

HISTORY OF
1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED), 50TH INFANTRY
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE

1 January 1969
to
31 March 1969

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PREFACE

I. Purpose: This report is intended to give all interested agencies and personnel a complete and unbiased record of the Battalion's accomplishments and failures during operations conducted in the Republic of Vietnam from 1 January 1969 to 31 March 1969. It is hoped that the events recorded and lessons learned which have been outlined in this report will prove beneficial to other units in the successful accomplishment of their respective missions.

II. Scope: This historical report covers administrative as well as the operational aspects of the Battalion for this reporting period. The information for this report was obtained from the files and daily journals of the 1st Bn (M), 50th Infantry.

ANNEXES

- ANNEX A** After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radoliff, 6 Mar 69
- ANNEX B** After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radoliff, 20 Mar 69
- ANNEX C** Defoliation and Clearance Along QL-19
- ANNEX D** Overlay of QL-19 and Radoliff

SECTION I

1. INTRODUCTION:

a. On 31 January 1969, AO Walker was redesignated AO Marshall. The Battalion continued to allocate two rifle companies for; securing the Bridges along QL-19; protecting LZs Schueller and Action; and providing a Mobile Road Reaction Force. The 3d Rifle Company was used to conduct offensive operations in AO Marshall.

b. On 10 March 1969 the Battalion changed their concept of operations. Three subordinate AOs were designated along QL-19; AOs West, Central, and East. One Rifle Company acted as the Battalion maneuver element, while the other two companies were assigned responsibility for AO West and AO Central. The Scout platoon, with the Mortar Platoon of the maneuver company attached, was given AO East. (See Annex B, Map Overlay)

c. Enemy activity increased significantly during the months of January and February, and increased slightly over that level during March.

d. Enemy attacks on Camp Radcliff consisted mainly of sniper fire on the "Greenline", and sapper and mortar attacks on installations and equipment inside of Camp Radcliff. Enemy activity on LZ Schueller and LZ Action were characterized by sniper fire along with B40 rockets and mortar fire. Convoys and the securing elements along QL-19 were hit with sniper, rocket, and mortar fires. The Mobile Strike Force Companies ORCON to 1-50th came in contact with squad and platoon sized enemy elements.

2. TACTICAL OPERATIONS:

a. 1-31 January 1969: Enemy activity for the month of January was mainly characterized by ambushes along Highway QL-19. MSF Company 233, ORCON to 1-50, successfully conducted operations in this area resulting in six VC/NVA KIA, 20 detainees CIA, five small arms CIA, 1,000 lbs of rice CIA, along with several B40 rockets, mines, and 10 lbs of documents CIA. Elements of 1-50th while conducting operations, killed 22 VC/NVA, captured two PWs, crew served weapons and eight small arms. Other weapons captured were several mines, booby traps, and 60mm mortar rounds.

(1) 2 January 1969:

(a) Signal elements on Hon Cong Mountain reported receiving a burst of small arms fire at 0115 hours. Fire was returned with negative results.

(b) At 0742, C(-)/1-50th conducted a combat assault in two LZs at BR383512 and BR31511. Simultaneously the Short Range Ambush Patrol (SRAP) moved to BR380471 by APC. This was in reaction to locally gathered intelligence that an enemy unit was about to enter a Montagnard village (BR395449) and levy the village rice supply.

(c) At 1255, MSF Co 232 made contact with an estimated enemy squad at BR439233. In the same area they found several bunkers, four rucksacks (1US, 1 CIDG, 1 VC), one AK47 magazine, one US M3 6x30 binoculars, two

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pith helmets, green NVA uniforms, a VC canteen, and one flashlight.

(d) At 1825, MSF Co 232 found a large hooch at BR452236 and destroyed it. Documents found in the area indicated that an airstrike, (date unknown), hit an enemy CP located at BR457237. The documents were extracted and turned over to 172 MI. Co 232 later reported locating six bunkers (1x6) and ten hooches (10x10) at BR439233.

(e) At 2115, FSB Kathy (BR385225) was harassed from the west with automatic weapons fire 300 meters from the base. Small arms fire was returned with negative results.

(f) Bridge 20 on QL-19 received 15 rounds of small arms fire from the north at a distance of 400 meters at 2215 hours resulting in negative casualties.

(2) 3 January 1969:

(a) At 1030, B/1-50th found six hooches, 300 lbs of rice, and 3,000 ears of corn at BR391460. It was extracted and turned over to An Tuc District Headquarters.

(b) At 1646 MSF Co 233 initiated contact with a squad size element at a distance of 30 meters resulting in the capturing of one SKS, one AK47, one rucksack and inflicting one possible KIA. Blood trails leading to the southwest were pursued with negative results.

(c) At 1730 a convoy was taken under fire at Bridge 19 (BR521461). B/1-50th was alerted and began moving towards the contact area. At 1800 hours approximately 1,000 meters west of Bridge 19 vehicles were taken under fire by B40 rockets and small arms from the south. The enemy fire seemed to be originating from Hill 674. At 1950 hours the enemy force broke contact and withdrew. In this ambush, friendly losses were nine NVA, two KHA, several trucks destroyed. The enemy losses were unknown.

(3) 4 January 1969:

(a) At 1000 hours MSF Co 232 made contact with five NVA at BR450231. The enemy was engaged at a distance of 15 meters resulting in two NVA KIAs and two AK47s CIA. The remaining NVA fled to the northwest. The MSF pursued with negative results. Additional items captured were three rucksacks, six AK47 magazines, two canteens, 15 lbs of rice, and four bottles of medicine.

(b) At 1505 hours a patrol from Bridge 19 found a 60mm mortar base plate in the village northwest of Bridge 19 (BR518462).

(c) At 2008 hours Bridge 24 received 50-100 rounds of small arms fire from the south. Small arms fire was returned with undetermined results.

(4) 5 January 1969: At 1130 hours MSF Co 231 made contact with three NVA in green khakis. Results: one NVA KIA, CIA one AK47 with magazine, one pack with clothes, two mines - (one anti-personnel, and one shaped charged).

(5) 6 January 1969: At 1055 hours Strong Point #4 received small arms fire and M79 fire from BR336465. Co A reaction force responded with negative results.

(6) 7 January 1969: At 1145 hours a MSF reconnaissance team was engaged by an enemy platoon size element at BR417278 with undetermined results.

(7) 8 January 1969: At 0810 hours elements from Co A discovered one Chicom anti-tank mine (1 1/2 inches in diameter) near Strong Point #10. It was destroyed in place by EOD.

(8) 10 January 1969:

(a) At 0946 hours MSF Co 233 initiated contact with 7 NVA dressed in khakis, carrying rucksacks and SKS carbines at BR475216. NVA fled to the northeast with negative enemy casualties.

(b) At 1110 hours at coordinates BR297856, D/2-1 Cav engaged five VC with at least one weapon, results were unconfirmed five VC KIA.

(9) 11 January 1969: At 1745 hours Hawk team 53A at BR523412 spotted several individuals moving away from their ambush site. They were engaged and the VC/NVA returned small arms fire and fled southwest with negative results.

(10) 12 January 1969:

(a) At 0800 hours MSF Co 232 at BR433224 found ten cave type bunkers with sleeping space for 75-100 people. Also found in the area were chickens, pig pens, ten jugs of rice wine, farm tools, bundles of punji stakes, and large amounts of green tobacco. The area appeared to have been vacated one day prior to the search. All was destroyed except the wine.

(b) At 1030 MSF Co 232 found a base camp with ten one week old hooches, ten bunkers with overhead cover, fresh meat cuttings, and eight pigs at BR45229. All were destroyed.

(c) At 1320 hours MSF 232 found a cache of numerous school books, letters, and documents at BR430232. All items were extracted.

(11) 14 January 1969: At 1030 hours MSF Co 232 located an enemy training area consisting of six hooches and six bunkers with overhead cover at BR443228. Facilities were set up for 30 students to receive three blocks of instruction (1st-Counter ambush, 2d-Mines, 3d Barbed Wire and Protective Fencing). All were destroyed.

(12) 15 January 1969:

(a) At 0720 hours the 1st platoon, 4/1-50th, with one tank attached made contact in the vicinity of Strong Point #4 with an enemy force,

armed with small arms, 60mm mortars, B40 rockets, and anti-tank grenades. The entire element received intense fire and two APCs were hit by B40 rockets. Two platoons of Co A reacted swiftly and the enemy immediately broke contact by attempting to withdraw. Two APCs were destroyed, one M48 tank was damaged. There were 11 US WHA, two US KHA. Enemy losses were: ten KIA, one CIA, one RPG-2, one RPD, five AK47 magazines, grenades and miscellaneous equipment CIA.

(b) At 0805 hours the SRAP platoon reported that a convoy was being hit east of Bridge 18 from BR531469 with mortar and B40 fire. The SRAPs reacted and moved towards the ambush. The maneuver element of C/1-50th also moved towards the ambush site. At 1020 hours the SRAP made contact and called for gunship support. C/1-50th maneuver element and SRAP platoon continued to operate in vicinity of Bridge 18. Results: one US KHA, one US WHA, three vehicles slightly damaged and two NVA KIA.

(13) 16 January 1969

(a) At 0700 hours C/1-50th reported that a tank from 1/C/1-69th armor was hit by B40 fire near Pump Station #7. The Scout platoon reacted to the contact. By 0721 hours fire was coming from the high ground at BR096462. Gunships were called in and expended in the contact area. Contact was broken leaving one US KHA, one US WHA, one tank damaged, unknown enemy casualties.

(b) At 1100 hours a convoy was hit by small arms fire between Bridge 26 and 27. B/1-50th moved an element towards that contact. At 1130 hours a FAC reported spotting 50 VC north of Bridge 27 at BR273445. At 1155 hours, 1-50th had forces spread along QL-19 from the Mang Yang Pass to SP#10 in search of enemy units. Results one US WHA, three VC/NVA KIA.

(c) At 1715 hours, MSF Headquarters reported that during the day the MSF companies found the following:

1. At BR458233 a French rifle (MAS 36-2), US 12 Gauge shotgun, two hand grenades, two CBU-4s, two packs of documents, and huts and bunkers.

2. At BR440223 found 12 huts and bunkers with overhead cover, five rolls of WD-1 commo wire, a latrine area, 50 man mess, and a classroom area.

(14) 17 January 1969: At 0701 hours elements of A/1-50th while on a mine sweep, engaged two squads of VC/NVA employing small arms, automatic weapons, and B40 rockets, resulting in one US KIL, four US WHA, two NVA/VC KIA, two AK47s, one RPG-2, several B40s and chicom grenades CIA.

(15) 20 January 1969: At 2012 hours the SRAP platoon reported engaging six VC/NVA. Immediately after initiating the contact they received four mortar rounds from BR355517. Artillery was fired and the contact was broken by the enemy with undetermined results.

(16) 21 January 1969:

(a) At 0100 hours Bridge 20 received approximately 14 rounds of 82mm mortar and light small arms fire. Negative casualties or damages.

(b) Hawk team 52B initiated its ambush resulting in two US WHA

(not serious), four VC/NVA KIA, one NVA KIA (CIA), one AK47, one SKS, one machine gun, one pistol, two B40 rockets with launchers, a medic bag, and one chicom grenade CIA.

(17) 23 January 1969: At 0826 two mines were found on SP#3. They were plastic mines with 22 lbs of explosives. At 1135 hours, two more mines were found on SP#2. One was a basket type with a 60mm mortar round, the other was a Russian anti-tank mine.

(18) 24 January 1969:

(a) At 0723 hours a gunship crashed and burned near SP#10. The Scout platoon reacted and secured the aircraft. All crew members were killed.

(b) Hawkeye 23 (0-1 203d Avn Co (RAC)) drew fire from four automatic weapons at BR359599. Artillery was fired with unknown results.

(19) 25 January 1969:

(a) At 1306 hours a LOH from D/2-1 Cav was shot down at BR359554. The SRAP platoon and Aero Rifle platoon D/2-1 were inserted to secure the aircraft. The crew escaped with one man slightly wounded. During the operation the ground troops made light contact with negative results.

(b) At 2110 hours Hawk 52C initiated its ambush. Results were no friendly losses, one VC/NVA KIA, one mine CIA, one B40 rocket and launcher.

(20) 27 January 1969: At 0830 hours, 4th platoon A/1-50th found one dead VC/NVA near SP#1. An AK47 with ammunition and two chicom grenades were found partially camouflaged nearby.

(21) 31 January 1969: B/1-50th assumed the Bridge Security Mission and C/1-50th became the M-neuver Company. At 1600 hours C/1-50th was combat assaulted into an LZ at BR323556 to conduct RIF. (AO bounded by BR3054, 3059, 3559, 3554). The operation continued until 4 February 1969; one small contact was made resulting in one US MIA (slight).

b. 1-28 February 1969: Enemy contacts for the month of February were similar to those contacts for the month of January. The Battalion had braced itself for the expected Tet offensive which really never materialized. Snipers continued to harass QL-19 with small arms, mortar fire and rocket fire. Periodic sniper fire was reported by the "Greenline" at Camp Redcliff. The Battalion accounted for 35 VC/NVA KIA, three PIs, 11 crew served weapons-CIA, and seven small arms CIA.

(1) 5 February 1969: At 0500 hours two RF platoons (241 & 246), an intelligence squad, 20 National Police, and two platoons from C/1-50th conducted a cordon and search of Don Cho (BR100433). Results: three confirmed VCI and six suspects captured.

(2) 6 February 1969:

(a) At 1250 hours the Military Police reported finding a booby

trapped chicon grenade along QL-19 at BR383453.

(b) At 2028 hours 1st Cav Training Center reported receiving two or three rounds of fire from the base of Hon Cong Mountain. M79 fire was returned with negative results.

(3) 7 February 1969: At 1500 hours an exercise alert was called by 1-50th at Camp Radcliff. It was terminated at 1627 hours after reinforcing units were committed to blocking positions within Camp Radcliff.

(4) 8 February 1969:

(a) C/1-50th departed Camp Radcliff at 0715 hours to assume the Mobile Road Reaction Mission from A/1-50th. A/1-50th opened the road at 0830 hours and was relieved by C/1-50th at 0940 hours.

(b) First platoon A/1-50th reported movement and talking (VN) all around their night location (BR356492) several times during the night of 8-9 February. Artillery was fired in support, and activity diminished after each fire mission.

(5) 9 February 1969:

(a) Operation "Easy Draw", a practice alert, was put into effect at Camp Radcliff at 0400 hours and concluded at 0600 hours.

(b) At 1625 hours D/2-1 Cav spotted several enemy running out of a bunker at BR351548 and engaged them with gunships resulting in two confirmed KIAs and eight possible KIAs. Several hooches and bunkers were also destroyed at the same location.

(6) 10 February 1969: A(-)/1-50th, two platoon of RFs, and one platoon of National Police conducted a cordon and search of An Quy village (BR465425) beginning at 0541 hours and terminating at 0830 hours. Four males were detained for questioning.

(7) 11 February 1969:

(a) At 0807 hours the SRAP (Hawk 51) ambush (BR336463) received three frag grenades from the east. Immediately thereafter, they heard movement in the same area. They engaged with small arms fire, called in artillery, and 81mm fire. Gunships also expended in the area. Negative friendly casualties, enemy casualties unknown.

(b) At 0852 hours 1st platoon A/1-50th while searching hooches (BR343511), received six 60mm mortar rounds. There were negative friendly casualties. Gunships expended to the west of this location where they spotted VC/NVA in a woodline with unknown results.

(c) At 1405 hours 2/A/1-50th was combat assaulted clandestinely into an LZ at BR349507. (The 18 inch cargo doors were not removed from the helicopters and only three or four men were put in the helicopters. These men sat far forward in the chopper, backed up against the pilot and co-pilot's

seats so that the helicopters appeared empty as they went into the LZ/PZ.) At the LZ/PZ, 1/A/1-50th had only two or three men board the helicopter to be extracted. These personnel sat in the doorway, giving the impression that a full chopper load was extracted. The insertion of 31 men from 2/A/1-50th was completed successfully. Second platoon 1/A/1-50th remained in the vicinity of the LZ/PZ in ambush.

(8) 12 February 1969: At ~~0900~~ hours 2/A/1-50th found 10 bunkers with food hidden in the roofs which was destroyed.

(9) 13 February 1969:

(a) At ~~0820~~ hours Bridge 21 received several small arms fire from the south and returned fire with unknown results. Then at ~~0824~~ hours Bridge 26 received approximately 20 rounds of small arms fire from the south. Hawkeye (US Army O-1) spotted four to five individuals moving north towards Bridge 26 and called in artillery with unknown results.

(b) D/2-1 Cav reacting to information obtained by Hawkeye 21 on the afternoon of 12 February, began aerial reconnaissance vicinity grid BR328-356. At ~~1028~~ hours the Aero Rifle Platoon D/2-1 was inserted and began to search and destroy 50 hooches, 25 bunkers with connecting trenches, two small amounts of rice and corn, ten chickens and 30 pigs.

(10) 14 February 1969:

(a) At ~~0926~~ hours a convoy was ambushed from both the north and south sides of the road (BR511456 & BR511464). There was small arms fire, B40 rockets, and satchel charges. A Provisional Platoon, 1-50th reacted. Artillery was fired and gunships expended in the area. Results: one US KIA (convoy), seven US WIA (convoy), one PF KIA, five enemy KIA, three enemy PJs. Five AK47s, 26 chicom grenades, two RPG-2s, five B40 rockets, one RPD machine gun, and one command detonated mine CIA. Information about enemy rallying points (BR515445 & BR515440) was given by one of the PJs and artillery was immediately fired into these locations, with unknown results.

(b) At 1146 hours it was reported that a VC flag was flying on top of the hill at BR550464, and sniper rounds were received from that location. PF troops captured the flag and the hill was then saturated with artillery fire.

(c) At 1725 hours LRP team 22 received small arms fire and heard movement around their location (BR334576). Negative casualties. The team was extracted at 1821 hours (BR334577). After the extraction the covering gunships (Buccanors) engaged four VC, BR348566. A secondary explosion was seen in the area.

(d) Exercise "Cocked Hat" went into effect at ~~1800~~ hours and was effective until ~~2300~~ Feb 69. The exercise was a precaution taken because of the upcoming Tet holidays.

(11) 15 February 1969:

(a) At ~~0410~~ hours Hawk 54B (BR373464) heard movement and noises

about 100 meters to their northeast and also observed a fire being built about 800 meters to their north. 81mm mortars were fired on the movement and noises and 105s were fired on the fire with unknown results.

(b) The SRAP was extracted at 0825 hours and closed Camp Radcliff at 0850 hours. During the debriefing, the SRAP leader indicated that there was enemy activity around the SRAP night location. He reported that at 1930 hours two fires were observed approximately 400 meters from the ambush site, one to the north and one to the west. Artillery was called for and as the second round detonated, the fire was extinguished, and the flashlights disappeared. There was no more activity for the remainder of the night.

(12) 16 February 1969: A cease fire went into effect at 1800 hours today and was to last for 24 hours due to Tet.

(13) 17 February 1969:

(a) At 0930 hours a B/1-50th APC (Armored Personnel Carrier, M113) hit a pressure type mine with 23 lbs of explosive (BR508459). One man was slightly injured and a track was blown off the APC. The element also took a few rounds of harassing small arms fire. Artillery was fired on the suspected enemy location with unknown results.

(b) At 1700 hours Troop 11 (USAF FAC) spotted a bunker and a cave complex at BR360497. People were seen running into the bunkers as he flew overhead. An airstrike was put into this area at 1800 hours with unknown results.

(c) At 2020 hours the 1st Cav Training Center within Camp Radcliff, reported receiving five to six sniper rounds from Hon Cong Mountain (BR458467). They returned fire with M79, and an APC from 1-50th went to the area and reconned with .50 cal fire.

(14) 19 February 1969:

(a) At 1203 hours, 2/4/1-50th while operating in their AO, received 12 sniper rounds from the north (BR326544). Gunships expended in the area and arty was fired, both with unknown results.

(b) At 1630 hours MSF 211 made contact with an NVA squad size element (BR32117). The NVA broke contact and fled northeast. Negative friendly casualties. One enemy KIA.

(c) At 2115 hours LZ Harry, an outpost manned by RF/PF personnel, was attacked by an unknown size enemy force, vicinity BR557504. After a brief exchange of fire, the enemy withdrew. Artillery was fired, negative friendly casualties, unknown enemy casualties.

(15) 20 February 1969:

(a) At 0011 hours the 1st Cav Training Center, within Camp Radcliff, received approximately 15 rounds of sniper fire from Hon Cong Mountain (BR458464). The Training Center returned fire with small arms with unknown results. Negative friendly casualties.

(b) At 0135 hours E Co, 20th Infantry LRP, located within Camp Radcliff reported one HE round (unknown type) had detonated on the roof of one of their buildings. Negative results.

(c) At 0950 hours gunships from D/2-1 Cav reported killing one VC (confirmed) at BR358355. One 9mm pistol was taken off the body, but it was dropped into the river and not recovered.

(d) MSF companies 221, 222, and 223 began operations in their new AOs at 1650, 1330, and 1450 hours respectively. (MSF AOs: 221 Co, BR5640, 5646, 5146; 222 Co BR4938, 5638, 5646, 4946; Co 223 BR5246, 5646, 5650, 5250.)

(e) At 1557 hours, 2/A/1-50th received six to seven rounds automatic weapons fire 200 meters to the west of their location (BR30550) while operating in their AO. Negative casualties. Artillery was fired and gunships expended in the area, both with unknown results.

(f) The maneuver element from B/1-50th found one dead, partially buried NVA at BR510461 at 1659 hours. It was established that he was killed six to seven days ago by small arms fire.

(g) Hawk 54B BR332460 spotted two people vicinity BR330462 at 2000 hours. When the people started moving north, away from the ambush, 81mm mortar was fired with unknown results.

(16) 21 February 1969:

(a) At 1110 hours Strong Point #14 received five-eight rounds of small arms fire from the south side of the road (BR227507). Negative casualties. Hawkeye 21 (US Army O-1) spotted one individual moving around in that location and expended his rockets on the area with unknown results.

(b) While continuing operations in their AO, 2/A/1-50th received two rounds of sniper fire at BR317550 at 1201 hours. Negative casualties. Hawkeye 62 adjusted artillery on the area from which the sniper fire came.

(17) 22 February 1969:

(a) At 0900 hours Bridge 18 (B/1-50th) received automatic weapons fire, ten 82mm mortar rounds and 20 B40 rockets from north of the Bridge (BR535465). Artillery was fired, gunships expended in the area, and a reaction element consisting of platoon size elements from B/1-50th, C/1-50th, and C/1-69th Armor swept the area. Also MSF Co 223 aided in the sweep. Results: three US KIA (slight), eight NVA KIA, three AK47s CIA, two B40 rockets, one RPG-2 rocket launcher, and one 9mm pistol CIA.

(b) At 0945 hours MSF 223 spotted approximately three platoons NVA (approximately 100 total strength) at BR520473, heading west. Artillery was fired with unknown results. Then at 1000 hours MSF 223 made heavy contact with an unknown size enemy force at BR527472, negative friendly casualties. Results: One NVA KIA, one RPG-2 rocket launcher, two B40 rockets CIA.

(c) Bridge 18 once again came under fire, mortars and automatic weapons, at 1305 hours (BR545160). A convoy was passing through at the time and also received fire from the same vicinity. Artillery was fired, gunships expended in the area and the reaction elements once again maneuvered in the area. Results: four US WHA (slight-from convoy), one NVA KIA, one AK47 CIA. The village at BR557457 was cordoned and searched upon reports of VC being in the village, with negative findings. The Blackhawk gunships engaged enemy personnel at BR545462 and reported six possible enemy KIA.

(d) At 1620 hours MSF 223 found ten B40 rockets at BR535466.

(18) 23 February 1969:

(a) At 0358 hours the Hawk 51 element (SRAP) reported hearing the enemy shooting up the pipeline with small arms fire (approx 100 rounds) from BR337462 to BR333461. Artillery was fired and the shooting ceased.

(b) At 0420 hours, A/1-50th reported that the pipeline was blown at BR240495. While moving from Bridge 25 to LZ Action, a Scout Platoon APC was hit by a B40 rocket at BR293454 at 0700 hours. A/1-50th reacted and when they reached the contact area, received an unknown amount of mortar rounds. Results: six US WHA (slight), three NVA KIA, two RPG-2 rocket launchers, one B40 rocket CIA. Very slight damage was done to the APC.

(c) LZ Schueller received 10-15 rounds 60mm mortar, which included several CS gas rounds, at 0708 hours. Negative casualties.

(d) At 0950 hours an APC from C/1-50th was hit by a B40 rocket at BR351448. The element returned fire and artillery was fired. Results: one US WHA (slight), two NVA KIA, one RPG-2, two B40s, and one AK47 CIA. The APC was destroyed by fire.

(e) At 1055 hours an element from C/1-50th received four mortar rounds at BR331461 resulting in two US WHA (slight). Gunships expended and artillery was fired on the suspected enemy mortar location with unknown results.

(f) LRP team 22 was inserted at BR463341 at 1545 hours. They made contact with an unknown size enemy force at 1605 hours. Negative friendly casualties, four NVA KIA. Team was extracted at 1655 hours.

(19) 24 February 1969:

(a) At 0645 hours Bridge 27 received three 60mm mortar rounds (two HE, one smoke) which impacted 100 meters south of the bridge. Artillery was fired on the suspected mortar position with unknown results.

(b) Third platoon A/1-50th received one B40 rocket at BR258481 at 0729 hours. Negative casualties, negative damage.

(c) At 0753 hours, 1st platoon A/1-50th received two B40 rockets at BR302454, negative casualties.

(d) At 0829 hours Scouts/1-50th received two B40 rockets and small arms fire at BR243477. Gunships expended in the area and were credited with one NVA KIA and one machine gun CIA. The Scout element took one US WHA and two NVA KIA.

(e) At 0924 hours an element from C/1-50th received two mortar rounds at BR351448. Negative casualties.

(f) The Scouts/1-50th again received B40 rockets and small arms fire at 1107 hours (vicinity BR243486). Artillery was fired, A/1-50th reacted and maneuvered in the contact area, and gunships expended. Results: four US WHA, one US KIA, three NVA KIA, two possible NVA KIA, one APC damaged.

(g) At 1845 hours while moving to insert a Hawk team, 3d platoon C/1-50th received two B40 rockets and small arms fire at BR350447. The remainder of C/1-50th moved to the contact area and artillery was fired. Results: two US WHA (slight).

(h) At 2000 hours Camp Bullmoose (PF outpost) received automatic fire from the south. Negative casualties, artillery was fired with unknown results.

(i) Hawk 51 made contact with three enemy at 2045 hours at BR 241494. Results: two US WHA (slight). Hawk 51 moved back to PS8 and remained there all night.

(20) 25 February 1969:

(a) At 0515 hours Hawk 524 spotted three enemy at BR301454 and believed there was a large enemy force in the immediate area of their ambush. Gunships and a flare ship were sent to the area and expended with unknown results.

(b) OP Dick (manned by PFs) received seventeen 75mm RR rounds from BR519548 and BR513551 at 0710 hours. Negative casualties. Artillery was fired in support and upon sweeping the area, the PFs found six 75mm RR rounds, nine 82mm mortar rounds, and numerous blood trails.

(c) A/1-50th while checking out the area (BR233497) where several airstrikes were put in (24 Feb) found eight bunkers with overhead cover, four mortar pits with clothes still burning in them, and several chicom grenades, B40 rocket charges, M47 magazines, one 75mm RR canister, and a chicom red smoke grenade.

(d) At 1702 hours LZ Action received small arms fire and 75RR fire from BR265483. The area was saturated with duster fire and artillery with unknown results. At the same time, a convoy was hit vicinity BR250484. Also Strong Point 12 received several 75mm RR rounds and several B40 rockets. Gunships and artillery fired on suspected enemy location with unknown results. There were negative friendly casualties during the entire contact.

(e) At 1840 hours 3d platoon C/1-50th received two B40 rockets and small arms fire at BR250447. Negative casualties. Dusters from LZ Schueller and artillery fired with unknown results.

(21) 26 February 1969:

(a) At 1000 hours A/1-50th while conducting a sweep found one NVA KIA (body completely burned), one M47, and one RPG-7 with two rockets at BR240471.

(b) At 1127 hours A/1-50th received three B40 rocket rounds at BR234474. The enemy was engaged with gunships and Dusters, as well as small arms fire. Negative friendly casualties. While searching the contact area, they spotted a blood trail and found one NVA KIA at BR240175. Later while following another blood trail, they came under automatic weapons fire at BR234474. Negative casualties. Artillery was fired and gunships expended. FIC spotted 30-50 enemy at BR234471, which he adjusted artillery on, with unknown results. At 1455 hours A/1-50th found four enemy rucksacks with sixteen 82mm mortar rounds and some AK47 rounds at BR234474.

(c) At 1340 hours MSF 221 while conducting a combat assault, the lead aircraft noticed a secondary explosion when artillery was firing on the LZ (BR314367). Buccaneer gunships moved in to prep the area and received ground fire. Negative casualties. Several fires were blazing on the original LZ, so MSF 221 was inserted at coordinates BR319368. The Buccaneer gunships expended in the area from which they took the fire with unknown results.

(d) At 1456 hours an element from C/1-50th received one B40 rocket and automatic weapons fire from the north of QL19 at BR328461. Negative casualties. Artillery was fired with unknown results.

(e) At 1550 hours the Buccaneer gunships spotted eight enemy, vicinity BR310359 and received automatic weapons fire from a cave vicinity BR326363. They engaged with rockets and machine guns with unknown results.

(22) 27 February 1969:

(a) At 0020 hours PS47 received six B40 rockets from vicinity BR303453. Negative casualties, negative damage. Dusters returned fire and artillery was fired, both with unknown results.

(b) C/1-50th while conducting the mine sweep, was engaged with four B40 rockets at BR350450 at 0745 hours. Negative casualties or damage. Fire was returned and gunships and artillery supported, resulting in three NVA KIA, two RPG-2 rocket launchers, and two B40 rockets CIA.

(c) At 1703 hours a convoy was fired at with small arms fire at BR528464. An APC from B/1-50th hit a mine vicinity BR528463 while enroute to the contact area. As B/1-50th was returning fire, they observed a secondary explosion (BR528464). Artillery and gunships also expended in the area. Contact resulted in negative casualties and one APC slightly damaged.

(23) 28 February 1969: At 2245 hours Bridge 25 received ten 82mm mortar rounds and two B40 rockets from vicinity BR306453. Negative casualties or damage. Artillery was fired on enemy location with unknown results.

c. 1-31 March 1969: Enemy activity increased during March to the point of several daily contacts. Contacts consisted of sniper, B40 rocket, and mortar attacks on the elements securing QL19 and convoys. Camp Radcliff came under a mortar and sapper attack resulting in two US KIA, and seven US IAW. The Battalion accounted for 14 VC/NVA KIA, one NVA PW, two crew served weapons, and 13 small arms CIA.

(1) 1 March 1969:

(a) At 0827 hours an APC from C/1-50th hit a mine (60mm mortar) at BR302455. Negative casualties, negative damage.

(b) At 1440 hours Tonto 11 (USAF FAC) received about 50 rounds of ~~automatic~~ weapons ground fire from vicinity BR380367. Artillery was fired into the area with unknown results.

(c) At 1624 hours an element from C/1-50th received two rounds of sniper fire at BR344453. Negative casualties.

(2) 2 March 1969:

(a) A tank on SF7 received one sniper round from BR280458 at 0850 hours. Neg casualties.

(b) At 0930 hours a convoy received four rounds sniper fire at BR000440. Negative casualties. A VC suspect was detained by the MPs after the incident.

(c) An APC from C/1-50th hit a mine on SF5 (BR328460). Negative casualties, although there was slight damage to the APC.

(d) At 2000 hours, LRP team (Kilo) from the 173d, reported seeing five VC planting mines at vicinity BR352443. As the team moved to set up a hasty ambush, the enemy spotted them and fled south.

(3) 3 March 1969:

(a) At 0615 hours IRP team (I) of the 173d LRPs made contact with approximately ten VC/NVA, (BR378446), resulting in seven US WHA and one VC/NVA KIA. Gunships expended in the contact area with unknown results.

(b) At 1825 hours personnel at LZ Action found four 25 lb satchel charges under the chopper pad on the east side of the perimeter (BR268471). The charges were removed and destroyed by EOD.

(c) At 2045 hours PF platoon 239 initiated contact with an estimated platoon of VC at BR465421. The enemy quickly broke contact and fled to the east. Negative friendly casualties, one possible enemy KIA, one carbino and two chicom grenades were captured. Artillery was fired on the fleeing enemy with unknown results.

(d) At 2325 hours the pipeline was blown by the enemy at BR558450.

(4) 5 March 1969:

(a) At 0626 hours LZ Schueller received six to eight rounds of 60mm mortar fire. The rounds all impacted outside the perimeter and there were negative casualties. Artillery was fired on the suspected mortar position (BR353459) with unknown results.

(b) At 0745 hours the mine sweep element from C/1-50th received five B40 rocket rounds and small arms fire at BR350450. There were negative casualties. Artillery was fired and gunships expended in the area, both with unknown results. While making a sweep of the contact area, C/1-50th found three freshly dug foxholes (3'x3') at BR351448.

(c) At 0920 hours, C/1-50th received one B40 rocket at BR346444, negative friendly casualties. Along with the Short Range Ambush Patrol (SRAP) they engaged the enemy, resulting in two enemy KIA, CIA one AK47 and one RPG-2 rocket and launcher.

(d) At 1025 hours in the Mang Yang Pass (BR235504) a convoy was engaged by small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Results: one US WHA (convoy), three trucks slightly damaged, and enemy casualties unknown. A/1-50th reacted and swept the contact area with negative findings.

(e) At 1605 hours C/1-50th found a booby trap at BR335460. It consisted of a baseball type grenade with the pin pulled. EOD blew it in place.

(f) At 1900 hours LZ Action received six to eight 60mm mortar rounds and eight small arms fire. All the mortar rounds landed outside the perimeter; negative casualties. Counter mortar fire was fired by arty at BR248472.

(g) At 1910 hours Bridge 25 received one 57mm RR round from vicinity BR305464 with negative casualties. Artillery was fired with unknown results.

(h) At 2015 hours the pipeline was blown by the enemy at BR360459.

(i) At 2030 hours, LRP team 45 (BR330421) received ten to fifteen mortar rounds (unknown size) which impacted approximately 150-200 meters north of their location. Negative casualties. They could not determine the direction they came from.

(j) LRP team 43 (BR356401) reported seeing 25-30 lights (torches) moving southeast in a column type formation at BR342408. They called in artillery fire on that location resulting in one secondary explosion and the scattering of the lights.

(k) At 2243 hours Camp Radcliff received approximately eleven rounds of mortar fire (size unknown) which impacted in the Golf Course area. Four slight WHAs (three US, 1 VN) and negative damage. Artillery fired counter mortar (BR444488 & BR457498) and gunships expended in these areas with unknown results.

(5) 6 March 1969:

(a) At 0750 hours an APC from C/1-50th hit a mine (two 60mm mortar rounds) at BR347455. Negative casualties, negative damage.

(b) At 1036 hours PF platoon #140, acting upon information

obtained from the local populace, found 50 lbs of rice and 50 lbs of salt at BR494434. They also detained five women at this location, who were later interrogated and classified as follows: four civil defendants, one VC.

(c) At 1130 hours LRP team 43 initiated contact with an estimated squad size enemy element at BR357422. Results: Three enemy KIA, one SKS rifle CIA, and one US WHA (punji stake). The team was extracted after the contact.

(d) At 1900 hours the Buccaneer gunships received approximately 30 rounds of .50 cal from vic BR265485. There were negative casualties or damage. The gunships expended in the area and artillery was also fired; both with unknown results.

(6) 7 March 1969:

(a) At 0953 hours LZ Action received eight 82mm rounds (two of which impacted inside the perimeter) and automatic weapons fire, resulting in four US WHA. A convoy passing LZ Action at the time was hit by four 82mm mortars, resulting in one US WHA and one slightly damaged truck. Artillery fired counter-mortar on the suspected enemy mortar position (BR259455). At the same time, SP#7 and SP#10 received small arms fire. Negative casualties. Three individuals were spotted 200-300 meters south of SP#10 and were engaged with unknown results.

(b) At 1105 hours LZ Schualler received ten to fifteen 82mm mortar rounds, resulting in 14 WHA (nine from 1-50th). Artillery fired counter mortar on the suspected enemy mortar position (BR362452) with unknown results.

(c) At 1030 hours A/1-50th while making a sweep in the area of the suspected mortar location (BR259455) from which LZ Action was mortared; found one knife, one canteen, and a rag soaked in blood along a trail they were following (BR255455).

(d) At 1840 hours LRP team 46 made contact with an estimated squad size element of VC at VR355425, resulting in two VC KIA. Artillery was fired and gunships expended in the area. The team was extracted at 1915 hours.

(7) 8 March 1969:

(a) At 1004 hours SP#5 received approximately 30 rounds of A47 fire from BR328467. Negative casualties. Fire was returned with small arms and 81mm mortars with unknown results.

(b) At 1045 hours an element from C/1-50th received one B40 rocket and small arms fire at BR343466. Negative casualties. Two enemy were spotted heading north during the contact. Fire was returned and artillery was fired in the contact area with unknown results.

(c) A convoy received two B40 rockets and light automatic weapons fire from the north side of the road at BR258473 at 1134 hours. Negative casualties. Eighty One millimeter mortars were fired and gunships expended in the area, both with unknown results. At the same time SP#12 received small arms fire. Negative casualties. Fire was returned with unknown results.

(8) 9 March 1969:

(a) At ~~0845~~ hours an APC from C/1-50th hit a mine at BR3~~02154~~ while making a mine sweep. Negative casualties, negative damage.

(b) At ~~0925~~ hours LZ Action received fifteen 82mm mortar rounds, resulting in three KIA (2-17th Arty). Counter-mortar fire was put on the suspected enemy mortar position (BR251~~463~~) with unknown results. Simultaneously FS8 received ten 60mm mortar rounds, resulting in one KIA (4-60th Dusters). Artillery fired counter-mortar fire on the suspected enemy mortar position (BR23~~0100~~) with unknown results.

(c) The companies of 1-50th changed missions with Co A taking over the AO West, Co B taking over the AO Central, and the Scouts and the mortar platoon of Co C taking over the AO East. Co C returned to Camp Radcliff to prepare for offensive operations.

(d) At 165~~0~~ hours Bridge 26 and SP~~78~~ received two mortar rounds which detonated about 1~~00~~ meters north of the bridge. Negative casualties.

(e) At 175~~0~~ hours an APC from the Scouts/1-50th hit a 4~~0~~ lb anti-tank at BR5~~07162~~, resulting in one US KIA, two US KIA, and one APC destroyed.

(f) Hawk 53A BR351~~49~~, at 2212 hours, spotted two enemy walking on the road and shooting the pipeline. They were too far away (4~~00~~ meters) from the ambush to be engaged with small arms. Artillery was called in on their location with unknown results.

(9) 10 March 1969: At 1145 hours LRP team ~~44~~ made contact with an unknown size enemy force at BR343~~423~~. By 1215 hours they still had movement around the team and gunships were called in. At 1155 hours Co C/1-50th was alerted for a possible search and destroy mission in the area around LRP team ~~44~~. At 135~~0~~ hours Co C(-) was air lifted from Camp Radcliff and combat assaulted into the LRP's location (BR343~~432~~). A number of hooches varying in size from 3'x2' to 16'x3' were located and destroyed; however, contact with the enemy was not made. Co C(-) and LRP team ~~44~~ were extracted at 19~~04~~ hours and replaced by SRAIF platoon/1-50th (LZ BR345~~425~~).

(10) 11 March 1969:

(a) At ~~0840~~ hours Co A found three mines (4" diameter) at SP~~79~~. Co A also found four anti-personnel mines on SP~~10~~. Each mine contained approximately three pounds of explosives.

(b) At 2131 hours Bridge 25 took two incoming B40s and four mortar rounds of unknown size from approximately BR3~~0049~~. The bridge **personnel** engaged immediately and artillery was fired with unknown results. There were negative damage or casualties.

(11) 12 March 1969:

(a) At ~~1000~~ hours Co A found a dead (burned) body at BR2355~~03~~ with an AK47 and a chicom grenade. A search of the area revealed two bunkers

4'x2'x6' with overhead cover and camouflage. Also three B40 rockets with charges were found at BR230502. At 1200 hours in the same area they found another body three to four days old with three AK47 magazines and one B40 round.

(b) At 1825 hours a vehicle from LZ Action passing through the Dak Po (vic BR337461) area had two mortar rounds fired at it from an unknown direction, negative damage or casualties. Co B reacted with negative results. About the same time another truck vicinity SP#1 had a B40 fired at it from about 100 meters south of the road. Negative casualties or damage.

(c) At 1855 hours Co A's ambush, while moving into position, spotted seven VC moving towards its location at BR271475. The ambush engaged and a maneuver element reacted from LZ Action. At 2005 hours Co A reported one SKS, three AK47s captured and four enemy KIAs.

(12) 13 March 1969: At 1330 hours 2/B/1-50th (maneuver element) engaged four NVA resulting in one AK47, one SKS, one chicom grenade, and seven rucksacks CIA.

(13) 14 March 1969: At 1935 hours Co A's ambush engaged 15-20 VC/100 at SP#10. At 1940 hours a reaction element left LZ Action to assist the friendly element on SP#10. At 2015 hours a flareship and two gunships were sent to assist Co A. Co A's reaction element linked up with the Hawk team. The two elements conducted a sweep and then returned to LZ Action while the two gunships fired up the contact area. Contact was broken at approximately 2130 hours. Negative casualties or damage. (Co A conducted a search of the contact area the following morning with negative findings.)

(14) 16 March 1969:

(a) At 0830 hours the SRMP platoon engaged two VC at BR303433. The enemy were dressed in black PJs, one was armed with an M-16. The VC returned fire and fled. Negative casualties.

(b) At 0945 hours SP"B" received one round of small arms fire from vicinity BR399445. The area was checked out with negative findings.

(c) At 1121 hours Bridge 25 received 40-60 rounds of small arms fire and one B40 from BR306461. 1-50th 4.2 mortar platoon in firing position at BR313454, mortared the area. There was negative casualties or damages.

(15) 17 March 1969:

(a) At 1753 hours a convoy received small arms fire between PS8 and Bridge 27 from south of the road. A reaction element from Co A moved out with negative results. Negative casualties or damages. (Approximate location BR 257483)

(b) At 1630 hours LRP team 44 found a large amount of blankets and clothing and poncho liners, and made contact with an unknown size enemy force. LRP team 44 was extracted; PZ time 1845 hours, PZ location BR377547, LZ location Camp Radcliff.

(16) 19 March:

(a) At 0745 hours a truck from the Scout platoon hit a mine. One man was slightly wounded. The mine was a basket type mine with 20-22 pounds of explosives and pressure type detonation.

(b) At 1840 hours a practice alert went into effect at Camp Radcliff. It ended at 1955 hours.

(17) 20 March 1969:

(a) At 1035 hours a convoy from 669th trans received two B40 rockets and small arms fire vicinity BR630427. Two US personnel were KIA, and two trucks were damaged.

(b) At 1640 hours three VC fired a B40 rocket at a Vietnamese truck at BR293456. The round hit the top of the truck wounding (slight) the Vietnamese driver. The Scouts reacted and swept the contact area with negative results.

(c) At 1758 hours the Scouts started receiving rounds from SP4C. These rounds included two B40 rockets and small arms fire. Supporting 81mm mortar was fired from Bridge 18. At 1850 hours an NVA soldier was captured in the contact area (BR510463). Negative friendly casualties were reported.

(d) At 2010 hours Co C's ambush BR305454 spotted two NVA on the north side of Q119 and engaged. Results: one NVA KIA, and one AK47 CIA.

(e) At 2020 hours Co B's ambush BR342458 initiated its ambush killing two NVA and capturing two AK47s.

(f) At 2240 hours sniper fire and sapper action erupted at the base of Non Cong Mountain in the 504th MP area and 4-503d rear area. Approximately 50-60 Eighty Two millimeter mortar rounds impacted in the northern end of Camp Radcliff. A General Alert was sounded at 2253 hours. Artillery, gunships, flareships, and Spooky responded to the mortar threat, while ground troops responded within Camp Radcliff. Light damage was inflicted on equipment at Camp Radcliff, however there were two friendly KIAs and seven MIAs. The alert was terminated at 2410 hours.

(18) 21 March 1969:

(a) At 0550 hours LZ Schueller came under attack. The attack ended at 0620 hours after the enemy fired ten to fifteen 82mm mortar rounds, 12 recoilless rifle rounds, and CS gas. There were negative casualties or damage.

(b) At 0735 hours A/1-50th mine sweep element had two B40 rockets fired at it vicinity BR261481. Fire was returned and moments later the SRAP platoon south of PS8 (BR237488) became heavily engaged with an unknown size enemy force moving towards the road or PS8. The SRAP had seven friendly KIA and one enemy KIA.

(c) At 1225 hours Bridge 18 received ten 82mm mortar rounds from the south. They had four slight MIAs. Artillery, gunships, 4.2 and 81mm mortars returned fire with negative results.

(19) 22 March 1969:

(a) At 0825 hours the Scout platoon reported two basket type satchel charges at BR528464. The satchel charges consisted of two chicom grenades with electric blasting cap and pressure type (home made) detonation device.

(b) At 1145 hours an APC from the Scout platoon hit a mine consisting of 20 lbs of explosives at BR528464 blowing off the front road wheel.

(c) At 1545 hours a Vietnamese citizen reported the location of a command detonated 105 round. It appeared to have been placed there in the last couple days at BR522465. EOD destroyed the mine.

(d) At 2200 hours PS7 received four B40 rockets fired at them from BR303445. Negative damage was reported but one man received fragments in the hand. PS7 and Bridge 26 returned fire along with artillery with unknown results.

(20) 23 March 1969:

(a) At 0755 hours an APC from the Scout element hit a mine on SP"C" (10 lbs of grey powder detonated by 82mm fuse inverted in a 60mm mortar round). One US was wounded.

(b) At 1035 hours SP#5 received automatic weapons fire. About five minutes later a convoy in vicinity of SP#5 reported receiving about 50-100 rounds of automatic weapons fire from the north side of the road approximately 200 meters out. Artillery was fired into the area and a sweep was conducted. Negative findings and negative casualties were reported.

(c) At 2100 hours Co C's ambush began to receive small arms fire. A maneuver element moved out of PS7 to help out. They received approximately four rockets believed to be B40s. Contact was broken around 2115 hours. As the maneuver element returned to PS7 they received small arms fire from the north and south sides of the road. Four US MIA were dusted off at 2145 hours.

(21) 24 March 1969:

(a) At 0737 hours a unit from Co B at SP#4 reported having a B40 rocket fired at them. They maneuvered into the area and found one 60mm mortar round (BR347442). There were negative casualties or damages.

(b) Co C's element found three dud 105 rounds, four 2.75 rockets at BR321463 at 0920 hours. At 0926 hours Co C found two more dud 105 rounds and one 81mm dud in vicinity SR#6.

(c) At 1150 hours road control reported that a convoy received about 120 rounds of automatic weapons fire from north of the road near SP#5. Co C's reaction element went into the area and artillery was fired. Gunships also went into the area BR323464. Negative casualties, damage, and findings were reported.

(d) At 2045 SRAP ambush at BR508454, in vicinity of B19 made contact with estimated three individuals. Negative friendly casualties, one possible enemy KIA. They also had sniper fire from BR338462. Artillery was fired and the sniper fire ceased.

(22) 26 March 1969: D/4-503 was inserted into BR548498. PZ time 260800, LZ time 260832. Conducted dismounted search and clear BR5450, BR5650, BR5447, and BR5647. Negative results.

(23) 27 March 1969

(a) Co C assumed control of AO West at 0900 hours while Co A assumed control of AO Central.

(b) Co C maneuver element reported 10 bunkers 3'x5' with overhead cover made from logs. Also two 2'x3' spider holes and a sleeping area. Sleeping area was used in the past week. The bunkers and foxholes were very old. The area was destroyed BR249489 at 1450 hours.

(24) 28 March 1969

(a) Co B conducted a CA to a suspected enemy location. LZ time 0939 hours (BR346516).

(b) Co A at 0950 hours found two bunkers at BR367433. They destroyed them. They found 4'x6' small animal traps, three hooches big enough for 3-4 people. Area had not been used for 3-4 months.

(c) At 1420 Co B found one 4'x10'x4' bunker about 30 days old at BR351515. At BR349513 found four small hooches not used recently. All were destroyed.

(d) Co B was extracted at 1618 hours BR353504. Results of operation was negative.

(25) 30 March 1969

(a) At 0952 a convoy vicinity SP5 received 50-100 rounds of automatic weapons fire. Co A dispatched an element to vicinity SP5 to check out the area. After the initial burst no more rounds were received. Negative casualties or damages.

(b) A MSF element reported they engaged 4 NVA/VC vicinity BR333403. The enemy fled to the northeast. The MSF element pursued with FIC overhead. There were negative casualties.

(c) PS7 received three rocket and three mortar rounds from vicinity SP6. B25 reported receiving SA fire. Two men from Co C reported slightly wounded.

(25) 31 March 1969

(a) At 0630 it was reported that the road was cluttered between PS8 and the Mang Yang Pass with rocks, logs, and dirt. The road had been blown between B26 and B27 and also between PS8 and the Mang Yang Pass.

(b) At 0800 Co C's mine sweep team received three mortar rounds of unknown type and unknown origin. Negative damage or casualties.

(c) At 0340 PS2 reported receiving six mortar rounds. Negative casualties or damages.

(d) At 0915 powdered OB was reported on the road vicinity SP12. A fire truck from An Khe was dispatched to that area to hose down the road.

(e) Co A's element south of LZ Schueller found 100 lbs of corn, two feet of det cord, six entrenching tools, three hatchet heads at BR368420. They found punji stakes, numerous trails, one 4-5 man bunker with overhead cover about one week old, and eight graves (one recent) BR370474. At BR364408 they found two bunkers (10'x20') two hoochies (10'x15'), and 250 lb bombs with the explosives removed.

(f) An APC was hit with a PAC. A total of five were fired. Four people required dustoff. The APC was lightly damaged.

3. INTELLIGENCE

a. Enemy OB: The 1/50 (MCH) Inf continues to be primarily concerned with the 4th and 5th Battalions of the 95B Regiment, west of An Khe. East of An Khe elements of the 18th NVA Regiment, primarily the 7th and 8th Battalions, are known to be operating. Evidence confirming the presence of these elements was obtained from enemy documents and XWs.

(1) Movement:

(a) The 95B NVA Hqs and its attachments last known location was in the area BR5206.

(b) The 4th Bn Hqs, 95B NVA generally moves around in the area 10-12 kilometers south of QL-19 between the BR22 grid line in the east and the BR37 grid line in the west.

(c) The 5th Bn, Hqs 95B NVA Regiment also generally moves around about 10-12 kilometers south of QL-19 and between B15 in the east and BR22 in the west.

(d) Company and smaller units of both these battalions move in small groups to the highway where they conduct harassing and interdicting operations against convoys and friendly elements on QL-19. Contact on the highway is usually limited to 15 or less enemy personnel. One company from the 4th Bn 95B NVA Regiment has been located north of QL-19 during this period employing the same methods as those elements south of the Highway.

(e) Very little information is available on local force district companies in our AO because action against US personnel and equipment during this reporting period has been very slight.

(2) State of Readiness:

(a) Indications are that the 95B Regiment, including headquarters, attachments, and 4th and 5th battalions, are relatively well equipped. Their weapons include recoilless rifles, medium mortars and various small arms weapons. The 5th battalion appears to be the better equipped of the two infantry battalions. The Regiment has demonstrated a limited chemical capability during this reporting period.

(b) The 18th NVA Regiment can be considered to have a state of readiness similar to the 95B Regiment.

(c) It is believed that the enemy in AO Marshall cannot stay in contact for more than one hour. This is based on the poor quality of troops and also the primary mission of harrassing and interdicting QL-19. The enemy units in this AO can probably be resupplied within one to three weeks.

(3) Quality: The quality of the enemy in AO Marshall is considered low. This presumption is based upon poor training, poor education, lack of medical supplies and food stuffs, and generally ill-picked replacements.

(4) Combat Efficiency:

(a) Based upon the troop quality and logistical status, the 95B Regimental headquarters can be considered a unit of average efficiency. Contact with this unit cannot be confirmed.

(b) The 4th battalion, 95th Regiment is believed to have relatively low combat efficiency due to heavy losses sustained during this reporting period. The 4th Bn has resorted to using only small coll units to continue its mission of interdicting the highway.

(c) The 5th Bn, 95B Regt appears to have the greatest efficiency for the Regiment. This is based on its supply status, mission, and troop quality. The 5th Bn, 95B Regt and the 7th Bn, 18th NVA Regt are the only units that have employed the RPG-7 rocket launcher in this AO.

(d) The combat efficiency of the 18th NVA Regt cannot be accurately judged at this time due to limited contact.

(5) Morale

(a) Basing a judgement upon PW's, their combat aggressiveness, quality of troops, and status of supply, it is believed that the NVA units in this AO have low morale.

(b) The district force and local force units are believed to have average morale due to sparse activity and access to villages and food supplies.

(6) Counter Attack: The use of counter attack was employed, for the first time, in this AO by an element of the 18th NVA Regt during the post-Tet offensive.

(7) Armor: These units have not employed armor in this AO.

(8) **Special Weapons:** The RPG-2 and RPG-7 have often been used in the enemy's harrassing efforts. At ranges greater than 50 meters, the enemy has consistently displayed poor marksmanship.

(9) **Artillery:** All of the aforementioned units have 60mm mortar and 82mm mortar capability. They have shown a distinct lack of marksmanship.

b. **Nature of terrain and weather conditions:** AO Marshall is centrally located between the coastal plains of Binh Dinh Province and the plateau area of Pleiku. The area is predominately hilly to mountainous with two major valley compartments, the Song Con (Happy Valley) and the Song Ba. The immediate area in the vicinity of An Khe to the North, East, and South is characterized by rolling terrain. To the west it is more heavily vegetated with numerous gullies and deep ravines. To the north the terrain is generally open and rolling, broken by several small hills approximately eight to ten kilometers north of the camp itself. Behind these hills, the Song Ba River cuts the valley floor running west to east and then turning to the southeast. North of this, heavily vegetated and hilly terrain begins and continues unbroken for 30 kilometers. To the northeast and east the terrain is generally open and rolling with a large portion east of the Song Ba under cultivation and populated by many small hamlets and villages. Where the area is not under cultivation, it is densely vegetated with low bushes, grass and trees not more than ten to fifteen feet high which appears from the air as being relatively clear but in fact is dense enough to inhibit cross country movement and is intersected with numerous trails. This terrain continues for approximately three to four kilometers where it enters densely vegetated and hilly terrain which drops off sharply into the Song Con Valley. To the southeast, south, and southwest the terrain is open and rolling for two kilometers on the southeast extending to five kilometers on the southwest. Thereafter the terrain extending out to and past the boundaries of the AO becomes hilly and heavily forested with many steep ravines and small valleys which run generally to the southwest and from east to west, thus placing a series of high hills and mountains between this area and the Song Ba Valley. The Song Ba River which enters the AO from the extreme northwest of the AO bends back so that it enters and exits Camp Radcliff. At its exit from the camp, it bends further back until it flows in a west-southwesterly direction and exits the AO in the southwest corner. To the west the terrain is hilly, becoming mountainous on the extreme western boundary of the AO. The vegetation in this area is dense, becoming heavier and thicker in the extreme western area. Moving farther to the northwest, the terrain becomes extremely rugged and hilly with slopes normally exceeding 14° and with deep cut streams and valleys. The far northwest part of the AO extends about twenty kilometers farther north than the rest of the AO. It is bordered on one side, generally by the Song Ba River. The rest of the panhandle consists of extremely rugged Ba Nam hill masses. The entire area is separated by hill masses of varying sizes, steeply sloped and in most cases, covered with heavy tropical vegetation. The area is inaccessible, however considerable cultivation of this area is noticeable from the air. Throughout the AO, the drainage is generally north to south. The weather conditions for this reporting period has been clear skies with average temperatures of 80 - 90 degrees and occasional thunder storms.

c. **MI Agencies:** The Military Intelligence agencies within our AO are always relaying information to us of intelligence value. Many times plans and decisions are changed because of intelligence gathered from agencies of this type. The agencies that we receive information from are the 172d MI, the 525 MI, and MLCV. When it is possible, the area of a particular agent report is checked out. The reliability of these agent reports is considered F-3 or C-3.

d. Enemy personnel and equipment losses for period:

KIA	PW	C/S	S/L	
22	2	5	7	January 1969
35	3	2	7	February 1969
14	1	2	13	March 1969

4. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

a. Strength:

(1)	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned (Jan)</u>	<u>Assigned (Feb)</u>	<u>Assigned (Mar)</u>
EM	865	849	822	903
OFF	39	34	32	35
WO	2	2	2	1

(2)	<u>HHC</u>	<u>Co A</u>	<u>Co B</u>	<u>Co C</u>	<u>Co D</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>Total</u>
Gains	61	33	73	39	55	0	261
Hosp Rtn	10	21	19	43	8	0	101
KHL	1	3	0	0	0	0	4
WHL	23	22	15	37	4	0	101
NBD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NBW	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Co Art 15	6	14	7	6	10	1	44
Bn Art 15	0	2	2	1	0	0	7
Court Mart	0	0	2	0	0	0	2

b. Battalion Administration has continued to improve with the exception of casualty reporting. It is apparent that unit commanders are not giving this matter their command attention. Should this problem continue, it may result in congressional inquiries and personal embarrassment to the Battalion.

c. The Battalion MOS shortage problem which existed during the last quarterly report has been eliminated in that all medical vacancies and wheel vehicle drivers position's are now occupied by qualified personnel. The shortage of wheel mechanics still exist in that Service Company is presently six under-strength.

d. A rotational hump problem can be foreseen in August 1969 in that more than two thirds of the Senior Enlisted Personnel and ten officers will be due to

DEROS. This matter will be given detailed attention during the month of June 1969.

e. The Battalion awards program is progressing to the extent that it requires a full time position for processing. The following awards have been approved during this reporting period:

	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Total</u>
ACM-V	0	1	0	1
ACM-M	23	9	4	36
BZ-M	33	8	4	41
BZ-V	4	7	0	11
SS-V	1	1	0	2
PH	25	22	25	72
Air Medals	11	31	0	42

f. The 51th Infantry Detachment (Radar) was officially attached to this Battalion effective 6 March 1969. The total authorization for the 51th Inf Det is 19 enlisted personnel, PMOS 11F series.

5. LOGISTICS:

a. Supply:

(1) During the period 1 January to 31 March 1969 the following major items were received from the 58th Field Depot Qui Nhon:

<u>Qty</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>
5	Carrier Mortar M125A1	33	Carrier M113A1
7	Carrier Utility XM571	104*	Compass, Lensatic
3	Launcher Grenade M79	2	Machine Gun M60
13	Machine Gun Cal .50 M2	4	81mm Mortar
6	Rifle Recoiless 90mm	3*	Truck Utility M151

* Indicates those items received from Brigade Supply Officer, 173 Abn Bde.

(2) The Battalion started requisitioning non-expendable supplies from the 88th S&S Battalion Pleiku on 21 Jan 69. We still have liaison personnel at the 58th Field Depot in Qui Nhon who expedite our supplies through the 88th S&S liaison people there.

(3) The Battalion was short the following major items as of 31 March 1969:

<u>Qty</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>
2	Carrier Cargo M5110	1	Carrier Flame M132A1
19	Compass M-2	2	Detector Set Micro-Wave
2	Radar Set AN/PPS-5	41	Compass, Lensatic
14	Tool Set, Gen Mech	7	Truck Utility M151A1
1	Radio Set AN/GRC 106	2	Radio Set AN/GRC 125
13	Radio Set AN/VRC 47	3	Radio Set AN/PRC 71

b. Transportation:

(1) During the period 1 January to 31 March 1969 the transportation section continued to support elements of the Battalion with transportation and fuel.

(2) The transportation section mounted a 2,000 gallon tank on a 2½ ton for water carrying purposes. Now we have the capability to fill up all water points daily in the Battalion rear, as well as supplying LZ Action, LZ Schaeffer, and all ten bridges in the AO. We also supply water to the various units attached to the Battalion.

(3) Air transportation of supplies for the Battalion and units under its operational control for the reporting period was as follows:

(a) January	13 resupply sorties 5 backlogs
(b) February	33 resupply sorties 7 backlogs
(c) March	none

c. The Battalion is presently changing the PLL to stock a minimum of two each items. This will benefit us in the maintenance area. The number of line items at 100% fill doesn't mean anything during this change.

d. Medical:

(1) A reduction in the malaria rate is the most significant observation this quarter. Six cases have been observed thus far in the year. Weekly enforced observation of chloroquine-primaquine tablet administration, together with weekly urine testing for chloroquine content is felt to have contributed to the diminution in the malaria rate.

(2) The venereal disease rate has decreased from the past quarter, due largely to command emphasis on personal prophylactic measures. Three cases of primary syphilis were observed, and contacts were treated.

(3) Field sanitation in the Battalion rear area, on the bridges, and at the artillery fire bases is at an acceptable level.

(4) The medical platoon has participated in numerous MEDCAP programs coordinating through the S5 section.

(5) The number of profiles has been reduced to the present level of eight permanent and ten temporary.

(6) An underground medical aid bunker is fully operational now at LZ Schueller, with a routine and emergency capability. Daily sick call is conducted by the Battalion surgeon while three medical aid men are at the aid station at all times.

(7) Application of topical fluoride toothpaste has been accomplished on the total Battalion strength.

(8) Immunizations have been kept current through visits by the medical platoon to all artillery fire support bases, bridges, and strong points.

(9) The medical platoon is at TO&E strength regarding enlisted men. All rifle companies have their full complement of five medics, who are employed by the companies in a manner dictated by the tactical situation.

(10) Generally, it is felt that the health of the Battalion is at a higher level than at the close of the last quarterly reporting period.

6. CIVIC ACTION, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, AND VOLUNTARY INFORMATION PROGRAM: During the period covered by this report the S5 section coordinated with almost every unit assigned to Camp Radcliff either for direct support, or for donations to be used on S5 projects.

a. Units under direction of this command are conducting Civic Action Projects in the following areas:

- (1) Tu Thuy - BR4953, 4956, 5253, 5256, 173d Spt Bn
- (2) Cuu An - BR5250, 5253, 5650, 5653, 2-17th Arty
- (3) An Kinh - BR5048, 5050, 5248, 5250, 504th MP Bn
- (4) Song An - BR5245, 5247, 5745, 5747, 8-26th Arty
- (5) Tan Cu - BR4044, 4045, 4444, 4445, 5-22d Arty
- (6) An Son - BR4142, 4144, 4442, 4444, 6-84th Arty
- (7) Song Tan - BR4240, 4242, 4640, 4642
- (8) Tu Luong - BR4040, 4042, 4240, 4241

(9) An Khe - BR4511, 4514, 5011, 5055

(10) All other units were used in general support of all Civic Action Programs.

b. The S5 Civic Help Program is designed to provide materials and advice to the Vietnamese people whose communities may benefit from the self help concept of civic action.

(1) At the An Tuc High School a plan was drawn to build a latrine for the 400 students attending school. So far 30 bags of cement, sand, and lumber have been contributed to this project which is approximately 40% completed.

(2) The Catholic Church and Orphanage was given toys for its 14 children. The toys were sent to us by the Wakigan, Illinois group of YWCA, women who are taking an interest in the people of An Khe. S5 donated 169 English books and 56 maps as well as \$60.00 worth of school supplies to the An Tuc High School. These were also obtained from this YWCA group.

(3) The An Tuc Buddhist Temple was the recipient of five bags of cement which were used to repair their shrine.

(4) The Cho An Tuc market place built last quarter was so successful that another market place was begun near Bridge 21 on QL 19. Four buildings on Camp Radcliff were torn down and the tin and lumber is being used for the new market place.

(5) S5 provided a truck for a clean-up day in An Khe which yielded eight truckloads of trash taken from the city. This project, along with the new open-air market places, is greatly helping to improve the sanitation conditions in the villages along QL 19.

(6) The An Tuc dispensary has been pushing a big clean-up program to sanitize the civilian hospital facilities and the S5 helped repair a wall after a rocket attack, as well as re-wiring nine wards of the hospital.

c. A program was initiated utilizing two volunteer US teachers at the An Khe High School. Each man teaches a 1½ hour class, three days a week. One teaches English and the other teaches Physical Education. Plans are also being made to help another primary school with English teachers.

d. S5 coordinates with other agencies on several projects. The New Zealand Red Cross works mainly with the Montagnard refugees recently relocated near QL19. We have given them 76 bags of cement and 12 shovels during this period which are being used in constructing walls in their new villages. Fifty pounds of nails and several tools have also been donated for use in constructing houses and shelters. The Chicou Hoi agency was given 52 resettlement kits consisting of picks, shovels, axes, hoes, and other farming tools which in turn were given to the refugees in the village of An Dinh.

e. The largest single project for this quarter has been the employment of Montagnards on Hon Cong Mountain to cut wood. This project has a two-fold purpose. First, it is clearing away the cover used by Viet Cong Sapper Squads inside the perimeter of Camp Radcliff. Second, it is providing employment for the

Montagnard refugees which we have taken out of the enemy held areas and relocated near QL-19. Approximately \$500,000 (US) have already been spent in employing these Montagnard refugees.

f. A total of eleven large scale MEDCAPS have been conducted this quarter, treating 11,000 Vietnamese civilians. These MEDCAPS are also used to distribute rice (8,000 lbs) and foodstuffs (1,000 lbs). The rice was obtained from captured rice caches during Battalion operations and the foodstuffs were obtained from various units on post.

g. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) have increased their effectiveness tremendously since the acquisition of a speaker and amplifier system which adapts to the UH1-D helicopter. Eighteen speaker missions were flown for a total of 23 hours flight time. These loudspeaker missions are often coordinated with leaflet drops. So far we have dropped 755,000 Chieu Hoi; 277,500 VIP; 60,000 GVN; and 515,000 safe conduct pass leaflets. The results can be seen partially in the sudden increase in weapons turned in through the Voluntary Information Program which is conducted by S2 in coordination with S5.

(1) Turned in this quarter:

- 7-M26A1 grenades
- 1-M16 rifle
- 1-M60 machine gun
- 1-AK47 assault rifle
- 15 - 105mm artillery rounds
- 3 - 155mm artillery rounds
- 1 75mm recoilless rifle round
- 1-anti-tank mine
- 5 - 82mm mortar rounds
- 15 - 81mm mortar rounds
- 4 - 4.2 mortar rounds
- 18 - M79 rounds

(2) The S2 section has paid out 97,713,000 \$VN for these items and information leading to the discovery of the anti-tank mines.

h. In summary it is felt that during the past three month period, Battalion Civic Actions have increased to a point where a significant change is taking place in the citizenry of An Khe and An Tac. Self help work projects and efficient handling of refugees are creating a greater trust and confidence in the eyes of the Vietnamese people.

SECTION II

Personnel

Item: Misuse of Personnel

Discussion: It has been noted that some personnel are not being properly utilized once they are assigned to specific sections within the Battalion. For example, individuals assigned to a staff section or company for duty in PMOS 71B20 (clerk typist) are being utilized as RTOs.

Observation: Recommend personnel be assigned duties compatible with PMOS and grade. If they prove ineffective, then they should be reclassified into a MOS for which they are physically and mentally qualified.

Item: Practical Minimum Assignment

Discussion: It has been noted the staff sections and company orderly rooms are retaining too many personnel to perform and maintain the normal routine flow of correspondence and mission accomplishments.

Observation: Recommend supervisors analyze the work flow process, analyse job performance and have each individual prepare an individual job description of what he does in order to see if some persons within a given office are performing duties that could be accomplished as an additional duty by an actual authorized position.

Operations

Item: Enemy Ambushes

Discussion: On two occasions road clearing and mine sweep teams encountered trash and debris on the road. As the element slowed down or stopped to clear or check out the debris contact was initiated by the enemy.

Observation: Security elements should proceed with extreme caution when encountering debris on the roads. Maneuvering to the flanks of the road and use of recon by fire should be utilized in an attempt to trigger enemy ambushes prior to reaching the killing zone.

Item: Marking of LZs During Combat Assaults

Discussion: As the initial aircraft touched down on the LZ, the disembarking ground troops found the LZ was green and marked it with the appropriate green smoke. At the same time a door gunner on a slick decided to mark the LZ with smoke for subsequent aircraft using red smoke. Immediately confusion resulted with both colors of smoke displayed. Luckily the commander was on the ground and was able to straighten out the mistake before subsequent aircraft aborted.

Observation: Aviation personnel should be thoroughly briefed and made to understand that marking LZs and ascertaining whether an LZ is hot or cold is the responsibility of the ground commanders. Only ground troops should mark LZs with appropriate smoke.

Item: Artillery Preparation of Landing Zones

Discussion: Artillery preparations fired on proposed Landing Zones have caused fires. These fires have been caused not only by white phosphorus rounds indicating the last round, but also by point detonating HE rounds during the preparation.

Observation: During the dry season when fire hazards exist, point detonating HE rounds should be fired to neutralize known/suspected enemy locations in the vicinity of the LZ and VT fused HE rounds should be fired on the LZ. By utilizing artillery fusing in this manner, the possibility of conducting a combat assault into a burning/smoking LZ will be greatly diminished.

Item: Tracker Dog Team

Discussion: Tracker Dog Teams have been utilized several times without success.

Observation: It appears that the two man security element which was posted to the dog's front puts out a stronger, fresher scent which overpowers the older VC/NVA trail. Trackers must be employed on fresh trails and the two man security element must act as flank security and not as frontal security and trail breaker.

Item: Injury Prevention

Discussion: As a result of inadequate shielding beneath the driver's seat of the M113A1 (APC), drivers have received injuries when their APCs ran over mines.

Observation: Injuries can be prevented by placing two layers of sand bags under the driver's seat.

Item: Decontamination of Powdered CS on Highway

Discussion: Recently the NVA spread powdered CS on a stretch of 800 meters of QL 19. The powdered CS was effective enough to require gas masks. Traffic could not pass because the powdered CS would cling to the underside of a vehicle, making it difficult to drive without a gas mask.

Observation: Initial attempts to sweep the CS off the highway were ineffective. A water trailer was used in an attempt to wash the highway but this was too time consuming. A post fire truck was dispatched from Camp Radcliff and using the high pressure hoses, the highway was quickly washed down. This decontamination procedure was effective and the residual CS fumes were at a low enough tolerance to allow the passage of vehicles with unmasked drivers.

Training and OrganizationItem: Junior Enlisted Leadership Training

Discussion: Many of our present squad leaders and team leaders are relatively inexperienced individuals who through demonstrated leadership have been given these positions. Realizing this, the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) has init-

iated a 10 day leadership course at the Division Training Center, Camp Radcliff. The instruction given is basic military leadership and is aimed at filling the knowledge gap that the junior enlisted leaders have by virtue of their inexperience.

Observation: Due to good working relations between 1st Bn (M), 50th Inf and the 1st Cavalry Division Training Center, we have been able to send 12 individuals to the leadership course during February. This has enabled the 1-50th to increase leadership quality in our companies.

Intelligence

Item: VIP (Voluntary Informant Program)

Discussion: The VIP was highly successful during January 1969, however, during February the program slipped noticeably. This was due to increased enemy activity during which S-2 personnel were extremely busy and the VIP program was not given the attention it had enjoyed during January.

Observation: For VIP to be successful it must be run on a daily basis. Long periods of time will pass with insignificant results, however, when the local populace realizes the sincerity of the program, results will be noticeable as was the case in January 1969.

Logistics

Negative report submitted.

Others

Item: MEDCAPS

Discussion: The Battalion surgeon while conducting MEDCAPS has observed that the villages visited on a regular weekly basis have all but eliminated the majority of the minor illnesses suffered by a large percentage of the population.

Observation: Intermittent MEDCAPS are all but ineffective as there is no medical follow up on a scheduled basis. MEDCAPS should be planned in advance in coordination with the S-2 and S-5.

Item: Psychological Operations

Discussion: A local terrorist threw a grenade at a MACV jeep. The Battalion S-5 immediately initiated a PSYOPS mission with his vehicular mounted loud-speaker. In a previous incident the VC mortared An Tuc with HE and CS rounds killing one and wounding ten civilians. The next morning the S-5 utilized his vehicular mounted loudspeaker in a PSYOPS mission capitalizing on the terrorist act.

Observation: The non-availability of aircraft often render loudspeaker systems useless for several days at a time. Utilizing wheeled vehicles allows for quick movement into populated areas after an incident of this type and achieve maximum effect by being on the ground at the actual site of the incident.

Item: Health Records

Discussion: Following the death of a member of the Battalion in which he was disfigured beyond recognition, it was necessary to prove identity by dental examination and comparison to records. The soldier's health and dental records were not to be found at the Battalion Aid Station Records Section but in his personal belongings.

Observation: All dental and health records should be kept only at the Battalion Aid Station in order to render maximum effective health service to the individual, and to avoid the awkward situation in which, as in the aforementioned example, missing health and/or dental records could create difficult administrative problems for the Battalion. All health and dental records taken from the Battalion Aid Station will be signed for. All records not returned within one week will be reported to the respective companies.

Item: Signal

Discussion: The Admin Log Net was relocated on top of Hon Cong Mountain. The radio and antenna was placed on the mountain and remotes were run to the SA Log Pad.

Observation: By relocating the Admin Log Net the range was increased to cover the complete AO. This also gives us a net that has the same range as the command net and can be utilized as the command net in an emergency.

James R. Woodall
 JAMES R. WOODALL
 LTC, INF
 Commanding

ANNEXES

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 HEADQUARTERS
 1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED), 50TH INFANTRY
 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE
 APO San Francisco 96250

AVBE-BE

10 March 1969

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 6 March 1969

Commanding General
 173d Airborne Brigade
 ATTN: AVBE-SC/MD
 APO 96250

1. General: At 0522L 06 Mar 69 Camp Radcliff took an estimated eleven 82mm mortar rounds. The rounds landed in the vicinity of the Mike Strike Force Training Center and the 586th Signal Company. The attack was a stand off attack of short duration that was over within five (5) minutes.

2. Sequence of Events:

a. 2240: 2d Bn 17th Artillery informed Quick Strike TOC that Camp Radcliff was receiving mortar rounds.

b. 2241: Counter mortar was fired on the suspected mortar position and previously employed mortar positions in the vicinity of the suspected positions.

c. 2242: Gun and flareships were alerted to go airborne on order.

d. 2245: 2Bn 17th Arty reported no more incoming rounds.

3. Casualties and Damages:

a. Casualties: US - none, 1 Vietnamese WHA.

b. Damages: Minor damage to roof of one billet.

4. Discussion:

a. The attack on Camp Radcliff appeared to be a harrassing attack. No attempt was made by ground troops or sappers to penetrate the perimeter.

b. The quick reaction time of the artillery and 4.2 mortar section in firing counter-mortar prohibited the enemy from continuing his attack.

ANNEX A

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3YR INTERVALS,
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBIS-RE

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 6 Mar 69 (cont)

c. The FII was .99 during the period of the attack.

d. The area of the suspected mortar sites was swept by an element of Alpha Company 1-50th with negative findings.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


CARL L. MESSINGER
1LT, ARMOR
Adjutant

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 HEADQUARTERS
 1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED), 50TH INFANTRY
 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE
 APO San Francisco 96250

AVBE-BE

27 March 1969

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 20 March 1969

Commanding General
 173d Airborne Brigade
 ATTN: AVBE-SC/NEB
 APO 96250

1. General: At 2022~~00~~Mar69 Camp Radcliff came under mortar and sapper attack. An estimated three sappers were seen in the vicinity of the 504th MP Bn area just prior to the impact of the first mortar rounds. Explosive charges were implaced in the 504th MP area which resulted in two US KIA, five WHA, and moderate damage to five buildings.

2. Sequence of Events:

a. 2240 - MPs informed 1-50th TOC that sniper rounds were coming from Hon Cong mountain and several unknown type explosions were heard in the 504th MP Bn area.

b. 2242 - D/2-1 Cav gunship ordered airborne.

c. 2250 - 586th Signal reported mortar rounds impacting in their area.

d. 2251 - 5th SF Group MSFIC reported mortar rounds impacting in their area.

e. 2252 - 4.2 mortar and artillery began firing counter-mortar.

f. 2253 - General alert sounded.

g. 2300 - Incoming mortars ceased.

h. 2330 - Flareship airborne.

i. 2330 - Battery A (Rear) 2-17th reported individuals in ditch between guns and Greenline.

j. 2334 - Spooky on station, Camp Radcliff.

k. 0110 - General alert terminated.

ANNEX B

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS,
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBE-BE

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 20 Mar 69. (cont)

3. Casualties and Damages:

a. Casualties:

- (1) US KIA - 2
- (2) US MIA - 5

b. Damages:

- (1) One 5ton wrecker, moderate damage.
- (2) One 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck, moderate damage.
- (3) One 3/4ton truck, moderate damage.
- (4) One 1/2ton truck, moderate damage.
- (5) Two UH1H helicopters, one slight, one moderate damage.
- (6) Four 55 gallon drums of OE30 oil destroyed.
- (7) One 600 gallon fuel tank moderate damage.
- (8) One 400 gallon water trailer, moderate damage.
- (9) Eighteen buildings, moderate damage.

4. Discussion:

a. At ~~1700~~ 1900 Mar 69 several individuals were reported in the ditch between A Battery (Rear) 2-17th arty and the Greenline. How long the sappers had been inside the perimeter of Camp Radcliff and exactly where entrance was made is still unknown.

b. The purpose of the attack appeared to be part of the current series of coordinated attacks on US installations.

c. It is believed that the 20-30 rounds of mortar that hit within Camp Radcliff served a dual purpose of destruction and distraction so as to cover the withdrawal of the sappers.

d. Searches have been made and continue to be made for the sappers who may still be within the confines of Camp Radcliff.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Michael E. Hilliard
 MICHAEL E. HILLIARD
 1LT, INF
 Acting Adjutant

DEFOLIATION AND CLEARANCE ALONG QL-19

1. Efforts were continued during this quarter to reduce the enemy's ability to ambush vehicles on QL-19.
2. Defoliation missions were run by the Brigade Chemical Section this quarter. The area from the Mang Yang Pass to LZ Schueller was sprayed approximately ~~200~~ 200 meters deep of both sides of the road.
3. Rome plows were used to clear likely ambush locations along the road.
4. There were six new Strong Points set up during this quarter. Each of the new Strong Points were cleared of vegetation and were manned daily by APCs.