL 1, turning west at LZ Ichiban and proceeds to target area.
11. Execution:
 - a. General: Co A (-) and Co D had been conducting this sort of mission

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 Authority UND 87354
 By T NARA Date 5/8/99

CONFIDENTIAL

29 May 1968

SUBJECT: After-Action Report - The Battle of An Bao

for several days with no significant findings. On 5 May 1968, 9 APC's and 50 personnel proceeded on the assigned mission, departing LZ Uplift at 0748 hours.

- b. Nothing significant was sighted as the unit proceeded toward the objective area until they arrived in the vicinity BR906795. At that location, the lead elements discovered several fresh spider holes and a pair of black pajamas which apparently had been hung on a hedgerow to dry. The terrain at this location is generally open and rolling with a ridge line to the south; the fingers of the ridge are covered with dense scrub brush; the low land between the fingers is cultivated rice paddy.
- c. At 1002 hours, LT Dennis E Hinton reported that his unit had seen approximately 15 males in black pajamas moving rapidly away from the Co A axis of advance. (See Sketch 1, point 1. The sighting was to the west of the company (-) position. He immediately called for artillery reconnaissance by fire and fired direct fire with his track mounted M-60 and Cal .50 machine guns. As Co A (-) advanced toward the location of the sighting, the elements continued to fire small arms and 60mm mortar. A thorough search was made of the area which revealed two NVA packs near some holes. The company (-) pulled into a defensive perimeter, sent out one OP, and secured the area for the noon meal. (See Diagram A).
- d. Contact was initiated by the enemy at 1144 hours by directing a volley of 57 recoilless fires at and into the perimeter which almost immediately disabled 5 of the 9 APC's. These fires evidently signaled the launching of a ground assault, with the main effort coming from the high ground SW of the burning vehicles. Automatic, small arms and anti-tank weapons fire began pouring in on Co A (-) from the SE, Northeast and Northwest. Returning fire in the greatest volume possible, LT Hinton requested reinforcement, gunships and tactical air strikes. The Artillery FO's radio was destroyed by the initial volley of fire and no one on the ground had communications with the supporting artillery battalions. LT Hinton's last command before he was mortally wounded was "Get the hell out of here ASAP." Those personnel in APC's which were still operational attempted to pick up those who were fighting dismounted. Because of the confusion and heavy volume of incoming anti-tank fires, a complete pickup was not effected and the mounted elements withdrew from the area as ordered. (See Sketch 1). The highest ranking individual in the mounted element was a Sergeant E-5. As this element arrived at RT 1, the personnel hailed wheeled vehicles travelling on the highway and effected medical evacuation to LZ Uplift of the more seriously wounded, then returned to LZ Uplift.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority UND 87354
 By T NARA Date 5/21/99

CONFIDENTIAL

29 May 1968

SUBJECT: After-Action Report - The Battle of An Bao

The majority of these personnel had been wounded. The flame thrower track with this element had expended its load, then took a direct hit and was on fire with the gunner laying unconscious inside the vehicle. This track burned for several hours after it departed the area of contact.

- e. The dismounted survivors of Co A (-) in the contact area numbered approximately 15. They were rapidly organized by LT Frank W Webb in a small perimeter to the Northeast of the burning vehicles. (See Sketch 1). The terraced paddies afforded some protection from the main enemy attack, but left their rear exposed. LT Webb moved among the survivors consolidating the position, redistributing ammunition and asking for help over the one remaining radio. Sniper fires from the unprotected Northeastern portion of LT Webb's position took a heavy toll, and LT Webb was killed by small arms fire as he moved from position to position.
- f. Co C was located at LZ Uplift and had been performing maintenance for several hours when the violent contact was initiated. CPT Jay C Copley was alerted and moved from LZ Uplift at 1212 hours. The briefing which CPT Copley received was extremely vague because of the lack of information from the ground troops. CPT Copley was instructed to follow the tracks made by Co A and to move west towards the smoke.
- g. Co B, 1/69 Armor (-), also performing maintenance at LZ Uplift, was alerted at the same time as Co C (-) 1/50 Inf and was instructed to move to the contact area to assist in the relief of Co A (-) 1/50. Co B (-) 1/69 Armor departed LZ Uplift at 1221 hours. CPT Timothy Grogan CO, Co B, 1/69 Armor was instructed to move North on QL 1 to LZ Ichiban, then turn Northwest and then West into the contact area. CPT Grogan did not know the location of LZ Ichiban and was not certain of the turn off point to the contact area. Consequently, his element overshot the turnoff and turned West from the highway approximately 1500 meters north of the desired location. (See Sketch #2). One tank became mired in a stream crossing; another was left to secure it and the remainder of the Company (-), numbering 5 tanks, moved back to the South and entered the paddy on the axis shown in Sketch #2.
- h. CPT Grogan's mired tank reported a mass exodus of civilians immediately after the company (-) left. Co B (-) 1/69 Armor advanced toward the contact area and began receiving small arms fire less than half-way to the location where LT Webb's perimeter was being systematically eliminated. CPT Grogan requested clearance to return the fires, which was granted, silenced the resistance, and continued towards

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 Authority VND 87354
 By T NARA Date 5/26/99

CONFIDENTIAL

29 May 1968

SUBJECT: After-Action Report - The Battle of An Bao

the pillar of rising smoke.

- i. Co C (-), 1/50 arrived at the location of the dismounted survivors only seconds before the enemy launched his final assault. Rapidly and effectively Co C formed a protective ring around the men, loaded up the wounded and evacuated them to the West. The timely relief cost Co C (-) dearly. Captain Copley, the CO, was among the 30 wounded from Co C (-) as the enemy fires rained in from both sides of his relief force. Meanwhile, Co B (-) 1/69 Armor continued to advance toward increasing resistance. Taking 9 casualties, the tankers fought in to join the Co C perimeter and together regrouped in a position where resupply and Dustoff were effected, and preparation for a counterattack were completed.
- j. At 1230 hours, CO, 1/50th Inf requested the release of Co B 1/50 which had been securing LZ English. Permission was granted, and Co B, 1/50th with 1 platoon from Co B 1/69 Armor arrived at LZ Ichiban at 1501 hours. The first mission of Co B was to assist in the extraction of the 2 mired tracks which Co B 1/69th Armor had left behind and had since come under an anti-tank and small arms attack. Co B detached one platoon to accomplish this mission and proceeded to the location where Co B 1/69th Armor and Co C (-) 1/50th were effecting resupply and preparing for the counter-attack. (See Sketch #2).
- k. At 1700 hours, Co B (-) 1/69th Armor, and Co B (-) 1/50th and Co C (-) 1/50th moved out in the counterattack. Air strikes adjusted by Captain Grogan had been applied continuously for several hours and were still arriving on station. Artillery engaged known enemy targets each time there was a slight lull in the bombing and strafing. The counterattack proceeded up to the position indicated on the sketch #2 where the infantry began taking excessive casualties from fires coming both from the East and West of their axis of advance. (See Sketch #2). The units drew back towards a night logger position for additional resupply. Before they reached the proposed location, 2 tanks became mired in the rice paddy which had been dry and hard only a short time before. Apparently, someone flooded the paddy deliberately or the bombs destroyed a dike, allowing the paddy to be flooded. In either case, the trafficability of the paddy was reduced significantly in two hours time.
- l. By the time the elements had secured a coil for resupply, it was nearly dark. At this point, the Chinook pilot at LZ Uplift refused to fly to the logger position, stating that the area was not secure

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority UND 87354
 By T NARA Date 5/10/99

CONFIDENTIAL

29 May 1968

SUBJECT: After-Action Report - The Battle of An Bao

and that he had to check through his chain of command before flying the resupply. After 30 minutes of communications, the pilot consented to fly, then again refused. At approximately 1900 hours, the decision was made to move the companies to LZ Salem for resupply, where the pilot consented to fly. Ammunition for the tanks and carriers was critically short. There was an immediate need for all types of ammunition. The duty officer, 173d Abn Brigade was notified of this battalion's intention to move to LZ Salem. Five sorties of CH-47 were flown to LZ Salem where the resupply stocks were secured.

- m. When there was one sortie remaining to be flown, S-3, 173d Brigade informed the Battalion that the elements would not withdraw as far back as LZ Salem, but would remain in their position. Some adjustment was made and the resupply aircraft were informed of the new landing zone location. On that note, both CH-47's departed station. One CH-47 returned to LZ Uplift at 2400 hours and flew the required resupply.
- n. At the logger site, personnel were still breaking down ammunition at 0330 hours when an enemy attack was initiated. (Sketch 3). Small arms, anti-tank and indirect weapons fire rained in from four directions. Reaction was instantaneous and fire superiority was gained within a minute. A ground attack coming from the Northwest was eliminated by small arms and tank cannister ammunition. At least 200 anti-tank and mortar rounds were fired at the logger position causing 3 KIA and 18 WIA. A stack of undistributed ammunition took a direct hit, burned and exploded for several hours. This contact was broken at approximately 0500 hours.
- o. The elements in the contact area were assigned the mission of again sweeping through the contact area, which they did for 2 days with no significant findings other than enemy dead. One NVA Chieu Hoi to Co B 1/50 at 0630 hours 7 May.
- p. The following is a breakdown of friendly and enemy losses (body count) for the contact:

	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>HC 1/50</u>	<u>Co A 1/50</u>	<u>Co B 1/50</u>	<u>Co G 1/50</u>	<u>Co B 1/69</u>
KIA	117		11	3	2	2
WIA			26	26	30	9
CIA	1					
S/A	6	4	32		4	
C/S Wpns	7	2	17			
APC		1	4			

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Authority	UND 87354
By	U NARA Date 5/10/99

CONFIDENTIAL

29 May 1968

SUBJECT: After-Action Report - The Battle of An Bao

12. ~~Conclusions~~

Interrogation of 1 Hoai Chanh revealed that 3 enemy battalions were located in a U-shaped ambush with the mission of destroying the battalion APC's. Five APC's were destroyed. Although there is no conclusive evidence, it is felt that the enemy allowed intelligence leaks concerning his location, to draw our elements into his prepared positions. That Co A (-) paused for a noon meal where it did was probably a fortunate turn of events. The main attack required the enemy to leave his prepared positions in order to assault the APC. The low readiness posture of Co A allowed the initial enemy attack to gain and maintain fire superiority. The supporting arms could not be brought to bear on the enemy for lack of radio communications.

13. Reporting Officer's Analysis:

- a. The Battle of An Bao marks the first time that a unit of this organization has been rendered combat ineffective. Had a reconnaissance element for Co A been utilized as it moved out on its assigned mission, events might have unfolded differently. Fifty personnel, distributed in 9 APC's is too small a force to maintain the fire power on the tracks and provide dismounted security. It is also felt to be significant that all but one of the relief units arrived on the scene in a reduced strength posture. Static security and other commitments allowed only Co B 1/50 to arrive intact. All others involved were minus at least one platoon.
- b. Resupply became a minor problem several times because of lack of transportation. Tank and mechanized units in contact expend ammunition in quantities which were beyond the expected levels. An experience factor has now been obtained and perhaps future resupply requirements will be better anticipated. Approximately 15 CH-47 sorties were required to support an effective force of 7 mechanized and 2 tank platoons.
- c. Perhaps the most outstanding support received during this contact was the MAC air support. The MAC aircraft remained on station constantly and airstrikes were nearly continuous. It is impossible to accurately measure their overall effect, but there can be no doubt that it was extremely significant.

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29 May 1968


SUBJECT: After-Action Report - The Battle of An Bao

Richard P Guthrie

RICHARD P GUTHRIE
CPT, Infantry
S-3 Air

- Incl:
- 1 - Lessons Learned Report
- 2 - Diagram
- 3 - Sketch 1
- 4 - Sketch 2
- 5 - Sketch 3

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Lessons Learned Report - Battle of An Bao 5 May 1968

1. Maximum use of all available fire support to include organic, supporting artillery and air should be used constantly. Air strikes and/or artillery should be used any time a body of 15 are actually seen, providing that support is available.
2. Visual Reconnaissance from the air is best effected by helicopters. Fixed wing aircraft do not provide effective V.R. 2 LOH might be held for the purpose of flying V.R. on request. The techniques should be tried.
3. We should train ourselves to show the restraint, self discipline, and patience which our enemies show. Precipitous actions cause casualties. Think, plan, and coordinate. Then, react deliberately.
4. Security elements should be dismounted from tracks during movement where visibility is limited. Each track should provide security at a meal halt; meals eaten on staggered time schedule. This is more time consuming, but much more secure.
5. When all weapons on ACAV APC are firing, it is extremely difficult to accurately fix the enemy fires. Tracks should regulate and alternate weapon fires. Additional training is needed in this area, for mechanized troops operating alone and when operating with tanks.
6. More deliberate actions should be conducted with tank forces so that the troops can learn the capabilities and limitations of each arm.
7. There were several examples of relatively low readiness posture. Local security is the implicit responsibility of all leaders. Apparently they have not been properly trained in this one area.
8. SUMMARY: No glaring errors in this contact are apparent, but the number of small errors was great:
 - a. Security was posted, but was inadequate.
 - b. Artillery reconnaissance by fire was conducted, but not fully exploited. Artillery was not effective once contact was made. When contact was made the Artillery F.O. apparently lost and never regained contact with the firing batteries.
 - c. Co C 1/50 was hurried to contact, arrived just in time, but was not briefed well enough to be able to assume a proper formation or react properly once contact was made.
 - d. There were many examples of hasty reaction to underdeveloped situations.


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Authority UND 87354
By T NARA Date 5/21/99

DIAGRAM

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


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SKETCH #1




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By T NARA Date 5/10/99

SKETCH #2

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


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
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By T NARA Date 5/21/99

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SKETCH #3




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DAILY LOG FOR 1-30TH (M) INFANTRY ON 5 MAY 1968


Concept of Operation: A Co - Remain at UPLIFT to perform maint. QRF, etc vic BR 595783.
 B Co - N/C OPCON Bde.
 C Co - Move to UPLIFT
 D Co - Bridge sety and Bong Song Br.
 B 1/69 - Move to UPLIFT

- 0150 Have received 06 rds of mortar fire, neg casualties at this time. Try to put Arty in on the suspected location.
- 0155 Areas such as Pleiku and Kontum are receiving mortar attack at this time.
- 0201 Have 3 WIA not serious. Require that you have all E/E on 100% alert and turn in SITREP every 15 min.
- 0232 We are on 50% alert firing counter mortar plans now your 3 or 6 will have to decide as to alert status down there (stay on 50% alert).
- 0240 Hearing fire (A/W) to our W possibly Pony or Orange fire the last 10 min.
- 0315 Rec'd heavy A/W from South neg casualties returned fire with dusters, tanks and APC.
- 0319 Contact broken at 0318.
- 0323 Observed 1 squad VC/NVA run across open ground to our front (South) engaged with A/W, SA and organics, neg assessment also rec'd 2 B-40 rocket rds short of perimeter, no casualties.
- 0325 E/E report that they saw 2 streaks of flame from flame thrower (could be trails of B-40 rockets).
- 0449 Rec'd 2-3 rounds mortar fire 6 rds B-40 rocket fire, fire was directed at one of the tanks. 2-3 bursts from a flame thrower, A/W fire M-79 fire, fire came from approx 100 meters S+SW of perimeter, est 1 squad size NVA force was seen evading to SE, engaged with dusters, APC, A/W, organics and canister rd of tanks.
- 0620 Found 30 ft behind one of the tanks 1 RPG-70 unexploded round, SEADOG 23 has req EOD Team already.
- 0630 Moving out to check the contact area.
- 0650 Req to move out and perform my mission dismounted, Roger go ahead and dismounted.
- 0700 Moving into UPLIFT now.
- 0705 SGM and Pine Sheiks EM moving to LZ "V".
- 0708 Searched around LZ OLLIE, found 1 B-40 rocket inside perimeter, 1 B-40 in position. Have 4 Detainees. One is a boy who says he knows what happened. 1 one man and 2 old women.



DAILY LOG FOR 1-50TH (M) INFANTRY ON 5 MAY 1968 CONT'D

- 0718 Am about 10 min out of your location at this time would like someone to meet us when we come in to take the detainees off our hands.
- 0732 Req of 1st Squash was given in clear to Dustoff 60 to FAC. Pickup. SB "N" EL has moved out at this time.
- 0738 Have closed LZ UPLIFT at this time. Have dropped off the 4 detainees and B-40 rounds.
- 0743 Report that Bridge 372 vic 924827, known as Bailey Bridge has been blown. 11 RVN WIA and 3 RVN KIA.
- 0747 Report 18 NVA KIA, bodies at Bridge 372.
- 0748 Am moving out at this time.
- 0803 Would like to know if there is a LRRP Team working in our area.
- 0807 Friendly working in your area. Winston Skits 1B his push 35.20 (from M,D 14.80) coordinate with him as to respective location.
- 0812 Location of "SP" EL. From 93 1 2.6 oo.9 884999.
- 0817 Now on Money (Hyl).
- 0823 Request POL truck with MD gas to aid one of our tanks.
- 0839 Request your present location. From 113 R 8.5 D 4.8 905792 .
- 0910 Having trouble coordinating with Winston Skits 1 Bravo.
- 0913 Request VR at co-ords 905794. Have spotted 1.
- 0914 Request to know location of Winston Skits 1 B.
- 0928 Winston Skits 1 B was not inserted to the west of the S B "A" EL. To S A 5 present loc from 93 L 2.7 V 0.3 883953. Have found 1 manned position, probably an OP, freshly dug.
- 0936 Handeye observation in the village due west of my location a village with new bunkers and quite a few people. Req permission to move 500-600 meters west and checkout.
- 0940 Permission granted.
- 0941 Squash Gulf taking 1 VC Co under fire at 910715.
- 1002 Enemy location 903788. They are moving west over the ridge to the high ground.
- 1017 Am presently Airborne going to vicinity of SA on a V/R will be gone for 05 to 10 min.
- 1019 Spot Report: At approx 0915 at Bridge 375.1, co-ord 897865, EL of B 84 Engr rec'd




DAILY LOG FOR 1-50TH (M) INFANTRY ON 5 MAY 1968 CONT'D

- 250 rounds of auto wps fire from two wps, from each side of the road. Took 2 flat tires and a round in the block, neg casualties, returned fire with M-16, M-79 and M-60.
- 1044 In grid 89799079 the lead aircraft had problems and dropped 3 duds. Center of mass 858804 with a 300 meter radius .
- 1047 SP NK EL closing my location in about 10 min.
- 1101 Leaving UPLIFT at this time for LZ OLLIE.
- 1102 Request your present location from 111 R 8.3 D 4.5.
- 1117 Have found 2 NVA packs, couple documents, fresh diggings, entrenching tools, am breaking for chow.
- 1118 Closed OLLIE.
- 1144 Received one round recoilless rifle.
- 1145 Request MEDEVAC, just had one APC hit.
- 1146 Receiving fire from 360°.
- 1150 Notify "C" to get cranked up and B 1/69th.
- 1205 Spotted 4 APC burning.
- 1206 Gunships and A/S on the way.
- 1208 We are surrounded, they are closing in on us.
- 1209 Gunships on station (88-12).
- 1212 A/S & C Co & PS EL in route to A Co contact area, loc 895795.
- 1213 Their will be no extraction while their is contact.
- 1215 Took some hits, will make one more run then beam.
- 1221 Moving out at this time (9 tanks).
- 1222 At Ichibon now
- 1242 First A/S OJ out
- 1244 2 more gunships are 10 to 15 min out.
- 1247 Have some of A Co WIA, red heavy fire fm south.
- 1248 Have approx 15 WIA from A Co

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
DAILY LOG FOR 1-50TH (M) INFANTRY ON 5 MAY 1968 CONT'D

- 1251 Rec fire at this time
- 1259 Have a few WIA also.
- 1301 Gooks coming over Miss America towards UPLIFT, unk number.
- 1302 One TC hit with M/G fire believe he is alright.
- 1305 Would like to put A/S in village 1 click to west, saw a lot of enemy run in.
- 1306 Have been hit, C-M will take over.
- 1314 Azimuth 175^o concentration of enemy troops.
- 1316 Receiving very heavy fire, RR & SA fire.
- 1318 We need reinforcements taking heavy casualties.
- 1319 Request reinforcements to east of contact area.
- 1321 Received a lot of B-40 fire to our north, request A/S.
- 1325 Your B Co is assembling now to c/a into contact area.
- 1331 Get 300 rds 90 MM HE ready for C Co.
- 1336 B Co will be coming down to contact area in APCs also another tank EL.
- 1341 Can see RR position, will put in gunships.
- 1342 Need Dustoff badly.
- 1346 Putting in another gunship, last one went down.
- 1348 Rec sniper fire from 300^o.
- 1351 Rec sniper fire from all sides.
- 1356 2 boxes from PS stuck at via RR 925793.
- 1410 Took 4 hits everything OK.
- 1412 Will be moving shortly.
- 1422 Receiving fire, took 10 hits, took rds in blades.
- 1425 Receiving mortar rds 81mm.
- 1426 Have 5 or 6 APC with PG EL in col.
- 1446 A/S at loc 908791.




DAILY LOG FOR 1-50TH (M) INFANTRY ON 5 MAY 1968 CONT'D

- 1510 Chopper went down 800 meters west of SALEM it exploded when it hit 915812.
- 1516 My 2 tanks at BR 924804 are receiving B-40 fire.
- 1519 Go to BR 924804 to assist 2 tanks under fire.
- 1530 Have total of 4 KIA, 30 WIA friendly at this time.
- 1542 Still rec heavy sniper fire.
- 1545 Situation is, we will reorganize & resupply at EL, our B Co will marry up, then sweep to SW to base of Hill.
- 1613 The 2 stuck tanks still rec a lot of A/W fire.
- 1616 My M EL is receiving A/W fire at this time.
- 1621 Bringing in another A/S.
- 1647 Move to UPLIFT when ready.
- 1648 Will send Dusters to UPLIFT.
- 1707 All ELs ready to attack, will prep area first.
- 1710 Putting in another A/S, make sure all Red Leg is turned off.
- 1716 Were moving out at this time so far.
- 1725 So far we have 5 KIA, 43 WIA and 1 MIA friendly at this time.
- 1736 Will be putting A/S in at grid 923801. Have gone into area, have a lot of buildings burning will cont'd assault on other side village to east of 1st contact there are bunkers and hootches burning, are bodies in bunkers but no body count.
- 1810 Have polished up downed chopper.
- 1815 will be back into initial contact area in 15 mins.
- 1817 Arty into BB 915792.
- 1822 Request Dustoff for 2 WIA.
- 1824 Dustoff 60 in 05.
- 1833 Have another man shot in head will put him on Dustoff Bird.
- 1836 Receiving B-40 fire at this time.
- 1840 Pull back and FOB



DAILY LOG FOR 1-50TH (M) INFANTRY ON 5 MAY 1968 CONT'D

- 1847 Move to Ichibon
- 1852 Have a total of 3 WIAs, PS EL has 1 WIA at this time.
- 1853 Dustoff received fire, will pull back to secure area.
- 1858 Send LOG to BR 910802.
- 1906 All Red Leg shut off, will put in another A/S.
- 1917 Received 1 RR rd, no damage & no one hurt.
- 1924 Contact Spooky 33 on A/G push.
- 1925 En route your loc with 5 WIA and 1 KIA.
- 1940 We have a total of 6 KIA, 9 MIA & 50 WIA total as of this time, also 05 APGs .
- 1945 Request you send Spooky to Paragons loc to your SW on codes push.
- 2000 Haven't see fire for 30-50 min we are getting last tank out of mud, then we will move to LA SALEM for resupply.
- 2125 Will receive resupply in your present location.
- 2126 Stay where you are and FOB, dig in and set up good defenses, shoot up hill to your south and surrounding area, be prepared for an attack have a sky spot going in at 2210 at 180° 3 km SW of your ELs.
- 2201 Have one man with broken hand would like to send him in.
- 2218 Need 2000 rds 50 cal & 4 cases of M-79 for the night.
- 2224 You will get 3 sorties of LOG have max security for Bird.



DAILY LOG FOR 1st 50th (M) INFANTRY ON MAY 6

Concept of Operation: A Co - Move into contact area behind B Co and set up blocking position, via 900 799. Move from UPLIFT 0530.

B Co - Move into contact area 0530, obj. 905 795.


S Co - Move with B 1/69.

BM - Move from UPLIFT at 0530 into contact. Block Pos 900 799.

D Co - Continue security of Bong Song BR and bridges 87-94.

B 1/69 - Move into contact area at 0530.

- 0020 Flipper has arrived to haul Log 1st sortie has been lifted out at this time.
- 0050 2nd sortie complete.
- 0052 3rd sortie lifted off.
- 0102 3rd sortie complete also.
- 0332 Receiving incoming Huy S/A fire, calling in Arty now, will keep you informed.
- 0345 Receiving B40 and possible mortar fire with S/A & A/W; request Spooky on station, negative casualties
- Have casualties - no count, have a track hit. Request gunships.
- 0355 Could definitely use A/S in same area as today. Lot of fire coming from tree lines and hedge rows.
- 0402 NVA were trying to crawl into perimeter. They did withdraw. There is more movement around the perimeter and digging in all around at this time. Still requiring B40 and mortar.
- 0405 Moving to NW W from the front. Shift fires to there.
- 0408 Have some WIA. One possibly serious. Total 3.
- 0416 1 track with 10 WIA (B40 twice), 1 tank with 4 WIA (some serious).
- 0420 Have 17 WIA now.
- 0422 Receiving heavy mortar fire again.
- 0435 S/A has stopped. Are receiving mortar fire. Have more casualties from PS E1s.
- 0443 2 KIA, 2 serious WIA, 18 slight WIA, 4 boxes hit.
- 0450 6 WIA serious. 1 tank knocked out.



0451 4 WIA - 2 litter, 2 AMB

0455 Friendly casualties report enemy fire has died down, only sporadic ~~sp~~ now.

0515 Ammo requests: 400 yds 90mm, 10 cases .50 cal, 40,000 rds Co-AI. Will need this before we move out.

0531 Receiving A.W fire again from the north tree lines. Spooky is engaging.

0535 Receiving mortar and B40 rocket fire from south.

0540 Fire has stopped again at this time.

0543 Have 1 more WIA (5 total).

0543 Total 31 WIA, 10 serious.

0548 Spooky will leave station.

0620 Moving out.

0620 At Ichibon now, A/S going in close, will have to hold up.

0630 Am right behind CM.

0645 Have 2 KIA, 7 WIA serious, only 2 man tank crews.

0700 Dustoff have 8 on board, 4 lift - 4 AMB. Info remark - Loc BR 912 800 and BR 910 807, enemy concentrations.

0706 A/S going in at t is time.

0713 Make sure all resupply is along in, no internal.

0720 Have 2 KIA, 3 serious WIA and 10 lightly wounded.

My 2 EL picked up 12 assorted weapons n/w of perimeter.

0740 C-M EL closing FCB

0748 Flipper 82 spotted 30 personnel in black PJ's 200 meters to your south.

0758 VC Loc 910 798, putting in A/S on them.


0816 Put next A/S in at BR 899 798.

0820 Move your EL's out ASAP.

0845 Put next A/S to west.

0849 Leave 1 diamond EL from A Co to secure downed vehicles.

0902 A/S complete, you can put Red 2 EG in now.



0903 Will hike off at approx 0930

0911 Have 2 dusters escort recovery EL at B Co loc.

930 2 EL counted 11 enemy bodies in his area.

0936 Dusters will return to W/LIFT no later than 1500.

1000 VC loc at BR 920 818, 905 818, 895 815, also NVA spread from 920 818 west to 895 818.

1:04 Move out.

1011 Be prepared to assist EL to north if they get contact.

1029 Have 1 flight at 1040 for next A/S.

1055 Found 3 bodies with full field gear, one is booby trapped. No weapons on them.

1100 Found one body, no wps, continuing search to west.

1115 1 friendly MIA slight (Frog), Medvac not required.

1157 Message from Danger '6' - Be careful of enemy bodies being booby trapped.

1213 Have found 8 US KIA, another body just bones, trying for further ID. These were found in the OCP contact area. Also 5 enemy bodies have been found.

1215 Have you found any documents? A few have been found. 3 enemy bodies have been booby trapped. One had a grenade around the neck, 2 others covered with weeds, probably booby trapped.

1216 The M-81 and 2 dusters have just arrived my location.

1220 M-57 has just closed my location.

1224 Request unit locations.

1238 There are 7 US bodies and 2 sets of bones, request bird to bring them in, LZ is secure.


1312 Bring bodies back with you.

1355 Will be S & C ing in area of yesterday's contact.

1404 Weapons that were reported this morning were, 4 B-40 rockets, 2 Lt M/G's, 3 AK-47's and 2 SKS plus 37 bodies.

1421 Found 3 bodies total so far.

1421 Uplift is receiving mortar rounds, approx 5 so far.




- 1426 Counter mortar fore coming crystal.
- 1430 Found 1 B-40 rocket launcher in last nights POF Loc 913 SC2.
- 1442 Mortar rounds coming from Vic BR 920 764.
- Returning to uplift with downed vehicles, will also bring in US bodies.
- 1515 Have found 1 more body (NVA) and 1 AK-47: Total 38 bodies 12 wpns.
- Moving at this time for UPLIFT.
- 1610 ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Have searcher contact in area of last night. Many blood trails and blood on ground. The dead and wounded were dragged down stream bed towards village BR 905806. Believe Bodies are buried in that village. Possible some enemy still in village, will fire redleg in there tonight.
- 1612 Closed UPLIFT.
- 1717 Reference 6 downed APC's: SB 6 feels they are in a condition that they can be salvaged.
- 1736 Request to know if you have enough ammo to fire your main gun. Also, do you have enough ammo to fire continuous H & I all night. (They have enough).
- 1736 Fob Loc BR 894 798.
- 1812 Request you have some Ele check out village 905 805 first thing in the morning.
- 1840 Ask your 3 if he can use a combat sky spot around 2100 hrs.
- 1852 SD 6 wants 116 at his loc at 1930 6 May.
- 1855 Closed Fob 1845.
- 1855 New time for meeting 2000 SD 6 will send his bird down to pick up 116.
- 1915 Uplift is under mortar attack, no details.
- 1917 Have received 1 round inside of perimeter, could be friendly Arty round. (no casualties).
- 1915 All Ele have closed Fob SB-6 SC-6 Pa6 in Fob BR 894 798.
- 1934 Bridge 94 is receiving S/A from ARVN in village (BS 925 220) to north. Just H & I fire but coming close overhead.
- 1940 661 920 Muster Hill Sitrep. Muzzle flashes BR 915 730 engaged with duster. Believed to have neutralized 2 of the 3 tubes. 2 WIA by mortar attack, received approx 15 rounds.
- 1945 2/503 Loc A Co 872 788, B Co 903 828, C Co, 901 763, Ambush 868 794 D Co 872 799

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 Authority UND 87354
 By T NARA Date 5/21/99

D Co OP 868 79.

- 1946 Have 4 more WIA, total 6 Not serious.
- 1957 Believe it was a 105 round.
- 2003 ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ No target for Spooky at this time.
- 2025 Loc of line 4 from 97 W 3.2 R 1.2, AMB 99 W 3.5 R 0.8.
- 2050 A 1/69 Harvick Gallop lala has closed uplift 2015. They are being integrated into base defense.

 1 5 ton radiator and tires and windshield damaged. 1 . ton with windshield damaged. 1 ANVRC 46 radio damaged.
- 2115 Inform 113 and 112 TOT from Sea Dog. Do not fire any 90mm or 50 caliber, only 81mm. Road runner fires up to 1000 meters of Fob, then 1000 meters to east of Fob.
- 2200 D-26 at LZ Geromino is receiving AW fire from the south, am calling in Arty at this time - 30 rounds of fire.
- 2356 They are at the same location I am. Will go over and see what their trouble is.
- 2400 Closed out.



FROM: FDO, 173d Abn Bde


9 May 1968

SUBJECT: Analysis of Air Activity for 1 - 7 May 1968

TO: 173d Abn Bde (S-2) (S-3)

1. There was moderate air activity in the Cochise AO during the first two days of the month. On the 3rd of May, the 2nd Battalion of the 503d Infantry (A & B Companies) came in contact with an estimated VC Company in the vicinity of BS 930050. An immediate air strike was called and the air strike was directed by Tonto 03 (FAC). This airstrike was critical due to the approaching darkness and close proximity of friendly elements. Results: Two secondary explosions, one automatic weapons position was silenced; one large military structure was destroyed. Darkness precluded further assessment. This action was a prelude to the intensive activity that followed on the 5th and 6th of May. Air activity was average on the 4th of May.
2. During the two day period of 5 and 6 May, there were thirty two air strikes flown in support of: A, B and C Company, 1-50th Mech; B Company, 1-69th Armored; B Company, 2-503d and B Company 3-503d. The sixty-two tactical aircraft involved, expended close to eighty tons of ordnance and 17,000 rounds of 20 millimeter cannon.
3. Three Forward Air Controllers directed these air strikes, logging twenty six hours on thirteen flights in the two day period.
4. Analysis of all reports reveals 45 NVA/VC confirmed KBA, with the possibility of an additional 108 KBA and 35 WBA, based on a Chieu Hoi report and other intelligence data. There were 119 military structures destroyed (bunkers, hootches, ect) numerous structures damaged, three secondary explosions, three automatic weapons positions silenced and numerous trails interdicted.
5. Fighter units supporting the operations included the following:
 - a. 6th Air Commando Squadron, Pleiku
 - b. 12th TAC Fighter Wing, Cam Ranh Bay
 - c. 559th TAC Fighter Squadron, Cam Ranh Bay
 - d. 31st TAC Fighter Wing, Tuy Hoa
 - e. 306th TAC Fighter Squadron, Tuy Hoa
 - f. 308th TAC Fighter Squadron, Tuy Hoa
 - g. 37th TAC Fighter Squadron, Phu Cat
 - h. 416th TAC Fighter Squadron, Phu Cat
 - i. 14th Air Commando Squadron, C Flight, Phu Cat
6. Forward Air Controllers who directed the air strikes were:
 - a. Major Alvin L Lewis, Texarkana, Texas
 - b. Major Henry M Donaldson, Chevy Chase MD. and Bainbridge GA.
 - c. Major Wayne A Ferguson, Milton, Oregon

These Forward Air Controllers are attached to the 173d Abn Bde at LZ English. They are under operational control of the Direct Air Support Center at IFFV Hdgs, II Corps (Nha Trang). They are under the direct control of LT COL James A Cook, Air Liaison Officer.
7. The majority of the air strikes were in support of the Brigade, which was in direct contact with the enemy forces. The close proximity of the line of battle made the



direction of air strikes extremely critical. In the final analysis the Forward Air Controller is held responsible for the selection of the target and the delivery of the ordnance on that target.

Henry M Donaldson, Major, USAF
Fighter Duty Officer/Forward Air Controller
173d Airborne Brigade

Copy to: IXC

LEGEND


● ——— KNOWN ENEMY POSITIONS

◇ APC

□ TANK


⊞ THICK VEGETATION

▨ VILLAGE



INCLOSURE 1
APPENDIX C
ANNEX A


Map extracted from unknown Official document, possibly a 69th armor After Action Report.
Map courtesy of Don Spaulding, 1/69th Armor Association Historian.



Unofficial Map courtesy of Don Spaulding, 1/69th Armor Association Historian.

Area where Lt Webb and survivors set up
defensive position (where I was hit)

AN BAO
5 MAY 1968
1/50 breaks for lunch
1122



Unofficial Map courtesy of Bob Bihari, A Company, wounded in Battle of An Bao.