

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED) 50TH INFANTRY
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96250

14 July 1968

SUBJECT: Historical Activities Operational Report

Commanding General
173D Abn Bde
ATTN: S-3
APO 96250

1. INTRODUCTION

a. On 5 April 1968, this battalion was detached from the 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Division and attached to the 173D Airborne Brigade. There was no change in the area of operation except that the name was changed from AO PATRICK to AO COCHISE GREEN.

The latter part of March and throughout the month of April saw little action on the part of the enemy in the AO. During the month of May, there was a considerable increase in enemy activity. The enemy initiated three major actions against US forces during the month and numerous small contacts were made. Indications were that the enemy was striving to gain a major victory. In June, operations continued, but at a lesser intensity.

b. During this period, most of the operations were conducted with companies operating in an independent role. When contact was firmly established, additional companies were inserted with battalion controlling the action. There were 17 combat assaults, 65 mechanized operations, 17 dismounted operations, and 32 joint operations conducted during this reporting period.

Significant enemy activity which had an influence on our operations was the increase of the use of land mines and anti-tank weapons. This battalion had 6 APC's hit by anti-tank weapons and 10 were either damaged or destroyed by mines.

2. TACTICAL OPERATIONS

a. The beginning of the reporting period saw extremely limited enemy activity. The 1st Bn (M), 50th Inf was operating along the coast from the southern Nui Mieu mountains north to the southern portion of the Cay Giép mountains complex.

(1) On 011340 April, B 1/50 vic CR 021719, had an APC hit a pressure detonated mine of unknown size. Friendly losses were

2 US KHA and 1 US WHA.

(2) On 021708 April, A 1/50 vic BR 999783, had an APC hit a mine of unknown size. Friendly losses were 3 US KHA.

(3) The third platoon from Co B found three bodies of NVA soldiers. They had apparently been killed during the night by H&I fires vic BR 985741. The platoon also recovered 1 AK-47 and 4 inches of documents.

(4) On 061327 April, B 1/50 reported finding a cave at BR 988743. After searching the cave they reported finding 8 full magazines for an AK-47, 3,000 rounds for an M-1, 3 Chicom grenades, 2 homemade bombs, a belt of 100 rounds of 30 caliber ammunition, 10 empty magazines for a BAR and 2 entrenching tools.

(5) On 130909 April, C 1/50 had an APC hit a mine of unknown size vic BR 834578 with negative casualties. The track suffered extensive damage and had to be salvaged.

(6) On 111449 April, C 1/50 had a man hit a land mine vic BR 839977. Friendly casualties were 1 US KHA and 3 US WHA.

(7) On 151005 April, A 1/50 had an APC hit a mine vic BR 833577. The mine was of unknown size. Damage to the APC consisted of one road wheel blown off and the hatches were blown off. Friendly casualties were 7 US WHA.

(8) On 100910 April, C 1/50 wounded and then captured 1 VC who was spotted from the air trying to evade the element vic BR 957826. At 1055 hours, C 1/50 engaged 2 more VC, killing them both.

(9) On 20 April, C 1/50 engaged one VC vic BR 955855 who was spotted from the air trying to evade the element. Result was 1 VC KIA. At 1040 hours, a man from B 1/50 stepped on a land mine of undetermined size. Friendly losses were 1 US KHA and 2 US WHA.

(10) On 301704 April, the 2nd platoon of A 1/50 was engaged by an enemy element of undetermined size, firing AV and SA. The platoon called artillery into the area but were unable to assess the damage. Results were 4 US WHA, negative enemy assessment.

b. A considerable increase of enemy activity took place during the month of May. Three major actions were initiated by the enemy against elements of this battalion.

(1) On 011505 May, an element from the 504th MP Co received 50 rounds of AV fire vic BR 903858. They returned fire with M-60 machine guns with negative assessment of damage. No friendly cas-

ualties were received.

(2) On 021621 May, C 1/50 engaged an undetermined size enemy trying to evade. Enemy personnel were wearing khaki uniforms and had web gear. Results were 3 NVA KIA and negative friendly casualties.

(3) On 2 May, C 1/50 still operating east and northeast of Dam Trao Lake, engaged 3 NVA evading. NVA were wearing green uniforms. Results were 3 NVA KIA and negative friendly casualties.

(4) Battle of An Bao

(a) The 5th of May brought the first major contact of the reporting period. At 0145 hours, LZ Salem received approximately 6 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and light SA fire for a 5 minute period. Results were 3 ARVN WIA with negative assessment of enemy casualties.

(b) At 0315 hours, LZ Ollie sustained a ground attack from the south by an unknown size enemy force. A platoon of C 1/50 with tanks of B 1/69 Armor employing canister rounds, repulsed the attack with negative friendly casualties. The enemy employed SA, AW, M-79, B40 rockets, flamethrowers and mortars in their attack. Contact was broken at 0325 hours, with negative assessment of enemy casualties.

(c) A 1/50 was given the mission of S/C vic BR9079. Intelligence indicated that an enemy artillery battalion and regimental CP was working in the area. The enemy's mission was unknown at the time.

(d) At 1146 hours, A 1/50 made contact with an estimated 2 NVA battalions employing SA, AW, B40 rockets, 57mm recoilless and 82mm mortar fire. Contact was initiated by the enemy as the company was establishing a perimeter. A volley of recoilless rifle and rocket fire was directed at the APC's which almost immediately disabled 5 of the 9 vehicles in the perimeter. A ground assault was initiated by the enemy immediately following the initial volley. The main attack came from the high ground to the SW. Automatic, SA, and AT fire came from the SE, NE, and NW. The ground assault continued against the dismounted survivors of Company A who had set up a small perimeter NE of the burning vehicles.

(e) C 1/50 and B(-) 1/69 were sent into the contact area at 1212 hours. Co C arrived moments before the enemy appeared set to overrun the small perimeter and successfully

thwarted the enemy attack long enough to evacuate the survivors to the east. The tanks from B(-) 1/69 were in contact well before they reached the initial area of contact and had to fight their way through the enemy to where A and C 1/50 were pinned down. Once the forces were joined, contact was broken.

(f) B 1/50 was brought into the area to reinforce the units and a counterattack was launched. Fighting was still heavy and spread over an 800 meter front at times. Contact continued until 1930 hours.

(g) A 1/50 was moved back to LZ Uplift and C and B 1/50 with B(-) 1/69 set up on FOB at BR 925806. At 0332 hours, 6 May, the FOB site began receiving moderate to heavy SA fire. At 0350 hours, they reported receiving B40 rockets and several 82mm mortar rounds. Artillery began firing close in defensive fires. At 0445 hours, the attack ceased.

(h) Total casualties for the contact were 22 US KIA, 93 US WHA. Equipment losses were 5 M113A1 destroyed, 1 UH1C gunship destroyed and 3 helicopters damaged. Enemy losses were 117 KIA and 5 RPG-2, 3 AK-47, 2 SKS and several B40 rockets CIA.

(i) A Chieu Hoi stated that he was a member of the 97th Bn, 2nd VC Reg't, 3rd NVA Division. He further stated that 3 battalions were involved in the attack against A 1/50. The other two battalions involved in the attack were the 7th and 9th Battalions, 22nd NVA Reg't.

(5) On 061420 May, LZ Uplift received 3 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle fire. At 1921 hours, LZ Uplift received 15-20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 6 US WHA.

(6) Battle at Trung Hoi (2)

(a) On 11 May, B and C 1/50 with a platoon from B 1/69 were sent to the southern end of the 506 valley on a S/C mission. Intelligence indicated that the enemy may have moved to that location following the battle on 5 May.

(b) At 1344 hours, the elements came under attack with an estimated NVA battalion via BR 874735. The enemy initiated contact with a ground attack similar to the engagement of 5 May. B and C 1/50 were separated by 600-700 meters when the contact was initiated against both elements. Company C reported that the enemy was probing from all directions. Both companies were brought under fire with SA, AN, AT, and

82mm mortars. Company B's position became untenable as enemy assault waves swept into the perimeter from the south-west. All organic and supporting weapons were brought to bear on the assaulting troops. The order was given for Co B's withdrawal toward Co C which was in a delaying position covering the withdrawal. The companies reorganized at ER 895719 for Dustoff, resupply, and to link up with the 1/69 reinforcements enroute from LZ Uplift.

(c) At 1610 hours, the unit moved out on the counterattack. One platoon of tanks had arrived to reinforce. The units advanced without contact to ER 878727, where they again came under heavy enemy fire at 1648 hours.

(d) At 1830 hours, the companies moved to ER 882720 for additional resupply. When resupply was effected, the unit displaced to ER 880723 for an FOB location. No further enemy activity followed.

(e) It was estimated that this battle cost the enemy over 200 of his men, although only 61 bodies were found. It was apparent the following day that the enemy had policed the contact area extremely well during the night. Friendly losses in the battle were 3 US KHA and 40 US WHA.

(7) On 120835 May, a tank from B 1/69 Armor hit a pressure detonated mine of unknown size at ER 908771. There were no casualties but 2 road wheels were destroyed.

(8) On 130729 May, an APC from C 1/50 hit a pressure detonated mine of unknown size at ER 894716, resulting in 1 US WHA and one road wheel destroyed.

(9) On 170830 May, a tank from B 1/69 hit a pressure detonated mine of unknown size at ER 896718. There were no casualties but 4 sections of track and one road wheel was destroyed.

(10) The period following the contact on 11 May until 25 May showed a sharp decrease in enemy activity in the AO. There were instances of units receiving 10-40 rounds of sniper fire, but a large contact was not made with enemy forces.

(11) On 21 May, an undetermined size force of VC ambushed vehicles on highway 1 vic 897865. They fired 150 rounds M1 and SA, 3-3.5 rockets, and 2 M-79 rounds. The elements from 61st Trans Co returned the fire with M-60's, M-79's and M-16's. One 3/4 ton truck received 5 hits. One US was WHA. There was no assessment of enemy casualties.

(12) Battle at Trinh Van (1)

(a) Following the contact of 11 May, indications were that the enemy had left the area only temporarily. On 25 May, companies B and C 1/50 moved into the area in which they had had the contact on 11 May. At 1106 hours, both companies came under heavy fire from the west, NW, and NE vic BR 874 728. AP, AV, SA and mortars were fired on the friendly position. Unlike the attacks of 5 and 11 May, the enemy did not assault, but instead fought from well fortified, well camouflaged positions. Co B attempted to maneuver and flank the enemy and attack to the northwest, but enemy mortars and rocket fire were too effectively registered in the area.

(b) Companies B and C moved to BR 883720 to receive required Dustoff and resupply. They were also to be reinforced by the Scout platoon and tanks from A 1/69. When they arrived at that location, they received heavy mortar and rocket fires from the south. The companies then moved to BR 891722 while airstrikes were directed into the area. At that location, they secured a LZ, effected Dustoff, and received resupply.

(c) At 1612 hours, the companies moved out to the west and advanced without incident until they reached the initial area of contact. They then received heavy fire from 3 directions.

(d) Due to a limited maneuver capability in that area and the fact that darkness was closing in, the companies moved to a location vic BR 903710 and set up an FOB. Contact was broken at 1905 hours. No contact was made that night.

(e) The following morning, the units again swept through the area of contact meeting only little resistance from snipers. No significant enemy activity or engagements followed.

(f) During the fight US losses were 1 KHA and 20 WHA, while the enemy body count was set at 46 KIA. One APC and one tank was damaged during the contact.

(13) On 26 May, an APC from B 1/50 hit a 105mm pressure detonated mine vic BR 376722. The mine blew the roadwheels and track off of one side of the vehicle. Casualties were 6 US WHA.

c. On 020835 June, a platoon from A 1/50 was engaged by an estimated company sized enemy force vic BR 925797. They engaged the enemy with artillery and organic weapons. Contact was broken at 0915 hours. Results of the contact were 1 US KHA and 3 US WHA. There was no assessment of enemy casualties.

(1) On 041610 June, A 1/50 found an SKS hidden in a hedge row vic 976863. A thorough search of the area was made. The company found 2 NVA hiding in a tunnel. The NVA threw a grenade out of the tunnel but it rolled back in, killing them both. Resulting casualties were 2 NVA KIA.

(2) Between 4 June and 16 June there was little enemy activity in the AO. This period was characterized by sniper incidents along highway 1 and in the area the units of the 1/50 operated. No large contact was made with the enemy during this time. One US WHA was received during the period due to sniper fire. No assessment of enemy casualties was made following the sniping incidents.

(3) On 16 June, C 1/69 had two tanks hit mines to the north and northeast of the Nui Mieu mountains vic ER 995802 and CR 005820. Both tanks were moved to the first location and were secured by an element from the Scout platoon. Co A 1/50 then moved into the area to secure the vehicles when it became apparent that they could not be removed that evening. At 1940 hours, A 1/50 reported receiving SA, AW, B40 and 82mm mortar rounds from the south. Artillery and gunships were called into the area and Spooky was brought on station at 2030 hours. There were no friendly casualties and negative enemy casualties.

(4) On 171550 June, a VTR from 1/50 hit a 155mm and 8 inch artillery mine, pressure detonated vic ER 905724. Two road wheels and a track were blown from the VTR. Casualties were 2 US WHA.

(5) On 212050 June, a platoon of C 1/50 spotted a VC meeting of 30-40 individuals with weapons vic ER 920166. The VC opened fire with M-60's, M-79, AK-47's, and small arms fire. The platoon began adjusting artillery and 81mm fire into the area. Contact was broken at 2115 hours. There were no friendly casualties, while the VC suffered 1 confirmed KIA. There was negative assessment on the damage done by the artillery.

(6) On 250603 June, a platoon from A 1/50 engaged VC vic 982792. One VC was KIA and 2 were WIA.

(7) The lack of enemy activity during most of June supported the intelligence reports the battalion had received during the month of June. These reports indicated that the NVA were moving to the north and west either for resupply and recuperation or were moving into new AO's entirely.

3. INTELLIGENCE

a. During the month of April, the 2nd and 22nd Regiments of the 3rd

NVA Division were based in the northwestern Phu My District. During this period they were taking on replacements, being resupplied, and trained.

b. During the month of May, three contacts were made with the 2nd and 22nd Regiments. The 22nd Regiment with elements of the 2nd Regiment were still located in northwest Phu My District at the end of May.

c. In the month of June, intelligence sources reported the 2nd Regiment and 22nd Regiment moving out of Phu My District heading northwest toward Kontun or Quang Ngai.

d. Nature of the terrain and weather conditions

(1) Areas bordering the mountains and rice paddies are generally overgrown with thick hedgerows and short shrub bushes. These areas are extensively used by the enemy in building defensive positions, i.e. bunkers, anti-aircraft positions, and camouflaged trenchlines. Movement by tracks in this area demands ground troops to provide security.

(2) Often snipers and tank-killer teams set up positions in stream beds that run through rice paddies into the thick hedgerows. Once they have fired upon allied troops, they use the stream beds as exit routes into the brush areas where they usually hide.

(3) Detection of the enemy in this type of area is very difficult and is best accomplished using dismounted troops with tracked vehicles used in support.

(4) Trafficability in the wet season presents problems for the tracks. At times the paddies fill with water and the ground becomes very soft. During this period, operations with tracked vehicles are limited.

(5) In some bush areas, tracks have a difficult time maneuvering. Large ditches and deep stream beds are some of the problems encountered. Routes must be found where these obstacles can be bypassed consequently causing channelization and increased susceptibility to AT mines.

(6) Weather: Normally the weather during the reporting period has been clear with temperatures ranging from the low 80's to the high 90's. Humidity has been high which results in an occasional rainshower.

e. Decisions and plans adopted with reasons based on enemy situations.

(1) On 5 May 1968, operations were centered vic BR 912799. Elements were sent into this area because of strong intelligence concerning a buildup of enemy forces in the area. The contact resulted in 117 KIA.

(2) On 11 May 1968, working on agent reports, contact was again made with the 2d Regiment, vic BR 874735. Enemy casualties were 61 KIA.

(3) On 25 May 1968, intelligence indicated another buildup in the area of the 11 May contact. A recon in force was initiated resulting in contact with elements of the 2d and 22d Regiments. The enemy lost 46 KIA.

f. Enemy's Personnel and Equipment Losses by month and Losses during the Reporting Period as Follows:

	<u>Weapons</u>			
	<u>Killed-in-Action</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>Crew Served</u>	<u>Small Arms</u>
April	13	0	0	0
May	224	2	7	5
June	3	0	0	1
Totals	240	2	7	6

4. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

a. Strength:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
1 April 1968	881-37-2/920	838-34-2/874
30 June 1968	865-40-2/907	854-34-2/890

<u>DATE</u>	<u>GAINS</u>	<u>HOSP</u>	<u>RTN</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>NBD</u>	<u>NEW</u>
April 1968	73	20	5	19	1	0	
May 1968	231	46	18	138	0	0	
June 1968	366	34	2	3	2	1	
Total:	673	100	25	160	3	1	

DATE	REPL	ART 15	BN ART 15	SPCM*	SPCM**
April 1968	46	24	4	0	2
May 1968	161	5	2	1	1
June 1968	106	13	0	0	1
Total	313	42	6	1	4

b. Burial and graves registration: No significant problem areas exist in this regard. The battalion policy stresses evacuation of KHA at the earliest possible opportunity.

c. Awards and decorations:

DATE	SS	SM	BS ^W "	BS	ACM ^W "	ACM	VNCG
April 1968	0	1	5	5	2	5	3
May 1968	1	0	19	15	8	11	20
June 1968	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total:	1	1	24	20	10	16	23

d. Problems encountered in change of command from 1st Cav Div. to 4th Inf Div to 173d Abn Bde.

(1) The Bn finance records had to be converted from the CAMP (IBM) System which pays on the 15th of the month, to the manual system which pays at the end of each month.

(2) There was a shift in emphasis concerning awards and decorations. The required tailoring of the awards program was compensated for however by better control and a more responsive system.

(3) Personnel actions which were initiated with the 1st Cav. had to be resubmitted and processed through the 173d Abn Bde. There was an appreciable delay in processing correspondence in this area due to the prolonged administration affiliation with the 1st Cav. for all other purposes.

(4) Mail: During the change of command from the 1st Cav. Div. to the 4th Inf. Div. to the 173d Abn Bde. the APO for this unit went from 96490 to 96355 to 96250. These changes occurred within a six week period and the resulting mail service was very poor. The majority of the Bn's mail was sent either to Da Nang or Pleiku.

e. The following changes were brought about by the adoption of MTOE 7-46 G and MTOE 7-47 G, effective 1 June 68.

(1) Organizational changes

<u>OLD</u>	<u>NEW</u>
<u>TOE 7-46 G - 7-47 G</u>	<u>MTOE 7-46 G - 7-47 G</u>
HQ - S-1,2,3,4	HQ - S-1,2,3,4
Bn Support Plt	Radar Section
Transportation Section	4.2 Mortar Section
HQ Mess Teams	Scout Section
4 Company Mess Teams	Flame Plt
Bn Maintenance Plt	Commo Plt
Bn Medical Plt	
Aid Station Section	
A - Mech Rifle Company	A - Mech Rifle Company
B - Mech Rifle Company	B - Mech Rifle Company
C - Mech Rifle Company	C - Mech Rifle Company
D - Provisional Mech Rifle Co	D - Service Company
	Bn Maintenance Section
	Support Plt
	Transportation Section
	HQ Mess Teams
	4 Company Mess Teams
	Bn Medical Plt

(2) Personnel changes

<u>OLD</u>	<u>NEW</u>
HQ 323 - 19 - 2	HQ 177 - 17
A 186 - 6	A 182 - 6
B 186 - 6	B 182 - 6
C 186 - 6	C 182 - 6
	D 142 - 5 - 2
<hr/>	
Total: 881 - 37 - 2	Total: 865 - 40 - 2

f. Infusion: The infusion program designed to alleviate the August Deros Hump problem of the 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf. was completed on 31 May 1968. The Bn has satisfied the USARV regulation concerning the Deros Hump period of newly arrived units in Vietnam.

g. Replacements: Currently our replacements are being received from IFFV. However, there has apparently been no decision made regarding the location of records and/or personnel at IFFV headquarters. As the situation exists, it is a time consuming process obtaining orders and amendment orders from IFFV.

5. LOGISTICS

a. Logistical operations for the period 1 April through 30 June were highlighted by the establishment of procedures wherein the battalion requisitioned equipment directly from the 58th Field Depot in Qui Nhon. This procedure enabled the battalion to have a consistent supply support activity. That is, future changes in operational headquarters will not disrupt supply activities. In the area of supply, the only serious problem area was in the field of Command Controlled major items. As of 30 June the organization was short the following items of equipment; 3ea M113A1's, 2ea M125A1 Mortar Carriers, 1 ea M132A1 Flame Carrier, 10 ea M-79 Grenade Launchers, 7 ea M2 50 cal Machine Guns, 1 ea 4.2" Mortars, 30 ea FRC25 Radios, 4 ea VRC46 Radios, 10 ea VRC47 Radios and 7 ea VRC53 Radios. A critical item is the mine detector. Currently the battalion is short two of the four authorized, which greatly hinders mounted operations.

b. Transportation presented no serious problem areas during the reporting period. Some changes in methods of operation were brought about by a decrease in available Air Transportation, but this caused no serious hardship. FOB positions for the companies in the field many times had to be located close to a good access road so resupply could be brought in by wheeled vehicle. The transportation capability of the battalion to support combat operations has been greatly increased as a result of the USARPAC MTOE 7-47G. This modification authorized the battalion 8 ea M548 tracked cargo vehicles. These vehicles, when received, will enable the Bn Transportation section to deliver supplies to the companies in any location the M113 can go into.

c. The area of Maintenance continued to be much the same as the previous reporting period. Repair parts were still not available in sufficient quantities. The battalion's average on PLL percentage filled was 68%. As in past months, the primary way the combat vehicles of this battalion were kept operational was through the use of a very effective controlled cannibalization program.

d. The period April-June 1968 saw a major improvement in the medical treatment facilities available within the battalion; through the attachment of a dentist from the 518th Medical Company. Having dental facilities available on the LZ has greatly reduced the number of personnel evacuated to rear areas, thereby making for more efficient manpower utilization. Also important in the medical area was the development of the Bn Medical Platoon into small scale clearing company. This change was brought about by circumstances wherein the nearest clearing hospital is 25 miles from our location. The battalion clearing station has proven its capabilities in several mass casualty situations.

6. CIVIC ACTION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

a. This battalion maintains a civilian Medcap center for the use of all Vietnamese civilians. The aid station is located on highway 1 inside LZ Uplift perimeter. It is open seven days a week and during the last quarter, it treated approximately 4000 Vietnamese Nationals.

b. Just recently, this battalion has undertaken the project of sponsoring the village of Van Truong. Phu My District Headquarters feels this is the village in the area adjacent to LZ Uplift most susceptible to the RD Program.

c. In the last quarter, this battalion distributed approximately 70,000 leaflets and posters with a Chieu Hoi and Voluntary Informant Program theme. Leaflets have also been distributed advertising the Medcap center.

SECTION II

Item: Fire control and fire discipline

Discussion: It has been noted that during contact, when all weapons on ACAV APC's are firing, it is extremely difficult to accurately fix the enemy fires. In spite of the tremendous load carrying capabilities of the APC, units must enforce rigid fire discipline to avoid the problems associated with resupply during contact.

Observation: Troops and junior leaders should be made aware of the requirement to control fires and exercise fire discipline when conducting recon by fire.

Mines

Item: Increased Enemy Mining Activities

Discussion: Enemy mining activities have increased in this area of operations, causing an increase in casualties and damage to equipment. Both anti-personnel and anti-tank mines are being used. Most mines that this unit has encountered have either been constructed of metal or had metal components somewhere in the detonation mechanism, leaving them vulnerable to detection equipment. Some of these mines could have been detected if the detection equipment was available and it was being properly employed.

Observation: This battalion does not have sufficient mine detecting equipment to supply all units at all times. The detection equipment should be attached to the units that will be operating in areas known to be extensively mined.

Once the detection equipment has been attached to a unit, the unit commander must insure that the equipment is properly employed. Particular caution should be used when terrain channelizes movement through an area to one or two routes of advance.

Security

Item: Security at a halt

Discussion: Whenever a unit stops moving, regardless of how long it intends to stop, measures must be taken to insure the maximum security of the unit. If the unit is going to be stopped for an extended period of time, it should send out clearing patrols over the entire area. Once the patrols are returned to the area, local security should be placed around the perimeter.

Observation: The element leaders must be aware of the necessity of

proper security while moving and whenever the element stops. The element leader must decide, after a personal inspection of the area, how many and of what size security elements are necessary to provide maximum security for his unit.

Medevac

Item: Medevac requests

Discussion: In order to insure that his elements receive the best possible results when utilizing a DUSTOFF, the commander must make a complete report when calling in his request. This report must include:

- (1) Exact location of requested pickup
- (2) Number of personnel to be evacuated.
- (3) Nature of injury/illness
- (4) Special request for equipment.
 - (a) Blood (including type)
 - (b) Doctor (if necessary).
 - (c) Side sling if PZ not available.
- (5) PZ red or green

Observation: All leaders down to and including the Squad Leader should be thoroughly familiar with the procedures for calling in a Medevac request. This will facilitate speedy and efficient Medevac responses and insure the best possible medical attention for casualties.

Fire Support

Item: Use of fire support

Discussion: Maximum use of fire support to include organic, supporting artillery, and air support should be made constantly.

Commanders must decide on the type of support that is actually needed and which support will best help the unit fulfill its mission. The commander must remember that when alternating airstrikes, ARA, and artillery there will be a lull in the fire support. If the unit needs continuous support with no break in the fires, artillery should be employed.

Observation: Leaders must be aware of the characteristics of all of the support available to him. Based on his knowledge of those characteristics he must decide what support he wants to employ and in what manner he wants the supporting fires employed. Careful consideration should be made of the results desired from the supporting elements prior to making the decision.

Gunship Adjustment

Item: Adjustment of gunship fire

Discussion: Adjustment of gunship fire by ground troops has been too time consuming because adjustment of the fire has not been specific enough. The delay in bringing effective suppressive and destruction fire on enemy positions affords him a distinct advantage. This can be denied by marking the adjusters' position with smoke and then by giving a direction (N,E,S,W) and distance in meters, nature of target, and location of friendly forces so that rapid, effective fire can be brought onto the target.

Observation: Leaders must be aware of advantages to be had over the enemy by the ability to quickly and accurately adjust gunship fires.


Item: Security while moving

Discussion: Mounted or dismounted units must always have security elements on the flanks while in movement. Flank elements should be kept well away from the main body of the unit. In areas where there are tall hedgerows, stream beds, or any other terrain features that could afford the enemy cover or concealment, the flank element must slow their movement to thoroughly search the area. The commander must adjust the speed of the unit to the speed the flank element can move while providing maximum security.

A point element should be placed well ahead of the unit while moving. The distance will vary with the terrain and the situation at the time.

A stay behind force may also be used to detect and engage enemy personnel trying to follow the unit.

Observation: Unit commanders must make the unit's junior leaders aware of the importance of maintaining maximum security while moving. The commander can never sacrifice security for time or distance.



JOHN B CARTER
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry
Commanding