

HISTORY OF
1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED), 50TH INFANTRY
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE


1 JULY - 30 SEPTEMBER 1968

CF
BY

928-03

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UNCLASSIFIED

PREFACE

I. PURPOSE: This report is intended to give all interested personnel and agencies a complete and unbiased record of this Battalion's accomplishments and failures during operations conducted in the Republic of Vietnam from 1 July 1968 through 30 September 1968. It is hoped that the lessons learned and outlined in this report prove to be of assistance to other units in the successful accomplishment of their respective missions.

II. SCOPE: This historical report covers all aspects of the operational and administrative activities conducted during the reporting period. Information for this report was obtained from the files and daily journals of the 1st Bn (M), 50th Infantry.

ANNEXES AND APPENDIX

ANNEX A - Strong Point Locations

ANNEX B - Combat Operations After Action Report: Task Force Schnoor

APPENDIX I - Map: Area of Operations for Task Force Schnoor

ANNEX C - Map: Crescent Area

ANNEX D - Map: Soui Ca Valley

ANNEX E - Map: Eastern Portion Hwy 19 (AO Walker)

ANNEX F - Map: Central Portion Hwy 19 (AO Walker)

ANNEX G - Map: Western Portion Hwy 19 (AO Walker)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED), 50TH INFANTRY
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96250

AVBE-HE

13 October 1968

SUBJECT: Historical Activities Operational Report

Commanding General
173d Abn Bde
ATTN: AVBE-SC/MHD
APO 96250

1. INTRODUCTION

- a. The period immediately preceding the beginning of July saw little activity on the part of the enemy. Engagements were with small units and the majority were not enemy initiated.
- b. The month of July again showed little activity on the part of the enemy infantry. Enemy mining activities did show an increase during the month. The 1st Bn (M), 50th Infantry during this period conducted operations in the Soui Ca Valley, Crescent area and in the Phu My District area (See Annexes C & D).
- c. In early August the 1st Bn (M), 50th Infantry continued operations in the Soui Ca Valley, and Crescent areas in AO COCHISE GREEN. On 17 August the Battalion assumed responsibility of AO WALKER from the 1st Bn (Abn) 503d. The mission of the Battalion became the security of Hwy 19 which runs through the AO, defense of Camp Rad-Cliff, and operations in AO Walker. During the latter part of August, the Battalion experienced an increase in enemy initiated activity. The enemy initiated several actions against bridge sites and convoys along Hwy 19.
- d. In the beginning of September, enemy activity against US forces along Hwy 19 continued.

2. TACTICAL OPERATIONS

- a. The beginning of the reporting period saw extremely limited enemy activity. The 1st Bn (M), 50th Inf was operating along the coast from the southern Nui Mieu Mountains north to the southern portion of the Cay Giap Mountains complex.

- (1) On 3 July the 1st Bn (M), 50th Inf began a joint operation with the 1st Bn 41st Regiment 22nd ARVN Division in the Scout Ca Valley.
- (2) B 1/50 discovered a tunnel 20 ft long at BR837588 on 4 July. They discovered 2 pair NVA boots, 6 60mm chicom fuses, and an M-26 booby trap. The booby trap was destroyed and all articles were extracted.
- (3) On 051245H July, B 1/50 engaged 4 individuals at BR826605 armed with 3 rifles and 1 M-79. They engaged with S/A and 81mm mortar fire with negative assessment of enemy casualties. Again at 2000 hrs that day, B 1/50 engaged 7 individuals at BR837591 with 81mm mortar and artillery fire. No assessment was made of enemy casualties.
- (4) On 100900H July at BR828596, a soldier from B 1/50 hit a mine of unknown type, resulting in 1 US KHA and 1 US WHA.
- (5) On 121655H July A 1/50 captured 1 NVA at BR934851. Individual had been wounded in the ankle. At 1700 hrs they made contact with an undetermined size enemy force at BR932849, resulting in 2 US WHA. No assessment was made of enemy casualties. At 1800 hrs A 1/50 received M-79 fire with no US casualties. They engaged the enemy with 81mm mortar fire with unknown results. Four (4) soldiers from A 1/50 were wounded at 1928 hrs vic BR933853 by a land mine. The mine was in the bottom of a foxhole that was approximately 2 months old.
- (6) On 131932H July, 2 men from A 1/50 were killed by a pressure detonated mine vic BR937862. The mine was suspected to have been a 105 round rigged with a pressure detonating device.
- (7) On 171052H July an APC from A 1/50 returning from a combined cordon and search operation with elements of the 40th ARVN Regt hit a mine vic BR930838. Casualties were 1 ARVN KHA, 4 ARVN WHA and 4 US WHA.
- (8) 2 VC were killed on 190730H July by elements of Co A 1/50. Individuals tried to break through the cordon Co A had placed around the hamlet vic BR952819. Both VC were approximately 20 yrs of age and had no ID cards.
- (9) On 20 July, two mining incidents took place against US forces. As on 17 July a combined operation (cordon and search) with elements of the 40th ARVN Regt and B 1/50 was being conducted. At 0705H a man from B 1/50 stopped on a mine vic BR957771 resulting in 1 US KHA, 2 US WHA and 1 ARVN WHA. At 1441H a man from A 1/50 detonated a booby trap vic BR957757 resulting in 3 US WHA.
- (10) The Scout platoon 1/50, captured 1 VC vic BR020797 who was attempting to evade at 210904H July.

- (11) On 220720H July B 1/50 captured 1 VC and killed an NVA LT who would not come out of a bunker vic BR003808. KIA had a complete set of webbed gear but no weapon. Elements of the 1/50 received sporadic sniper fire throughout the day with negative casualties. At 2355 hrs A 1/50 was placed OPCON to 2/503d and committed north of LZ English.
- (12) On 25 July the 1/50th began operations in the Soui Ca Valley. Co C moved into the valley with a platoon of tanks from 1/69 Armor. They moved to BR814603 where FSB Catskill was to be established. Enroute to that location C 1/50 captured 2 NVA, 1 AK-47, and 1 B-40 rocket launcher vic BR807602.
- (13) On 26 July B 1/50 and A 1/503d (OPCON to 1/50) conducted a C/A vic BR745648. The 1st Bn 41st ARVN Regt also conducted a C/A to the south of the US companies, marking the 1st day of the combined operation. A 1/50 remained OPCON to 1/69 Armor. At 0945 hrs an APC from A 1/50 hit a mine vic BR882736. Friendly casualties were 3 WHA including the company commander.
- (14) On 270300H July, FSB Catskill came under heavy S/A, A/W, and rocket attack resulting in 5 US WHA. 2 APCs were hit with B-40 rockets. One APC suffered extensive damage to its wiring system while the other had extensive road wheel and casing damage. At 1215 hrs a grenade being carried by a man from B 1/50 exploded killing him and wounding 3 others.
- (15) On 28 July, operations continued in the Soui Ca Valley and Oregon Trail area. At 0215 hrs FSB Catskill received 6-8 mortar rounds resulting in 1 US KHA and 3 US WHA. Countermortar targets were fired with undetermined results. A/1-503d found a large bunker complex and cave complex vic BR747647. The cave had a mess hall 20 X 25 ft and a large underground hospital complex. Rucksacks and medical equipment were extracted from the cave complex. The cave complex was made up of large material rock caves going down 6 layers. Some of the rooms found were 60 X 20 X 30 ft.
- (16) On 29 July A/1-503d continued the search of the cave complex while B 1/50 secured the area. At 291905H July Lucky Star 039 crashed after completing a LOG mission to B 1/50 vic BR739642. B 1/50 moved to the downed aircraft and secured it at 2012 hrs. Five (5) personnel were not injured and 1 person was slightly injured. The aircraft was extracted by CH-47 on the morning of 30 July.
- (17) At 1025 hrs 31 July the Scout Platoon engaged 3 individuals vic BR801603 killing one NVA. They also captured documents, flags and webbed gear. At 1005 hrs Co B 1/50 made what was to be the largest and most important cache this Battalion had found since it arrived in Vietnam in September 1967. At BR478646 the lead element of Co B discovered a cave complex. Security was posted and the search of the caves began. The complex was larger *

than the one found 2 days earlier by A/1-503d. At 1600 hrs Co B Company Commander reported that his elements had found \$150,000 in US currency and approximately 550,00 piasters in the cave. An accurate count was made when the money was extracted to LZ English. Co B had found over \$150,000 in \$50 bills and over 935,000 piasters. ~~This remains the largest cache of currency uncovered in the Republic of Vietnam by any unit.~~

- b. The 1st Bn (M), 50th Infantry continued operations in AO COCHISE GREEN from 1 August to 17 August. On 17 August the Battalion moved from LZ Uplift to Camp Radcliff in AO WALKER and assumed the mission of securing Hwy 19 through AO WALKER and conducting operations within the AO.
- (1) On 1 August B 1/50 continued searching the cave complex and the surrounding area. During their search they found a typewriter (Royal 440, SN2911), a Russian MG, 32 Cal, SN8172959, pay documents, medical supplies, and SKS rounds. At 1454 hrs, Lucky Star 310 crashed on Company's B LZ. There were no casualties, but the aircraft was destroyed. At 1525 hrs B/1-503d discovered one dead VC with rifle vic BR947640. The VC had apparently been killed by artillery 2-4 days earlier.
 - (2) On 2 August A/1-503d found an old French 9mm sub-machine gun vic BR955655. B/1-503d discovered a cave complex vic BR752638.
 - (3) At 1116 hrs 3 August elements of the Scout Platoon hit a booby trapped hand grenade vic BR799588. 4 personnel were wounded including the platoon leader. A/1-503d was extracted to LZ English at 1600 hrs.
 - (4) On 6 August B/1-503d found a tunnel complex vic BR762632. During the search of the tunnel, the company found 1 SKS, several rucksacks, medical supplies and documents.
 - (5) B/1-503d found another cave complex on 7 August at BR761635. They found 2 civilian radios and 30 lbs of documents in the entrance of the cave.
 - (6) At 1140 hrs on 8 August an APC hit a mine loc BR842572. There were no injuries but the track sustained serious damage to road wheels and the suspension system. C 1/50 found another US anti-tank mine 10 meters from where the APC hit a mine.
 - (7) ~~On 9 August, FSB Catskill was closed out and all units returned to LZ Uplift and LZ English.~~ The operation had netted large caches of currency, individual weapons, 5 NVA CIA and 4 NVA KIA. The operation in the Soui Ca Valley also served to prove the value of co-locating CPs when conducting joint operations with ARVN forces. At 1620 hours, 1 NVA was captured vic of FSB Catskill.

- (8) The period from 10 August through 15 August was spent in preparation for the Battalion's move from LZ Uplift to Camp Radcliff. Local patrols were conducted in the vicinity of LZ Uplift with negative contact or sightings. On 15 August, the Battalion began the move to Camp Radcliff. B 1/50 with the Scout Platoon attached, proceeded to LZ Schueller and assumed the Mobile Road Reaction Force mission at 160700H Aug 68 from A 1/69 Armor. Company A, Headquarters Company (-) and Service Company moved from LZ Uplift to Camp Radcliff on 16 August with no incidents along the highway.
- (9) On 17 August, the 1/50th assumed the mission and responsibility of AO Walker. The change became effective at 1700 hours. At 1150 hours, A/1-503d killed 1 NVA in grey uniform vic BR880808.
- (10) On 18 August, C 1/50 found 3 mines vic BR235495. Mines were whicom grenades with pressure type firing devices. Mines were blown in place by EOD personnel.
- (11) Several intelligence reports of VC/NVA units moving within the AO were received between 18 and 23 August. Indications were that the enemy was planning an attack directed against the highway and bridge sites within the AO. At 0150 hrs on 23 August, ~~LZ Schueller~~ received approximately 15 mortar rounds resulting in 1 US KIA from the artillery battery. At 0201 hrs, Camp Radcliff received approximately 12 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in 3 US WHA. Counter-mortar fire was fired in both instances. Flare ships and gunships were sent up to locate mortar positions with negative results. Approximate location of the mortar tubes that fired on LZ Schueller was BR363468. The approximate location of the mortar tubes that fired on Camp Radcliff was BR489450.
- (12) At 230905 August, Pump Station #8 (BR251484), Bridge 27 (BR262472), and ~~BR Action (BR266470)~~ came under mortar and AW attack. Gunships and artillery were used in support. The reaction force from B 1/50 at LZ Schueller was committed at 0905 hours. A convoy traveling west along the highway was ambushed at the time the other US positions were attacked. Three personnel from the convoy were WHA and medevaced to the 17th Field Hospital at Camp Radcliff. Four VC were confirmed KIL after the attack on the highway and several heavy blood trails were found.
- (13) At 0245 hours on 24 August, bridge 26 (BR288454) came under a heavy ground attack from the south by an estimated reinforced platoon. SA, AW, M-79 and B-40 rockets were used in the attack. The initial volley of rocket fire hit the command bunker killing the platoon leader and 2 EM. Artillery was called into the area at 0253 hrs. The enemy overran the western end of the bridge in 5 to 6 minutes after the initial contact. Fighting, including hand to hand combat, took place between elements of the Scout Platoon and the VC on the bridge. The remaining

element from the Scout Platoon carried the wounded to bridge 25 to be evacuated. The bridge was retaken and secured at 0330 hours. The attack resulted in 3 US KIA and 6 US WIA out of the 11 personnel on the bridge that night. Ten satchel charges were found on the bridge. No enemy bodies were located, but large pools of blood and heavy blood trails were found on and near the bridge site. At 1835 hours, elements from B 1/50 received 4 mortar rounds via BR343357. There were no US casualties.

- (14) On 25 August, elements of B 1/50 and the Scout platoon were engaged by an estimated enemy company at 0939 hours via BR295435. They were engaged with SA, AW and B-40 rocket fire. The FO was killed in the first minutes of the contact; as a result of this, artillery support was not called for until the fiercest of the fighting had been completed. Gunships were on station before artillery could be called in and adjusted. Elements of B 1/50 and Scout platoon pulled back to bridge 26 to evacuate casualties while 2 airstrikes were put into the area. C 1/50 was combat assaulted south of the contact area via BR328388. From that location they conducted S/D operations to the north into the contact area meeting no resistance. Friendly casualties for the action were 1 US KIA and 11 US WIA. Known enemy losses were 5 KIA and 1 AK-47, 2 B-40 rocket launchers, a B-40 sight, miscellaneous ammunition and clothing CIA. At 2030 hours, bridge 25 came under attack from the south. The enemy engaged the bridge with SA and AW fire. There were no US casualties.
- (15) On 261549 hours August, Pump Station #8 and a westbound convoy received SA and AW fire from south of highway 19. Artillery and gunships were used in support. There were no US casualties and enemy losses are not known. On 27 August, 1 NVA KIA was found via BR298431.
- (16) On 310820H August, intelligence was received concerning an imminent attack upon highway 19 in the vic of LZ Action and Bridge 27. The Reaction Force from B 1/50 was alerted and began their movement towards bridge 27. Gunships were placed on station via of LZ Action. At 0940, elements west of LZ Action began receiving rounds from south of highway 19. At 0948, Pump Station #8 was attacked from the south by mortars and SA. A ~~convoy traveling west between bridge 27 and the Bang Yang Pass~~ was ambushed at approximately the same time Pump Station #8 came under attack. There was 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA from the convoy. Contact was broken at 1045. Artillery and gunship fire was placed to the front of the reaction and maneuver element from B 1/50 as they moved into the contact areas. T/C air was used further to the elements' south on suspected enemy mortar locations and avenues of withdrawals. Gunships reported receiving ground fire from both sides of highway 19. C 1/50th began moving South from their FOB to conduct BDA and attempt to interdict the enemy moving North of Hwy 19. Negative contact

was made although just prior to dark they spotted 4 enemy to their east, engaged with light organics with negative results. There was no ground contact made after 1045 hours. Friendly losses were 1 US KIA, 7 US WHA, 3 VN WHA, and 5 vehicles extensively damaged. Enemy losses were 6 KIA, 2 AK-47 CIA, 2 B-40 rocket launchers CIA, and assorted documents and equipment.

c. The 1st Bn (M), 50th Infantry continued operations in AO WALKER from 1 September through 30 September.

- (1) At 010130 September, ~~the MCV compound in An Son reported receiving a mortar attack.~~ All rounds landed between 150-200 meters away from the compound. 1 VN woman was killed and 1 VN boy was wounded. At 1150 hours, gunships reported receiving approximately 50 rounds of ground fire from vic BR251472. They spotted 1 VC with an AK-47 vic BR249408. Gunship fire was placed into the area with unknown results. At 1423 hours, A 2/503 discovered 6 fresh graves vic BR233473. All of the graves were from 4 to 6 hours old. At 1610 hours, LRP team 13 made contact with an unknown sized enemy force vic BR239451. Gunships and artillery were used in support. B 7/17 Cav was sent into the area. A 2/503 was combat assaulted into the area and set up an operational base in the area of the contact. The LRP team remained with the company. One gunship pilot was wounded in the foot during the combat assault. An airstrike was put in vic BR244438 at 1722 hours.
- (2) At 020740H September, the minesweep on highway 19 hit a mine vic BR276469. There were 3 personnel slightly wounded and the minesweep was destroyed. At 1530 hours, B 1/50 found a mortar site vic BR227471. The site was destroyed.
- (3) At 031031H September, a LOH from B 7/17 Cav received ground fire from vic BR275398. Gunships and TAC AIR were put into the area. At 1120 hours, the Cav moved back into the area and again received ground fire. Another A/S was put in at 1158 hours. At 1316 hours, B 7/17 Cav had an LOH shot down vic BR275404. There were no serious injuries in the crash. A 2/503 was combat assaulted into the area at 1352. They secured the LOH while the radios and guns were removed. The LOH was destroyed in place with incendiary and WP grenades. At 1520 hours, LRP team 13 reported contact with an estimated VC squad resulting in 3 possible VC KIA vic BR240442. Extraction of the LRP team was completed at 1634 hours.
- (4) At 060313H September, bridge 22 came under B-40 and SA attack from the south. Artillery, gunships, and flareships were used in support. Contact lasted approximately 45 minutes. The gunships remained on station until 0440 hours. They expended ordnance to the south of the bridge from 75 to 2000 meters away. There were no US casualties. The PF forces near

bridge 22 sustained 8 lightly wounded. Two NVA KIA were found south of bridge 22 the following morning. Satchel charges, bangalore torpedoes, and propellant charges for B-40 rockets were found in the area also. A 2/503 found a dead NVA vic BR246480. The body had been in that location approximately two weeks. B 1/50 found a third NVA KIA vic bridge 22 on 7 September.

- (5) At 1000 hours on 8 September, a gunship from the 134th Aviation Company received 3 hits from ground fire vic BR260500.
- (6) On 11 September, ~~13~~ ~~13~~ engaged 5 VC killing 2 vic BR239475. Blood trails were found leading away from the area.
- (7) Task Force Schnoor arrived in An Khe on 14 September. Elements making up the Task Force were as follows: C 1/503, B 2/503, 1 plat 17th Cav, 1 squad 173d Engr, and A Btry 3/319 Arty. The Task Force's mission was to be ready to react to the development in operations. (See Annex B, After Action Report, TF Schnoor)
- (8) At 140104H September, LZ Schueller came under mortar attack from vic BR362465. A total of 18 82mm mortar rounds impacted within the LZ wounding 5 US personnel. Counter mortar fire was put into suspected mortar positions with unknown results.
- (9) On 19 September, a Lambretta loaded with civilian personnel hit a mine vic BR398440. Two civilians were killed and 7 wounded. A 1/50 found 1 NVA KIA vic BR255477. The NVA had apparently been dead approximately 10 days.
- (10) On 15 September, C 1/50 engaged 3 VC vic bridge 21 at 2350 hours. One VC fell and was apparently wounded. The other two dragged the body away. There were no blood trails found in the morning. Villagers from a village 125 meters west of the bridge reported that 10 VC had been in the village that night.
- (11) On night of 21 September, elements of C 1/50 made three reports of spotting movement to the east of bridge 19. At 0056 hours 22 September, they engaged an unknown size VC element south of bridge 19. A search of the area in the morning turned up 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA, 1 AK-47, and 1 B-40 rocket 75 meters from the bridge.
- (12) On 23 September elements of C 1/50 located another VC KIA vic bridge 19. This made the total of 2 VC KIA and 1 VC CIA for the action at bridge 19.

(13) On 260919H September C 1/50 reported that LZ Schueller was receiving mortar rounds and a convoy between bridges 24 and 25 was under attack. Strong points 2 and 3 also came under mortar and rocket attack. The APC at SP 2 was hit by a B-40 rocket. The APC at SP 3 was hit by an 82mm mortar round inside the cargo hatch. The track immediately exploded tearing off all of the hatches, gun mounts and totally destroying the APC. One man was killed at LZ Schueller and one man was killed at SP 3. Total friendly losses for the engagement were 2 US KHA, 4 US WHA, 1 APC destroyed and 1 APC damaged. Artillery and gunships were used in support. Enemy casualties were 1 KIA. At 2131 hours, bridge 19 received 5 mortar rounds with negative casualties. Artillery was used north of the bridge site on the suspected enemy mortar location with unknown results.

(14) Operations continued in AO WALKER for the remainder of the reporting period with no contact being made with any enemy forces.

3. INTELLIGENCE

- a. Enemy Order of Battle: During this reporting period the 1st Bn (N), 50th Infantry changed AO's. ~~From period 1 July 68 to 16 August 68 the Battalion conducted operations in AO COUSSE and 1.~~ The main enemy units which the Battalion was concerned with were the 3d NVA Division and the XC.11 MF Bn.
- b. The 1st Bn (N), 50th Inf began operations in AO WALKER on 17 August 68. The main enemy units which the Battalion has been concerned with since its assignment to AO WALKER have been the 95B NVA Regt. and its supporting units.

(1) Movement

- (a) Until June of 1968, the 3d NVA Div was generally located in Binh Dinh Province. In June, intelligence indicated that the 3d NVA Div received orders to move northwest into Kontum Province. However, it was never confirmed that the whole 3d NVA Div had actually moved. The 3d NVA Div rear base area is reported to be located at BR7568.
- (b) The XC.11 MF Bn was formed in the early part of 1968. Their movements, indicated by intelligence, has been conducted generally in the ~~High Mountain Range.~~
- (c) The 95B Regiment is generally called a border regiment. The largest part of their operations are conducted along the Pleiku, Binh Dinh, and Phu Bon Province borders.

(2) State of readiness

- (a) The 3d NVA Div is considered to be a capable division. However, due to lack of equipment and trained personnel, the Division's state of readiness is considered to be low.
- (b) To more fully describe the state of readiness of the 3d NVA Div, a brief of each regiment in the Division will be given.
1. 2d VC Regt: This Regt is considered to be the Div's most effective Regt as far as accomplishing their assigned missions. Their equipment is a variety of new and old Soviet and Red Chinese make. Their supply system cannot resupply them during contact. Thus they cannot sustain more than approximately 2½ hours of combat at any one given time. After a contact they must retreat to an area where they can begin their resupply which normally takes anywhere from 1-4 weeks, depending upon the type of contact and the losses that they have sustained.
 2. 22d NVA Regt: This Regt is considered to be almost a stereotype of the 2d VC Regt with respect to equipment and resupply. However, the personnel and leaders especially, are considered to be of a lower grade than their counterparts in the 2d VC Regt.
 3. 18th NVA Regt: This Regt is considered to be lowest of all in state of readiness. Due to successful operations of Allied units against this Regt, it is believed that they cannot sustain more than 1½ hours of combat. Their resupply generally takes from 2-6 weeks. The reason being that they are not located as near the central supplies for the Div as their counterparts are. Further, the 18th Regt has just received a large number of replacements and is considered a "green unit".
 4. Taking all of these factors into consideration coupled with the successful operations of Allied units, it is obvious that the poor leadership, supply system, and quality of equipment are the main factors involving the low state of readiness of the 3d NVA Division.
 5. XC.11 MF Bn: Since this Bn was formed, there has been very few contacts with Allied units. Intelligence indicates that the personnel in this Bn were for the most part either local or village type VC and in poor health. Because of lack of food and proper medical supplies, this Bn had so many cases of malaria that the state of readiness was then considered very low. However, mainly with the help of the 3d NVA Div, their state of readiness is now considered to be average for their assigned mission.

6. 95B Regt: The state of readiness for this regt is believed average for their assigned mission. It is not believed that they would remain in contact for more than 1 hour. This is not due to resupply as with the 3d NVA Div, but to the poor quality of the troops. Since they are a border regiment, almost all supplies for the Binh Dinh Province have to pass through them, allowing them to more readily resupply themselves. It would take on the average about 1-3 weeks for resupply.
- (3) Quality: ~~The quality of all the enemy units in the Binh Dinh Province is considered to be poor.~~ The reason is that the majority of the replacements come from NWN. The average Pvt receives 3-4 months of training with much of this being political. Also the average Pvt receives little "train fire". Having already drafted most of their regular military-aged men, and because of the escalation efforts, the NVA have been drafting men outside of the military draft age group. Looking at these and other factors such as poor education, short medical and food supplies, the quality of the enemy troops is being lowered with every group of replacements.
- (4) Combat efficiency
- (a) The combat efficiency for the 3d NVA Div is considered to be average of most NVA Divisions. The reason being that contacts with the 3d NVA Div have been slight. The Div has mainly concerned itself with resupply and restraint for a possible general offensive such as occurred in May.
- (b) XC.11 MF Bn: This Battalion is considered to have a below average combat efficiency rating. There are three reasons for this. The first is the low quality of the troops; the second is the poor equipment; and the third is the lack of supplies.
- (c) 95B Regt: This Regt is believed to be the equivalent in combat efficiency of other enemy units operating in Binh Dinh Province. Contacts with this unit have been sporadic.
- (5) Morale: The morale of the 3d NVA Div would have to be rated by Regiments. The following is a brief discussion of these regiments.
- (a) 2d VC Regt: The morale of this Regt is considered fair. Although contacts during this reporting period have been sparse, this Regt has demonstrated some aggressiveness in combat.

- (b) 18th NVA Regt: This Regt, having been in numerous contacts with Allied forces, and not always choosing the time or place, is considered to have a poor morale rating. Not being able to receive proper medical care, insufficient food, and lack of trained leaders in combat, are main factors causing this poor morale.
- (c) XC.11 MF Bn: Intelligence indicates that this Bn has an extremely low morale rating. The most probable cause for this is the illness suffered by many of the troops and the lack of food supplies.
- (d) 95B Regt: Due to the sparse activity of this Regt and its capability for obtaining supplies, their morale is considered to be fair.
- (6) Counter attack: The use of counter attack by the above mentioned units, has never been employed. Normally these units will only employ one attack before they retreat and set up an ambush.
- (7) Armor: To date the use of armor has not been employed by the affore mentioned enemy units operating in Binh Dinh Province.
- (8) Special weapons: On a few isolated occasions, the use of Soviet-made portable flame throwers were employed by the 2d VC Regt and 22d NVA Regt. Also, the NVA have, in general, displayed good marksmanship with RFG-7 rocket.
- (9) Artillery: All of the affore mentioned units with the exception of the XC.11 MF Bn have employed on numerous occasions the 60mm and 82mm mortars.
- c. Nature of terrain and weather conditions: Binh Dinh Province has numerous mountain ranges, some valleys, and a few plains. Mountainous terrain is normally heavily vegetated and impassible by armor. The valleys and plains consist of hedgerows, rice fields, and some open terrain which is easily maneuvered. Weather conditions for the most part have been clear skies with an average temperature of 90 degrees and occasional thunderstorms.
- d. MI agencies: The use of such agencies is greatly employed by this Bn. Plans and decisions are frequently changed, acting on intelligence gathered from agencies of this type.
- e. ~~Enemy personnel and equipment losses for period:~~

| <u>KIA</u> | <u>FW</u> | <u>C/S</u> | <u>S/A</u> | |
|------------|-----------|------------|------------|-----------|
| 5 | 4 | 1 | 3 | July |
| 22 | 4 | 2 | 3 | August |
| 21 | 2 | 0 | 2 | September |

4. Personnel and Administration:

a. Strength:

| DATE | AUTHORIZED | | | | | ASSIGNED | | | | |
|-------------|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | HHC | A | B | C | D | HHC | A | B | C | D |
| 1 July 1968 | 194 | 189 | 189 | 189 | 149 | 206 | 148 | 164 | 173 | 160 |
| 30 Sep 1968 | 194 | 185 | 186 | 189 | 149 | 185 | 182 | 183 | 215 | 132 |

| DATE | GAINS | HOSP RTN | WHA | NBD | NEW |
|----------|-------|----------|-----|-----|-----|
| Jul 1968 | 79 | 33 | 6 | 19 | 1 |
| Aug 1968 | 51 | 12 | 4 | 21 | 0 |
| Sep 1968 | 33 | 105 | 2 | 13 | 5 |
| TOTAL: | 440 | 150 | 12 | 53 | 1 |

| DATE | CO ART #15 | EN ART #15 | GEN/SP |
|----------|------------|------------|-----------------|
| Jul 1968 | 13 | 1 | 2 (1 GEN, 1 SF) |
| Aug 1968 | 22 | 7 | 0 |
| Sep 1968 | 21 | 3 | 1 (SP) |

- b. The September gains will present a major rotational problem next year. To preclude this, an infusion program will have to be initiated during the 4th quarter of 1969 to prevent another major loss of personnel in August/September 1969.

* c. Awards and Decorations:

| DATE | DFC | SS | BS ³ V ² | BS | ACM ³ V ² | ACM | AM | PH |
|----------|-----|----|--------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------|-----|----|----|
| Jul 1968 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 48 | 1 | 19 | 34 | 24 |
| Aug 1968 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 102 | 0 | 86 | 0 | 17 |
| Sep 1968 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 46 | 19 |
| TOTAL: | 2 | 0 | 14 | 153 | 1 | 106 | 80 | 60 |

5. Logistics:

- a. Supply: During the period 1 July to 30 September, the Battalion continued to requisition major items of equipment from the 50th

Field Depot in Qui Nhon. Minor items of equipment are received from the Brigade Supply Office in An Khe. * The requisitioning of minor items from BSO commenced after the unit's change of location from LZ Uplift to An Khe. The Battalion also established effective liaison with the 58th Field Depot by placing an individual there on a permanent basis to expedite equipment to the unit. Command controlled major items continued to present a problem to the unit. As of 30 September, the organization was short the following items: 4 ea M113A1 APCs, 3 ea M548 Cargo Carriers, 4 ea M125A1 Mortar Carriers, 1 ea M132A1 Flame track, 2 ea Radio Set AN/GRC-106, 3 ea Radio Set AN/VRC-46, 12 ea Radio Set AN/VRC-47, 32 ea Radio Set AN/PRC-25, and 41 ea PVS-1 Starlight Scopes. The Battalion is still currently short two Mine Detectors, airmobile, which are authorized.

- b. **Transportation:** The transportation capabilities of the Battalion was greatly increased by the arrival of seven each Carrier, Cargo M548. These carriers are able to affect resupply either on the road or across country. Air transportation for the battalion continued to be furnished by UH1 and CH-47 aircraft. Throughout the reporting period, a total of 352 resupply sorties were flown, with a total backlog of 78 sorties also being flown. For the month of July, 79 UH1 sorties, 28 CH-47 sorties, and 26 backlogs were flown. During August, 50 UH1 sorties were flown with 13 backlogs. Sorties flown during September totaled 147 UH1 and 48 CH-47 sorties flown with 39 backlogs. The large amount for September was due in part to this unit's support of ~~Task Force Schmeer~~.

* Brigade Supply Office (BSO) has also been quite instrumental in furnishing this unit with barrier material such as concertina wire, engineer stakes, timber, barbed tape, and chain link fence for protection of bridge bunkers from armor piercing rounds. This unit has received tremendous response from BSO in the acquisition of needed items.

- c. **Maintenance:** 1st Bn (M), 50th Infantry completed movement from LZ Uplift to Camp Radcliff. The move involved all the vehicles of the Battalion. There were no major breakdowns during this move. At Camp Radcliff Battalion maintenance facility was established as well as a maintenance facility for all the line companies. One motor pool and one track park was organized. While the maintenance facilities were being set up, Battalion and company maintenance platoons and sections combined support of tactical operations. During this time period 8 APCs were recovered in the field and evacuated to depot. Also, during this reporting period there was a shortage of left torsion bars, ramp cables, drive sprockets, tires for 2½ ton and ½ ton trucks, and tracks for the personnel carriers. At the end of the period, the PLL balance stood at 74% fill. One other maintenance problem that has beset the Battalion is the delayed return from Support Maintenance of the night vision devices, crew-served weapons, 9927-A. Six were turned in on 8262 and at the end of the period had not been returned.

- d. **Medical:**

- (1) On July 1, 1968 our Battalion was located at LZ Uplift. At this time we were performing the duties of a clearing station since we handled all the casualties within our area of operations. This included personnel from the 1/69th Armor, and other supporting units.
- (2) On August 18, 1968 we moved to Camp Radcliff, An Khe. Here we resumed our duties as a Battalion Aid Station. We had to work hard on the sanitary conditions here in order to bring them up to their present acceptable standards. We also set up weekly inspections of all components within our Battalion area.

6. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs: The following ORLL covering Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs run by this command will cover a period from 12 September 1968 to 30 September 1968 due to a lack of any records of S-5 activities prior to this period.

- a. In the area of ~~psychological operations in AO Walker~~ there were the following activities:
 - (1) A loudspeaker mission was run through use of a helicopter and a PF furnished by the District Chief, Major Thua. The mission was run in an area enclosed by the following grids: BR1137, BR2437, BR1127, and BR2427. The theme of the mission was two-fold. Priority was set on requesting that ~~Montagnard~~ personnel move north to the Montagnard Refugee Camp located on Hwy 19. Secondly, a Chieu Hoi message was introduced into the area.
 - (2) Along with psychological operations, the Volunteer Information Program (VIP) was initiated in this command and also into AO Walker for the first time on 13 September 1968. Line companies were given 300 VIP leaflets each, and these were distributed throughout operational areas during the reporting period. Primary use of VIP leaflets were to inform this unit of impending attacks on Hwy 19.
 - (3) NPFF were used on Hwy 19 in order to search and interrogate the villagers of An Tan (5). Mission was to seek out any VC infrastructure in that village.
- b. In the area of Civic Action initial coordination with all VN government officials, and MACCORDS Advisors was made during the reporting period in order to gain information of the AO. The S-5 has also taken the responsibility to coordinate all Civic Action Projects initiated at Camp Radcliff through the Office of the Installation Coordinator. The largest Civic Action project in the An Tuc area is the market place of An Tuc. At this time it is approximately 70% complete. Since 13 September this unit has supported the construction with transportation and 1 or 2 EM each day to advise on the work being done.
- c. During the period 1 July till 16 August 1968, there were no MEDCAPS run; however, a Civilian Aid Station at LZ Uplift was in operation and treated 40 to 50 patients daily. During the period 17 August

through 30 September, there was only 1 MEDCAP scheduled; this was conducted on 29 September 1968 in the village of An Tan (5). There were approximately 125 people treated for various sicknesses and abrasions. Maneuver companies have helped immensely in the MEDCAP program by treating approximately 75 VN civilians while performing their missions.

SECTION II

CPs

Item: Co-locating ARVN-US CPs.

Discussion: The problem of communication has always existed when ARVN and US forces conduct joint operations. This battalion has found that by co-locating the ARVN and US CPs, communication difficulties can be significantly decreased. Co-locating CPs has proven beneficial to all of the units involved in the joint operations. Coordination of areas of operations, movement, fires and other support is made easier. Changes in operations due to the tactical situation can be coordinated quicker. When operating with the CPs co-located, the individuals in each section should coordinate directly with his counterpart.

Observation: The use of co-located CPs has decreased reaction times and increased the effectiveness of our combined operations.

Fire Support Base

Item: Establishing a Fire Support Base (FSB).

Discussion: During operations in July and August, this organization undertook the missions of establishing a FCB in order to provide support for units operating in the Vinh Thanh mountains. Due to the fact that the 1st Bn (M), 50th Infantry did not have an experience factor to aid in the planning and execution of the mission, an SOP was written to act as a guideline for the operation. (See Incl 1, Annex G (Organization and Defense of Fire Support Base) to 1st Bn (M), 50th Inf TAC SOP No 1). This SOP outlines priorities of work for the various tasks that must be accomplished in the construction of an FSB.

Observation: By establishing the work priorities and time schedules outlined in the SOP, the FSB was constructed with a minimum of confusion and substantial saving of time.

Communications

Item: Communication Equipment P/L.

Discussion: Maintenance of communication equipment at Battalion level has been considered satisfactory. The procurement of repair parts and replacement parts from supporting agencies has presented a major problem. The change in supporting units for this Battalion created a strain on the new supporting unit. They were unable to supply the required parts to repair this Battalion's communication equipment. Although a demand has been placed on the supply system of the new supporting unit, reaction has been too slow to meet our current needs.

Observation: It is recommended that prior to changing supporting units, the unit assuming the support mission should have its authorized prescribed

load list doubled to accommodate the expected initial influx of requests and demand on the system.

Item: Spare Frequencies.

Discussion: During the past month it has become apparent that a need exists for the availability of one or two additional frequencies within our SOI. The example in question is in reference to the attached IRRP platoon which is presently operating with us. They are presently using frequencies which are not included in our SOI and this creates a tremendous communication problem in that we have many intermediate stations which must transfer to us.

Observation: The Bn communications officer is presently working with the Bde Commo Officer in rectifying the above. The problem would be alleviated if the additional frequencies mentioned above are made available by the Bde for use as we deem necessary.

Report

Item: Spot Reports.

Discussion: In many instances company commanders and platoon leaders have sent incomplete spot reports to the battalion CP. In many cases information that should have been sent in was not reported due to either the lack of immediate information or an oversight on the reporting unit's part.

Observation: To assist leaders in the field in making accurate and complete spot reports, this battalion has issued a format to its units outlining the essential information to be reported. A similar format is kept with the Battalion NCS. All that is necessary when calling in a spot report is the reference to the line number on the format and the information the line calls for. By following this format, commanders have greatly improved their reporting procedures. Much unnecessary traffic has been removed from the command net with the use of this format.

Malaria/Medical

Item: Malaria.

Discussion: This Battalion has had a very high rate of malaria. This has happened in spite of the fact that there has been strict adherence to the wearing of the proper uniform in accordance with existing regulations. Prophylactic pills, mosquito nets and insect repellent will make malaria a rarity rather than a common disease.

Observation: Lectures and education of personnel are important but evidently far from the whole answer. It has been observed that even those men who have had malaria, often don't really mind getting the disease again. Many seem to desire hospital time over field time. The answer clearly lies in command emphasis that makes the more responsible men force the less motivated to protect themselves against the disease.

Logistics

Item: Use of Supply Representatives from Supported Units

Discussion: When one or more units are attached, procuring items for re-supply becomes a problem, not because of lack of items but because of the limited number of supply personnel to procure the needed items. Each attached unit was asked for a minimum of two supply representatives to procure items on the log requests. A vehicle is furnished, and the representatives are able to do the extensive log-work required to fill some of the log requests.

Observation: The use of supply representatives from attached units has relieved pressure on the supply personnel of this unit. Our personnel had been procuring items for both assigned and attached companies. Close monitoring and coordination is required to insure the smooth flow of supplies to the troops in the field. This is retained by having the attached units supply representatives working directly under the battalion supply sergeant of this unit.

Intelligence

Item: Weather's effect on Intelligence Operations

Discussion: Weather in recent weeks has restricted use of aircraft in a reconnaissance role. This has reduced snoopy, redhaze, and photography missions as well as the number of V.R. missions flown daily. With weather restrictions as they are at present, LRRP teams are being employed with a greater emphasis placed upon their findings.

Observations: Whenever possible more than one intelligence aid (i.e. Snoopy & Red Haze) should be used in such a manner as to further confirm or lend credence to the earlier report. However, when weather restricts the use of aircraft, LRRP teams can be of increased value.

Item: Intelligence Files

Discussion: When the Battalion arrived in AO Walker there was no intelligence files. The previous unit had destroyed all their intelligence records before departure.

Observation: To preclude a unit which is entering a new AO from having to start from scratch on intelligence, coordination and turnover of intelligence data should be accomplished prior to the old unit's departure.

Item: Intelligence Sources

Discussion: Due to mechanical failure, weather and the inability of intelligence source to be productive in all locations, intelligence can sometimes only be obtained from one or two sources.

Observation: Flexibility is essential in controlling intelligence gathering sources. However, preplanning to include checking weather conditions and terrain in the area of interest are mandatory.

Item: Security Clearance

Discussion: Certain sensitive duty positions in the battalion were occupied by men who did not have the required clearance.


Observation: Close coordination between the S1 and S2 sections is mandatory to insure that as new men fill sensitive duty positions, the necessary security clearance is obtained for them.

Maps

Item: Preparation of Maps

Discussion: TF Schnoor was placed OPCON to 1/50th on very short notice. When this occurred we found ourselves unprepared for the adequate handling of maps in this situation. At the final minute we had to rush the assembly of maps with the possibility of some errors being made.

Observation: It is imperative for this unit to continually maintain on hand a set of maps properly prepared (i.e. assembled, necessary information placed on them, and acetated). This would alleviate last minute rushes, and possible errors thereby insuring no delays in the operation to be conducted.



JOHN B. CARTER
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

ANNEX A (Strong Point Locations) to Historical Activities Operational Report, dtd 13 Oct 68, this Hqs.

| <u>STRONG POINT #</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|-----------------------|-----------------|
| 1 | BR352448 |
| 2 | BR348453 |
| 3 | BR340456 |
| 4 | BR336459 |
| 5 | BR328461 |
| 6 | BR305457 |
| 7 | BR286457 |
| 8 | BR281456 |
| 9 | BR280463 |
| 10 | BR276468 |
| 11 | BR266465 |
| 12 | BR256484 |
| 13 | BR242492 |
| 14 | BR234502 |
| 15 | BR228514 |

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED), 50TH INFANTRY
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96250

AVBE-DE

4 October 1968

SUBJECT: ANNEX B
Combat Operations After Action Report: TF Schnoor

Commanding General
173d Abn Bde
ATTN: S3/MID
APO 96250

In accordance with Brigade Regulation 335-8, the following report is submitted.

1. General: This report covers the operations of TF Schnoor within AO Schnoor from 14 September to 26 September 1968.
2. Name of Operation: Operation Walker/Task Force Schnoor.
3. Type of Operation: Search and Destroy.
4. Date of Operation: 14 September to 26 September 1968.
5. Location: AO in boxes BR3537, BR1137, BR1123, Southern boundary-Binh Dinh, Phu Bon Province boundary.
6. Control or Command Headquarters: 1st Bn (M), 50th Inf, 173d Abn Bde.
7. Reporting Officer: John B Carter LTC, Infantry, Commanding.
8. Task Organization:
 - a. B/2-503d
 - b. C/1-503d
 - c. TF Control
 - (1) A/3-319th Arty
 - (2) 1/E-17th Cav
 - (3) 1 Sqd, 173d Engrs

9. Supporting Forces:

- a. A/2-17th Arty 105mm, 4 guns.
- b. B/2-17th Arty 105mm, 5 guns.
- c. A/5-22d Arty 175mm, 1 gun.
- d. A/6-84th Arty 155mm, 2 guns.
- e. TAC Air Support: 21st TASS.
- f. Army Aircraft:
 - (1) 134th Avn Co.
 - (2) 61st Avn Co.
 - (3) 196th Avn Co (Hvy Lift).
 - (4) D Trp, 2-1 Air Cav.

10. Intelligence:

- a. Special intelligence received from a normally reliable source indicated the presence of 95B Regiment CP (BR285265). It was suspected that the Regiment CP was coordinating the movement of supplies and attacks upon allied personnel in AO Walker. 95B Regiment CP was reported to have the strength of at least a reinforced company.
- b. During the operation contact was made with NVA groups of from 2 to 12 men. The enemy appeared to be dispersed and trying to avoid contact.
 - (1) Units identified consisted of:
 - (a) K-7 Co (BR289256) 70 men - 60 NVA and 10 Montagnards.
CO: Bay, XO: Nam.
 - (b) K-2 Co (BR160316) 80 men, CO: Thong.
 - (c) K-3 Co (BR160316) 80 men, CO: Nam.
 - (d) K-6 Co (BR160316) 70 men, CO: Hai.
 - (2) Enemy morale was not good due to lack of food and Allied activity in their area.
- c. Terrain was interspersed with numerous small waterways. The Song Ba in this area presented no obstacle to foot troop movement. Concealment from both air and ground was good. Cover was fair.
- d. The Montagnards in this area supported the NVA either through their

own volition or because of coercion.

e. 172d MI Det provided support in interrogating a NVA captured in the operation.

f. VC/NVA losses:

(1) Person: (BC) 5, (EST) 2.

(2) Weapons: 1 AK-50,

(3) Clothing: The NVA were dressed in either khakis or black pajamas.

(4) Food: 2.1 tons of rice was confiscated.

(5) Medical: An NVA corp man's kit was captured. (An NVA doctor was believed to have been killed).

11. Mission: To combat assault into AO, interdict enemy movement from South to North and conduct search and destroy operations within AO.

12. Concept of Operations: TF Schnoor conducted operations in assigned area of operation within AO Walker from 14 Sep to 28 Sep 68. TF Schnoor employed B/2-503d and C/1-503d and controlled the operation from FSB Brigadoon. Maximum utilization was made of D Troop 2-2 Air Cav and all available supporting fires.

13. Execution: TF Schnoor arrived at Camp Radcliff by helicopter 140800H Sep 68. At this time they became OPCON to 1st Bn (M), 50th Inf. The remainder of this day consisted of briefings, issuance of the order and preparation for C/A into assigned AO.

a. Due to the intelligence received confirming that regimental CP of 95B was in the area southwest of AO Walker, the following action took place. Opn Phu Bon 142 consisting of two ARVN companies and two PF companies started to the Southwest of AO Walker, and TF Schnoor was alerted to conduct operations in the Southwest portion of AO Walker and north of operation Phu Bon.

b. 15 Sep 68 - At 1040 hrs, B/2-503d began C/A from Camp Radcliff to LZ vicinity coordinates BR239099. PZ time 1041, closed 1107 hrs. LZ time 1049, closed 1117 hrs. Arty and gunships were used to prep the LZ which was green. Then the LZ B/2-503d moved Southeast to an FOB site vicinity BR234900 with negative contact during movement. Remainder of TF Schnoor continued preparations for C/A at Camp Radcliff.

c. 16 Sep 68 - TF Schnoor was deployed by C/A into FSB Brigadoon BR275334. TAC Arty and gunships were used to prep the LZ. A/S: TOT 161210 Sep, Gunships: TOT 161220 Sep, PZ time: 1310 hrs, LZ time: 1329 hrs, LZ Green. C/1-503d moved from the FSB to the Southeast and B/2-503d moved South from their FOB to TF Schnoor

proper. C/1-503d while moving Southeast made contact with an NVA element. Results: Friendlies - no casualties. NVA - 4 KIA, 1 CIA, and 16 civilians (Montagnards) detainees. B/2-503d continued movement into AO Schnoor with negative casualties. FSB Brigadoon was secured by one platoon C/1-503d and 1 platoon E-17th Cav.

- d. 17-20 Sep 68 - Units of TF Schnoor continued operations in assigned AO with C/1-503d making contact on 20 Sep. They engaged 3 NVA in the vicinity of BR268293. Results: Friendlies - 2 WIA. Enemy - 1 NVA KIA.
- e. 21-24 Sep 68 - Units of TF Schnoor continued operations in assigned AO with B/2-503d preparing for movement to FSB Brigadoon, and C/1-503d preparing for movement to LZ Uplift. Preparation was evening of 24 Sep 68.
- f. 24-25 Sep - B/2-503d was lifted to FSB at 251030 Sep 68. C/1-503d was lifted from FOB BR203308 to LZ Uplift at 250930 Sep 68. 1/E-17th Cav was lifted from FSB Brigadoon to LZ Uplift on 251100 Sep 68. Remaining elements prepared for extraction.
- g. 25-26 Sep - A/3-319th Arty was extracted from FSB to An Kho 260800 Sep 68. TF Schnoor personnel extracted to LZ English 261300 Sep. B/2-503d conducted C/A from FSB Brigadoon to vicinity LZ BR330387, to continue S/P operations to the north in assigned AO.

14. Combat Services Logistic and Administration:


- a. Personnel: Administration for the TF was handled by the 1/50th S-1 section in conjunction with the Brigade AG Section. Casualty reports were handled by S-1 1/50th while all other personnel action and services were handled by Brigade AG.
- b. Medical: All casualties evacuated from TF Schnoor were handled initially by 17th Field Hospital, Camp Radcliff. The TF surgeon remained at Camp Radcliff and worked in conjunction with the 1/50th Aid Station in the treatment of personnel with minor wounds from TF Schnoor.
- c. Casualties: Friendly.
 - (1) KIA: 0
 - (2) CIA: 4
 - (3) WIA: 0
- d. Casualties: Enemy.
 - (1) KIA: 5
 - (2) WIA: 0

- (3) POW: 1
- (4) Captured:
 - (a) S/A: 1 AK-50
 - (b) C/S: 0

e. Logistics:

- (1) Class I: The two maneuver elements of the TF were provided three days rations (6 C-rations and 3 LRP rations) per individual as a basic load. One hot meal was provided for these companies every third day. The mess section from A/3-319th Arty was moved to the FSB and provided meals for the TF Headquarters, A/3-319th Arty, 1/E-17th Cav and the Engineer Squad at the FSB. No significant problems were encountered in providing Class I support.
- (2) Class II and IV: The expendable items requested by the TF that were on hand were issued immediately. All other items, expendable and non-expendable, were ordered through the liason officer from the brigade supply office. Hand receipt for certain items were issued by 1/50th PBO.
- (3) Class III: Gasoline for the TF's Mess Section was hooked to the FSB. Class III supply presented no problems.
- (4) Class V: Two company sized basic loads of ammunition for three days were delivered to the log pad by 173d Transportation. Ammunition was issued upon request. Artillery ammunition was drawn from the ASP as needed. Special items such as bangalore torpedoes were shipped from Qui Nhon.
- (5) Aircraft Sorties: A total of 137 sorties were flown for the Task Force for resupply and backlog. UH1H and CH-47 aircraft were used to carry internal and external loads.
 - (a) Resupply: 112 sorties - 76 UH1H and 36 CH-47.
 - (b) Backlog: 25 sorties - 7 UH1H and 18 CH-47.

15. Special Equipment or Techniques: None.


ANTHONY J JULIANO
CPT, Infantry
Assistant S-3