

Oct-Dec 1968

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QUARTERLY HISTORICAL REPORT  
1 OCTOBER 1968 - 31 DECEMBER 1968



1<sup>ST</sup> BN (MECH), 50<sup>TH</sup> INFANTRY

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Authority: NND 974235  
By: [Signature] NISA Date: 10/16

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HISTORY OF  
1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED), 50TH INFANTRY  
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE

1 October 1968  
to  
31 December 1968

JAMES R. WOODALL  
Major, Infantry  
Commanding

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E.O. 11652, Sec 3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

By *[Signature]* DASH, Date 5 APR 1976


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PREFACE


I. Purpose: This report is intended to give all interested agencies and personnel a complete and unbiased record of the Battalion's accomplishments and failures during operations conducted in the Republic of Vietnam from 1 October 1968 to 31 December 1968. It is hoped that the events recorded and lessons learned which have been outlined in this report will prove beneficial to other units in the successful accomplishment of their respective missions.

II. Scope: This historical report covers administrative as well as the operational aspects of the Battalion for this reporting period. The information for this report was obtained from the files and daily journals of the 1st Bn (N), 50th Infantry.



ANNEXES

- ANNEX A After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 30 Oct 68
- ANNEX B After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 11 Nov 68
- ANNEX C After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 12 Nov 68
- ANNEX D After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 18 Dec 68
- ANNEX E After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 22-23 Dec 68
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- ANNEX G Map - Camp Radcliff and Eastern Portion of QL-19
- ANNEX H Map - MSF AO and Western Portion of QL-19
- ANNEX I Map - 1st Bn Pleiku MSF AO



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SECTION I

1. Introduction:

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a. The Battalion continued operations in AO Walker. Two rifle companies were allocated for the protection of QL 19 to include securing all bridges and LZs Schueller and Action and providing a mobile road reaction force. The 3d rifle company was used to conduct offensive operations in AO Walker.

b. Resources from the rifle companies were also used in many instances to provide protection for Camp Radoliff.

c. Enemy activity during the first part of this reporting period was light. Enemy activity increased significantly during the month of November then decreased slightly for the month of December.

d. The majority of the enemy activity consisted of "stand off" and sapper attacks on Camp Radoliff, "stand off" attacks on LZ Schueller, sniper attacks on vehicles on QL 19, and platoon and company size contacts with the attached Mike Strike Force units.

e. The Battalion's most significant results were obtained by quick reaction to enemy initiated activity.

2. Tactical Operations:

a. Enemy activity during the month of October was light. This was due mainly to the large amount of rain which fell in the An Khe area during this period. The rains accomplished what the enemy could not. QL 19 was closed for 1 day to military traffic (convoys) due to the by-pass around bridge 25 being washed out. At this time bridge 25 could not be used because it was newly built and the cement had not completely set for usage.

(1) On ~~0100~~01Oct the new set of frequencies went into effect. Two companies experienced difficulties because other units which were not in the Battalion were on the same frequency. Until changing to the alternate frequency, communications with the 2 companies were poor. The situation would have been critical if either company had become engaged during this time.

(2) On ~~081000~~08Oct an exercise "communications alert" was conducted for Camp Radoliff. All units on post were contacted within 15 minutes.

(3) On 151010Oct (BR246487) a convoy heading east received SA, AW, and B-40 fire from south of QL 19. The Devil gunships (134th Aviation) which were scrambled, reported receiving SA from vicinity BR253480. Gunships did not observe anyone but they expended into suspected area. An ARVN woodcutter reported seeing an estimated platoon size enemy force dressed in green fatigues firing at the convoy. The mobile road reaction force pursued in the direction that the enemy was believed to have fled. The contact resulted in 1 US WHA (minor) from the convoy and unknown enemy casualties.

(4) On 160445Oct LZ Schueller received approximately twenty 82mm mortar rounds from vicinity BR450360. Counter-mortar artillery was fired with unknown results. Four US personnel were wounded.

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(5) On 16101500ct (BR107286) LRP team 13 spotted 11 NVA spread out as if they were searching for the team. The NVA were armed with AK-47s, SIGs, and one M-16. The team attempted to evade the enemy but received fire from several directions. Gunships were called on station and the team was extracted. There were negative friendly casualties and 1 possible enemy KIA. This contact along with intelligence reports confirmed the presence of the enemy in the vicinity of the Dak Ha Way. It was later ascertained that 95-B Regiment CP was located in this area.

(6) On 20205300ct Camp Radcliff came under a 82mm mortar attack. Approximately 20 rounds fell in the north part of the Camp. A general alert was sounded and counter-mortar artillery was fired. There were 11 US WHA and unknown enemy casualties. The next morning a patrol was sent out to sweep the area. The mortar position was located at BR158503. Blood trails and drag marks were found but the trail eventually died. Two chicom grenades in a pistol belt, mortar stakes and two dud 82mm rounds were found in the vicinity of the mortar position.

(7) The weather which had adversely affected operations all month reached a climax. Snoopy and Red Haze missions were not flown from 11-21 October. VRs by OI aircraft were severely limited. The bridge status as of 21 October follows:

(a) Bridges 18, 19, 22, and 24 had their by-passes completely washed out.

(b) The by-passes for Bridge 21 and Bridge 25 were washed out with water still flowing over them.


(c) Bridge 20 and Bridge 26 have no by-pass.

(d) Bridge 25, just completed, was not being used at this time but was awaiting evaluation from Engineers as to the strength of the new bridge to hold military convoys.

(8) On 23063000ct, the Short Range Ambush Platoon (SRAP), in a combined operation with RF/PF and the MPFF, conducted a cordon and search of Cuu Dao village (BR198545). All 5 men who were detained were classified as part of the VC infrastructure. A NEDCAP operation was conducted after the village was searched. Thirty five persons were treated and one was medically evacuated.

(9) On 23110000ct LRP team 14 made contact with 4 VC in vicinity BR195418. One Montagnard VC was killed. When the team started receiving fire from an estimated 8-10 individuals, they broke contact and were extracted. Although the team had just been inserted that same morning, in this short period, they saw many signs of enemy activity.

(10) On 27154300ct D/2-1 Cav, OFCON to 1-50th spotted 1 individual carrying ammunition cans in vicinity BR135340. The individual ran under the tree canopy. The gunships engaged and 2 secondary explosions were observed. When the LOHs checked out the area, they found 2 VC KIAs, 1 hooch and 1 bunker destroyed. Four more hooches (10'x 8') were found and also destroyed.



(11) On ~~30924~~Oct Camp Radcliff received a mortar and sapper attack. At the same time LZ Schueller received a mortar attack. Tower 1 was knocked out of action by sappers. Counter-mortar artillery was immediately fired. Gun and flareships were also employed as was Spooky with unknown results. Negative damage was inflicted on LZ Schueller. (See Annex A)

(12) On ~~311030~~Oct LRP team 13 had 3 NVA walking towards their position. One individual was carrying a mortar tube. At a distance of 100 meters the enemy was engaged. The team then started to receive fire from several other directions and attempted to break contact after killing 1 enemy. While trying to break contact the team was fired on by a total of 9 men until they were extracted at 1215 hours. The extraction ship door gunner reported killing 2 men while the aircraft commander reported that 2 mortar rounds landed near the PZ during the extraction. There was negative friendly casualties.

b. The month of November was highlighted by an intelligence report of a battalion size attack along QL 19 on 4 November. In anticipation of this attack 1-50th was provided with the following additional forces: 2/E-20 Inf (LRPs), C/1-503d, 1/C/1-69th Armor, A and C/7-17th Air Cav, and 3 MSF companies. Deployment of these forces by 1-50th precluded the enemy from staging this battalion size attack. However, several platoon and company size contacts were made during the month of November. In support of this operation and S/D operations for this month, the Air Force flew a total of 107 bombing missions.


(1) On ~~032213~~Nov MACV reported that RF/PF forces at An Tuc District Headquarters were receiving SA fire from vicinity of the An Tuc high school. The RF/PF force returned fire employing machine gun and mortar fire. A reaction force from District Headquarters was sent to the high school with negative findings.

(2) On 4 Nov 1-50th received additional forces as stated above in anticipation of a battalion size enemy attack. These forces were employed south of QL 19 between LZ Schueller and the Mang Yang Pass.

(3) On ~~040031~~Nov Hawkeye (01 aircraft) employing a starlight scope spotted approximately 25 NVA in vicinity BR235495. Artillery was fired and Hawkeye reported seeing 2 secondary explosions. D/2-1 Cav making a BDA the next day reported seeing 2 craters (BR235493) larger than the rest, but negative other signs.

(4) On ~~042110~~Nov an RF/PF ambush engaged an estimated 2 platoons of VC in vicinity BR391432. Artillery fire supported the RF/PF force. Two enemy bodies were found the next morning and a patrol found a freshly dug grave with 6 additional bodies. This was the most successful RF/PF ambush ever conducted in An Tuc. It is felt that the efforts of 1-50th's MATS team have proved fruitful.

(5) On ~~061950~~Nov Tower 27 started receiving SA fire. Tower 27 along with Towers 24, 25, 26, and 28 returned fire with their organic weapons. Tower 27 then had 3 or four B-40 rounds fired at it. It took 2 hits with 1 US WIA. All firing at Tower 27 ceased at 1957 hours. At 2025 hours Tower 23A





picked up 5 individuals on ground surveillance radar (GSR) in vicinity BR496476. Several other GSR sets started picking up movement and Towers 1, 13, and 28 received sniper fire. All suspected enemy positions were fired on by the towers. Counter-mortar targets were fired by the artillery. There was no further enemy activity during the night.


(6) On 071415Nov MSF 252 in vicinity BR244419 received fire from approximately 20 AW. The MSF returned the fire then broke contact. There was negative casualties on both sides. A/7-17th Cav in support of MSF 252 spotted 4-5 armed individuals in blue shirts and khaki pants in vicinity BR244420. Since the gunships did have commo with the MSF they engaged. They reported 3 unconfirmed enemy KIAs.

(7) On 080945Nov LRP team 24 spotted 31 NVA moving east along a trail in vicinity BR212402. The NVA were armed with AK-47s, SKSs, 1 RPG, 1 MG (.30 cal), and 1 mortar of unknown size. Four individuals had unusually large packs. They appeared to be carrying ammunition. The point man, who wore a dark blue beret, appeared to be caucasian. Artillery was directed in by the LRP team leader, resulting in 2 secondary explosions. Before gunships could engage, the NVA fled into the tree line. Once gunships were on station they expended into the last known enemy location. The following day the SRAP (1-50th) was inserted and discovered 5 large pools of blood. Located near the position where the 31 NVA were spotted by the LRPs, the SRAP found positions where another 30 men had hidden. The trails initially headed east but then were lost in a stream. The failure of the battalion to insert a reaction force in less time resulted in a loss of enemy KIA by DC and of enemy equipment and weapons.

(8) On 100033Nov A/1-50th FOB in vicinity BR273458 had three B-40s and SA fired at them from the east. The company returned fire with organic weapons and artillery fired defensive targets. In the morning in vicinity BR277456 an A/1-50th patrol found bandages, expended SA rounds and the fin assembly to a B-40 rocket. A tracker team picked up a trail of 4-5 individuals. The trail led to an intersection where 3-4 individuals joined with the first group. The trail continued SE but was lost in a deep stream.

(9) On 101415Nov A/7-17th Cav spotted 15 individuals in vicinity BR314340 running towards the woodline. They engaged. Two individuals were killed and 1 was wounded. The wounded man was extracted. Interrogation by the 172d MI revealed that the man had been transporting supplies for the VC. He said that he saw as many as 50 VC at one time in vicinity of the area where he was captured.

(10) On 10 November in response to numerous sightings of rafts and boats observed on the Song Ba River the SRAP was given the mission of conducting hawk operations in the vicinity BR396394. At 110045Nov they observed an 18 foot long raft with 5 individuals. The ambush was initiated. Based on moans and observing bodies fall into the water the SRAP reported 4-5 possible enemy KIA. Since the water was deep and swift, the raft could not be checked out that night. During the night the SRAP received several rounds of sniper fire from the other side of the river. They engaged with M-79 with unknown results. In the morning the raft was found 100 meters downstream. There were blood stains and a pan (10" diameter) of rice in it.



(11) On 111153Nov an indigenous patrol of MSF company 251 came under attack in vicinity BR223457. They received SA and B-40s from a platoon or larger size enemy force. Since the patrol could not determine their exact location, only blocking artillery could be fired. The enemy broke contact and headed SW. The patrol sustained 9 Montagnard WHA and 1 MIA. The MIA Montagnard was later found in serious condition from 3 bullet wounds and a bayonet wound in the throat. The US advisors could not get their Montagnard soldiers to pursue. Negative action was taken except for an aerial reconnaissance.

(12) On 111528Nov Camp Radcliff and the city of An Khe were attacked by 82mm mortars and 75mm recoilless rifles. Camp Radcliff received approximately 13 rounds of recoilless rifle fire centered on the POL storage area (BR473456). An Khe received an estimated 30-40 rounds of mixed recoilless rifle fire and mortars. The highest density of rounds landed in vicinity of District Headquarters (BR474434), An Tuc Dispensary (BR477434), and the new An Khe Market Place (BR470438). Artillery fired counter-mortar fire under the direction of Hawkeye (aerial observer). Upon completion, Hawkeye directed D/2-1 Air Cav into the area (BR498418) from which the enemy was firing. Infantry soldiers of A/7-17th Cav were inserted into this area. They found 6 expended 75mm recoilless rifle cases and 4 B-40 cases. (See Annex B)

(13) On 120620Nov MSF Company 221 (BR263403) received heavy SA fire from 2 sides and fifteen 60mm mortar rounds. Artillery and gunships fired into the suspected enemy positions with unknown results. At 0809 hours a patrol made contact with an estimated platoon size enemy force in vicinity BR262402. The contact was friendly initiated and consisted of an exchange of SA fire. The enemy broke contact with negative casualties on both sides. The remainder of MSF company 221 in reinforcing their patrol started taking a heavy volume of SA fire and several B-40 rounds. D/2-1 Cav which had been dispatched because of the initial contact was just coming on station and caught 40 NVA firing from a stream bed. The Cav troop continued making gun runs until they estimated that they had a 100% KIA. MSF company 221 refused to leave their perimeter however, and the kills could not be confirmed by body count. There was 1 US WHA and 3 friendly Montagnard WHAs. At 1645 hours MSF company 221 did move into the enemy location and found no equipment or bodies but numerous heavy blood trails.

(14) On 122202Nov Camp Radcliff came under a well coordinated sapper - mortar attack. The sappers hit A/2-17th Arty (rear) during the turmoil of the initial incoming mortar rounds. One 105 tube was destroyed and one 105 tube was damaged. LZ Schueller and 4.2 mortar platoon at Camp Radcliff fired counter-mortar fires. A total of one hundred forty one 82mm mortar rounds landed in the northern part of Camp Radcliff. (See Annex C)

(15) On 130030Nov a convoy in vicinity BR303455 had six 60mm mortar rounds fired at it from south of QL 19. They also received SA fire from the same location. Two Buccaneer gunships which were providing convoy cover spotted 25 NVA 300 meters south of the road. As the first gunship started to make its run, it was hit by several .50 cal rounds and crashed. Two US were KIA and 2 were WHA. The second gunship engaged the NVA with 5 possible KIAs. Tanks of 1/C/1-69th Armor which were sent as a reaction force with the Scout platoon also fired at the fleeing enemy. While pursuing the enemy the Scout platoon found 1 NVA KIA. He was hit by a canister round.

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(16) On 151745Nov C/4-503d spotted 3 NVA 600 meters to their north in vicinity BR187402. Artillery was called in. No patrol was dispatched out of the FOB because it was becoming dark. At 2155 hours C/4-503d started receiving SA and grenades from the north and east. The company fired their claymores and heard moaning. Artillery was called in on the fleeing enemy. At 0615 hours the next morning, C/4-503d started receiving 60mm mortar rounds. They received a total of 30 rounds which fell short of the FOB. Artillery fired all defensive targets and flare and gunships expended. At first light 1 NVA KIA with AK-47 was found 40 meters from the FOB.

(17) On 181100Nov LRP team 13 made contact with an estimated platoon size enemy force, west of pump station #8 (BR230498). The team immediately broke contact after receiving a heavy volume of AW fire. The Scout platoon was sent in as a reaction force with negative contact being made.

(18) On 181637Nov C/4-503d found 1 NVA who had been wounded 3 days prior by artillery. An interrogation by 172d MI revealed NVA, Nguyen Dinh Oanh, to be a member of 2d Company, 6th Bn, 320th Regiment.

(19) On 181637Nov C/1-50th was CA into a suspected enemy battalion area (BR189399) which was reconnoitered by the SRAP (1-50th).

(20) On 181740Nov C/4-503d vicinity BR193392 received eight 60mm mortar rounds from SE. Artillery was fired in support of the company. At 2340 hours C/4-503d heard a loud whistle. A trip flare went off and 4 grenades landed outside the perimeter. The company engaged with grenades and claymores. In both incidents there was negative friendly and unknown enemy casualties.

(21) On 201500Nov MSF was released from OPCON to 1-50th and departed via aircraft from An Khe Army Airfield, Camp Radcliff, RVN.


(22) On 211500Nov C/4-503d found 13,000 ears of corn in vicinity BR188418. The corn was extracted and given to the GVN.

(23) On 220640Nov C/1-50th had fifteen to twenty 82mm mortar rounds fired at their FOB (BR203365). Only 1 round landed within the perimeter. There were negative friendly casualties. Artillery and gunships were employed with unknown results.

(24) On 221840Nov a Scout platoon APC heading east was hit by a B-40 round in vicinity BR303455. Seven US and 1 Kit Carson were WHA. The APC was destroyed.

(25) On 230420Nov Bridge 22 received SA, B-40s, and several 60mm rounds resulting in negative US casualties. At 2045 hours bridge 18 received four 60mm mortar rounds resulting in 1 US WHA. Artillery fired during both contacts with unknown results.

(26) On 230930Nov C/4-503d found 3,000 ears of corn in vicinity BR188416. This brought their find of corn to a total of 17,000 ears of corn. All was extracted and released to District Headquarters, An Khe.



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(27) On 21~~06~~18Nov an APC on mine sweep hit a command detonated mine placed in a culvert under the highway through which the Dak Po flows (BR336161). The explosion left a 6 foot deep by 6 foot long crater the width of the road. Seven US were WIA. A temporary bridge (AVLB) was emplaced at 1300 hours permitting traffic to pass.

(28) On 262035Nov the SRAP ambushed 7 NVA in vicinity Dak Po (BR339161). A fire started on the pipeline. SRAP smelt flesh burning and saw 2-4 NVA fall when they blew their claymores. In the morning SRAP found 1 NVA WIA with an AK-47 and 3 AK magazines. A blood trail was followed south until it was lost in the Dak Po. The NVA, Truong Van Thang, was a member of C-17, Gia Lia Provincial Main Force Unit. For detailed readout see PIR #172-015-68.

(29) On 271825Nov C/1-503d in the vicinity BR195395 received forty 82mm mortar rounds from 3 tubes. Mortars were fired from the east and north-east. Gunships and artillery was employed with unknown results. One US was WIA.

(30) On 280313Nov the SRAP Hawk operation which had continued in the Dak Po area started taking AV fire from the south and SA fire from the west. Two US were WIA. Flare and gunships could not fly due to weather. A reaction force from LZ Schueller was committed. Contact ceased at 0410 hours with unknown enemy casualties.

(31) On 281753Nov C/1-50th (BR171386), which was approximately 3 kilometers to the SE of C/1-503d, started receiving 82mm mortars, B-40s, and SA from the NW and SW. C/1-50th received a total of 20 mortar rounds and 3 B-40 rounds resulting in 11 US WIA. Gunships and artillery saturated the suspected enemy location with fire.

(32) On 282007Nov "perimeter" radar, Camp Radcliff, picked up movement in vicinity BR178480. The guards on the perimeter engaged with organic fire. Radar readings continued in vicinity BR189478, 197478, and 180491. Artillery fired on all radar readings. At 2056 hours Tower 21 was hit by a B-40 round and the tower caught on fire. One US was WIA. Towers 21, 22, 23, and 23A reported movement behind their position. No fire was received from the rear. Spooky reported receiving several secondary explosions in vicinity BR185518. The area was searched in the morning with negative findings.

(33) On 290650Nov C/1-50th (BR171386) again received a 82mm mortar, B-40, and SA attack from the north and SE. The company received a total of 16 mortar rounds; one B-40, and 50-70 SA. Artillery and gunships expended in the area with unknown results.

a. In the month of December 1-50th for the first time was able to conduct a RIF operation along the Dak Ha Way, the base area for 95-B Regiment CP. The 1st Bn Pleiku NSF successfully conducted operations in this area destroying over 350 hooches, capturing 16,000 pounds of rice, and moving into an area which had previously been an enemy sanctuary. December also marked a significant increase in Hawk Operations from 29 in November to 130 for the month of December. Although these Hawk operations did not result in any enemy KIAs, it did significantly reduce the number of mining incidents along QL 19. On 16 December FSB Kathy (BR385225) was established in support of the 1st Pleiku NSF Bn.

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(1) On ~~021900~~Dec an APC from B/1-50th was hit by two B-40s in vicinity BR535461 on its way to reinforce bridge 18. Seven US were WHA and 1 US was KIA. Dustoff was employed with gunships and flareship. Two APCs from bridge 20 were dispatched and secured the area.

(2) On ~~030029~~Dec a Hawk operation from B/1-50th spotted eight VC 250 meters east of their location. The VC appeared to be planting mines. Artillery was called in with unknown results. The manner in which this ambush was conducted emphasized the need for more training and experience in conducting ambushes.

(3) On ~~061120~~Dec a MSF patrol (BR398327) was fired on by 3-5 VC at a distance of 150 meters. When the patrol returned the fire the VC fled SW. Upon searching out the area the patrol found 1 woman KIA, 1 man, and 2 children CIA. The captured man was a forced laborer and was classified as an innocent civilian.

(4) On ~~070930~~Dec MSF Co 213 in vicinity BR411331 found 14,000 pounds of rice. It was extracted the next day and presented to Major Thua of District Headquarters, An Khe, RVN.

(5) On ~~091500~~Dec D/2-1 Cav spotted 1 Montagnard VC in loin cloth. The gunships engaged resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). The LOHs while checking out the body found 10 hooches (8'x 10') and 4 bunkers. When they started to fire on the hooches, 5-6 individuals fled from them and ran into the woodline. The Cobras fired into the woodline with unknown results.


(6) On 111345Dec MSF company 211 had a squad size patrol make contact with 5 VC armed with carbines and wearing black pajamas and khakis. The enemy initiated the contact at 20 meters distance killing 1 friendly Montagnard. The VC broke contact and fled NW with negative casualties.

(7) On 13 December the 4th Infantry Division received an AO in AO Walker for an indefinite period. Their AO encompassed west of grid line 33 south from 2.5K south of QL 19, and north of grid line 22.

(8) On 14~~0930~~Dec MSF company 213 worked into an enemy position BR44291. They were hit with AW fire and claymores by an estimated company size enemy force. The MSF returned fire, then backed off and requested gunships. Gunships (134th Aviation) expended on the slope on which the enemy was located. The gunships reported 2 enemy KIA which were not confirmed. At 1230 hours MSF 211 conducted a combat assault to assist Co 213. Under cover of gunships, company 211 moved into the enemy position and found 5 bunkers and heavy blood trails leading SW.

(9) On 151100Dec Strong Points #3 (BR345454), #4 (BR335458), and #5 (BR329460) started receiving SA fire. Strong Point #3 also had two B-40s and one B-41 rocket fired at them. They took 1 hit. Two US were WHA and an APC was damaged. Artillery and gunships expended in the suspected enemy positions with unknown results.

(10) On 151340Dec LZ Schueller received fifteen 60mm mortar rounds from the SW. All rounds landed outside the perimeter. Artillery and gunships were employed with unknown results. There were negative friendly casualties.



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(11) On 152030Dec the 17th Field Hospital informed 1-50th that a Dustoff ship crashed in vicinity BR555431 while on a mission for 1-503d. Gunships and a flareship were dispatched with negative results. A platoon from C/1-50th was sent to the suspected location of the downed ship. They moved as best they could but due to darkness and security requirements they did not reach the downed helicopter until the next morning. D/2-1 Cav LOHs vectored them towards the downed Dustoff ship. Two men were found injured and 2 were dead.

(12) On 161000Dec a change of command ceremony was conducted. Major James R. Woodall, the Battalion Executive Officer, replaced Lt. Col. John B. Carter as Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion (M), 50th Infantry. Lt. Col. Carter was recommended for the Legion of Merit.

(13) On 161100Dec MSF company 213 in vicinity BR404283 made contact with an estimated 2 squads of NVA at a distance of 200 meters. There were negative casualties on both sides. Gunships (134th Aviation) were dispatched in support of company 213. The enemy was observed withdrawing south to a bunker complex in vicinity BR403273. An airstrike consisting of four M82 and four napalm was called in on the bunker complex. FAC reported 1 secondary explosion. Companies 211 and 213 while making a BDA found eight 5 man bunkers and 8 hooches. All were destroyed. They also found 1 NVA KIA in khakis and numerous blood stains and pieces of human flesh.

(14) On 171033Dec a lone 2 1/2 ton truck hit a mine in vicinity BR295453 along QL 19 resulting in 2 US KIAs and the truck being destroyed.

(15) On 180115Dec Camp Radcliff and LZ Schueller received a well coordinated mortar attack. Camp Radcliff received fifteen 82mm mortar rounds. All rounds landed outside the perimeter causing negative casualties. Artillery fired counter-mortar fires with unknown results. (See Annex D)


(16) On 181205Dec MSF company 211 in vicinity BR404267 reported receiving fire from the S and SE, 200 meters away, from an estimated 2 squad size enemy force. The MSF returned fire and the NVA withdrew to the east. With cover from gunships the MSF followed a blood trail. The trail, however, eventually diminished until it could not be followed.

(17) On 211500Dec a patrol from MSF company 213 found 2,000 pounds of rice in a 8'x 12' hooch. The rice was extracted and given to the GVN.

(18) On 212040Dec a Hawk team from A/1-50th spotted five NVA in vicinity of SP 10 (BR278468). They engaged with SA and observed 2 men go down. Although they had the ambush area under observation all night, the next morning, they found two 20 pound mines but no bodies or blood trails.

(19) On 222253Dec Camp Radcliff received a sapper attack. An estimated 5 sappers attacked the 1st Cav R&R Center with satchel charges and one B-40. It is believed that the sappers came through the section of the Greenline on Hon Cong mountain and returned the same way, further enhancing the reputation of "Hon Cong Harry". Two and a half hours later Camp Radcliff came under a mortar attack resulting in 20 US WHA. Sixteen minutes later LZ Schueller received a mortar attack. Camp Radcliff received ten 82mm mortar rounds while LZ Schueller received fifteen to twenty 82mm mortar rounds. The enemy continued to follow their established modus operandi of mortaring Camp Radcliff and LZ Schueller simultaneously. (See Annex E)

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(20) On 241100Dec MSF company 212 spotted 2 NVA moving down a trail in vicinity BR44229. At a distance of 100 meters the MSF engaged with negative results. They pursued the fleeing NVA southeast. In vicinity BR44328 company 212 found 30 hooches each with a heavily fortified bunker. This appeared to be an enemy CP and everything was destroyed. The MSF also found four 75mm recoilless rifle rounds and one 82mm cleaning brush but all food bins were empty. The fact that the NVA took food and left 4 rounds of ammunition indicated a possible shortage of food due to the several food caches captured by the MSF. At 1615 hours MSF 212 was fired on by an estimated platoon size enemy force resulting in 1 friendly Montagnard KIA. The enemy fled after 4 minutes to the NW. Gunships came on station but could not locate the enemy. With darkness setting in the MSF did not pursue.

(21) On 241000Dec a cease fire went into effect until 251800Dec. There were no incidents during the cease fire.

(22) On 271925Dec FSB Kathy received ten 82mm mortar rounds. There were negative friendly casualties. Mortars and artillery fired counter-mortar fires with unknown results.

(23) On 281012Dec a convoy moving west started receiving light SA fire. The maneuver platoon of A/1-50th which was only 200 meters east of the contact area, observed the location from where the firing was coming from and engaged with their mounted .50 cal machine guns. Three NVA were KIA by BC and one RPD, four B-40s, and two RPG-1 were captured. The enemy fled south. Hankey reported spotting 25 NVA flee into the Plei But area and disappear under the tree canopy. Artillery was fired with unknown results. The maneuvering platoon checked the area out with negative finds.

(24) On 281035Dec MSF company 233 in vicinity BR498239 started receiving heavy sniper fire. They returned fire. D/2-1 Cav came on station and fired into suspected enemy location. They saw 1 NVA fall out of a tree and had one secondary explosion (50' high orange cloud).


(25) On 291850Dec an APC from B/1-50th in vicinity BR524463 was hit by a B-40 on QL 19. Six US were WHA and 1 US was KIA. An APO which was accompanying the one that was hit engaged the suspected enemy position. Artillery and 81mm mortars fired blocking fires north of the road from where the B-40 was fired. The next morning the SRAP conducting a search of the area, found 1 NVA KIA with an AK-47 at BR527464. He was killed by an 81mm mortar fired by 4/C/1-50th. (See Annex F)

### 3. Intelligence:

a. Enemy Order of Battle: During this reporting period the 1-50th has been concerned with the 95B NVA Regiment and the local force units. There was little confirmed evidence concerning these enemy units thus making it difficult to accurately judge their status.

#### (1) Movement:

(a) The 95B NVA headquarters and rear service elements are believed to be located along the Binh Dinh-Pleiku borders. Their probable location is BR4536. Furthermore, there is evidence that elements of this unit are also located south of An Khe near BR4422.



(a) The 4th Bn 95B Regiment has recently been confirmed to be in an area SW of An Khe. Prior to this they were located SW of Pleiku which was confirmed in September 1967.

(b) The 5th Bn 95B Regiment has remained along the western edge of our AO, south of QL 19. Their probable location is near BRU539. The Bn has no known permanent base area.

(d) The local force district companies in AO Walker are generally located south of QL 19. There has been no evidence of their movement from this area. These local force units are subordinate to the Gia Lai Province Headquarters. There is also unconfirmed evidence that the H-15 local force Bn and E-210 local force Bn have moved into the southern portion of AO Walker.

(2) State of Readiness:

(a) Confirmed evidence cannot be produced concerning 95B Regiment's readiness condition. There are indications that the Regiment including the headquarters and 4th and 5th Battalions are relatively well equipped. Their weapons include recoilless rifles, medium mortars, and various small arms weapons. The 5th Battalion has a definite advantage in SA weapons.

(b) The 4th Battalion has been transformed into a transportation Bn according to last reports thus hindering their military capabilities.

(c) It is believed that the 95B Regiment cannot stay in contact for more than 1 hour. This is based upon the poor quality of troops and also the mission of the Regiment to harass and interdict QL 19. Because they are a border Regiment and numerous supplies move through them it is believed the Regiment can be resupplied within 1-3 weeks.

(3) Quality: The quality of the enemy in AO Walker is considered low. This presumption is based upon poor training, poor education, lack of medical supplies and food stuffs, increased friction between VC and NVA, and generally ill-picked replacements.

(4) Combat Efficiency:

(a) Based upon the troop quality and logistical status, the 95B Regimental headquarters can be considered a unit of average efficiency. Contact with this unit cannot be confirmed.

(b) The 4th Battalion can be considered possessing equivalent efficiency. Because it has been transformed into a support battalion it is reasonable to believe that its combat efficiency is lower than the 5th Bn.

(c) The 5th Battalion has an increased efficiency over its parent organization. This is based upon its supply status, mission, and troop quality.

(d) The district force companies are believed to have a low combat efficiency. H-15 local force battalion and E-210 local force battalion are also believed to have a low combat efficiency.

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(5) Morale:

(a) Because of the lack of confirmed reports it is difficult to accurately judge the 95B Regiment's morale. Basing a judgement upon their combat aggressiveness, quality of troops, and status of supply it is believed they have a low morale.

(b) The district force companies are believed to have average morale based upon food supplies and sparse activity.

(6) Counterattack: The use of counterattack has never been used by the above mentioned units. Their mission has been to harrass QL 19 and An Khe. The nature of this mission prevents sustained attacks.


(7) Armor: These units have not employed armor in this AO.

(8) Special Weapons: The RPG-7 and B-40 have often been used in the enemy's harrassing efforts. At a short range (50 - 100 meters) good marksmanship has been displayed against vehicle traffic. However, at a longer distance (100 - 200 meters) the enemy has displayed poor marksmanship with numerous short rounds.

(9) Artillery: All of the aforementioned units have 60mm mortar and 82mm mortar capability. They have shown a distinct lack of marksmanship.

b. Nature of terrain and weather conditions: AO Walker is centrally located between the coastal plains of Binh Dinh Province and the plateau area of Pleiku. The area is predominately hilly to mountainous with two major valley compartments, the Song Con (Happy Valley) and the Song Ba. The immediate area in the vicinity of An Khe to the North, East, and South is characterized by rolling terrain. To the west it is more heavily vegetated with numerous gullies and deep ravines. To the north the terrain is generally open and rolling, broken by several small hills approximately eight to ten kilometers north of the camp itself. Behind these hills, the Song Ba River cuts the valley floor running west to east and then turning to the southeast. North of this, heavily vegetated and hilly terrain begins and continues unbroken for 30 kilometers. To the northeast and east the terrain is generally open and rolling with a large portion east of the Song Ba under cultivation and populated by many small hamlets and villages. Where the area is not under cultivation, it is densely vegetated with low bushes, grass and trees not more than ten to fifteen feet high which appears from the air as being relatively clear but in fact is dense enough to inhibit cross country movement and is intersected with numerous trails. This terrain continues for approximately three to four kilometers where it enters densely vegetated and hilly terrain which drops off sharply into the Song Con Valley. To the southeast, south, and southwest the terrain is open and rolling for two kilometers on the southeast extending to five kilometers on the southwest. Thereafter the terrain extending out to and past the boundaries of the AO becomes hilly and heavily forested with many steep ravines and small valleys which run generally to the southwest and from east to west, thus placing a series of high hills and mountains between this area and the Song Ba Valley. The Song Ba River which enters the AO from the extreme northwest of the AO bends back so that it enters and exits Camp Radcliff. At its exit from the camp, it bends further back until it flows in a west-southwesterly direction and exits the AO

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in the southwest corner. To the west the terrain is hilly, becoming mountainous on the extreme western boundary of the AO. The vegetation in this area is dense, becoming heavier and thicker in the extreme western area. Moving farther to the northwest, the terrain becomes extremely rugged and hilly with slopes normally exceeding 11° and with deep cut streams and valleys. The far northwest part of the AO extends about twenty kilometers farther north than the rest of the AO. It is bordered on the right, generally by the Song Ba River. The rest of the parhandle consists of extremely rugged Ba Nam hill masses. The entire area is separated by hill masses of varying sizes, steeply sloped and in most cases, covered with heavy tropical vegetation. The area is inaccessible, however considerable cultivation of this area is noticeable from the air. Throughout the AO, the drainage is generally north to south. The weather conditions for this reporting period has been clear skies with average temperature of 80 - 90 degrees and occasional thunder storms.

c. MI Agencies: The Military Intelligence agencies within our AO are always relaying information to us of intelligence value. Many times plans and decisions are changed because of intelligence gathered from agencies of this type. The agencies that we receive information from are the 172d MI, the 525 MI, and MACV. When it is possible, the area of a particular agent report is checked out. The reliability of these agent reports is considered C-3.

d. Enemy personnel and equipment losses for period:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>RW</u>	<u>C/S</u>	<u>S/A</u>	
6	5	0	0	October 1968
17	2	1	2	November 1968
12	0	3	1	December 1968

4. Personnel and Administration:

a. Strength:

	Authorized	Assigned (1 Oct 68)	Assigned (31 Dec 68)
(1) EM	865	929	868
OFF	40	42	33
WO	2	1	2

(2) <u>HEC</u>	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
Gains	61	58	30	149
Hosp Rtns	19	16	3	38
KIA	/	/	/	/
WIA	2	6	3	11
NBD	/	/	/	/
NEU	/	/	/	/

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	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(3) <u>Co A</u>				
Gains	62	49	14	125
Hosp Rtns	9	18	10	37
KHA	/	/	/	/
WHA	0	3	1	4
NBD	/	/	/	/
NEW	0	1	0	1

(4) <u>Co B</u>				
Gains	75	41	18	134
Hosp Rtns	21	9	7	37
KHA	0	1	1	2
WHA	0	15	16	31
NBD	/	/	/	/
NEW	0	0	1	1

(5) <u>Co C</u>				
Gains	65	49	24	138
Hosp Rtns	4	4	1	9
KHA	/	/	/	/
WHA	/	11	/	11
NBD	0	1	1	2
NEW	3	3	1	7

(6) <u>Co D</u>				
Gains	20	18	17	55
Hosp Rtns	6	3	4	13
KHA	/	/	/	/
WHA	1	2	1	4
NBD	/	/	/	/
NEW	1	0	0	1

(7) <u>Battalion:</u>				<u>TOTAL</u>
Gains				601
Hosp Rtns				134
KHA				2
WHA				61
NBD				2
NEW				10

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	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>
(8) Company Art 15	23	21	13
Battalion Art 15	7	14	3
Court Martial	6	1	5

(9) The Battalion is short certain Military Occupation Specialties, in particular, medics, mechanics, and qualified truck drivers. At this time, the Battalion is also short seven officers.

b. In order to eliminate a rotational hump present within the Battalion for the month of May 1969, an infusion program was scheduled for the latter part of December 1968. Due to the response of the soldiers of the Battalion, 70 extensions were obtained into the months of June, July, and August thereby eliminating the need for a disruptive infusion.

c. During the reporting period, members of this Battalion were awarded 8 Bronze Stars for Valor, 2 Army Commendation Medals for Valor, 42 Bronze Stars for Meritorious Service, and 62 Army Commendation Medals for Meritorious Service. Also, there were 63 Air Medals and 75 Purple Hearts awarded.

d. Since moving closer to the Brigade's rear section, administration and cooperation between the two levels have greatly improved. Quicker action can be taken on immediate problems and questions concerning routine matters can be answered without the time delay normally associated with a written referral.


#### 5. Logistics:

a. Supply: During the period 1 October to 31 December 1968, the Battalion continued to requisition major items of equipment from the 58th Field Depot in Qui Nhon. During this period the Battalion also received a few major items as well as minor items from the 173d Spt Bn BSO. The Battalion still has an individual located at the 58th Field Depot on a permanent basis to help in expediting equipment to the unit. As of 31 December, the organization was short the following items: 1 each M125A1 Mortar Carriers, 2 each M548 Cargo Carriers, 1 each M132A1 Flame Track, 30 each Machine Guns Caliber .50 M-2, 2 each Mortars 81mm, 6 each Radio Sets AN/VRC-46, 10 each Radio Sets AN/VRC-47, 12 each Radio Sets AN/PRC-25, 9 each Truck Utility 1/2 ton. The Battalion is also still currently short 2 Mine Detectors, airmobile, 18 compasses M-2, and 140 compasses, Lensatic.

#### b. Transportation:

(1) During the period 1 October to 31 December 1968 the transportation section continued to support elements of the Battalion with transportation and fuel.

(2) Cargo vehicles being utilized as POL transports were modified and equipped with new engines to provide the additional capability of distant fuel spraying. Additional vehicles were converted to POL vehicles to facilitate the accomplishment of the commitments on the perimeter, Camp Radcliff, and the defoliation mission to the north and south along QL 19. Primary difficulty encountered was in getting a sufficient amount of 600 gallon pods from which to pump and spray and pods for refueling vehicles. The authorized



amount of pods are "on hand" but several are unserviceable. Support unit will not classify pods unserviceable, and they therefore cannot be turned in. We have been informed that repair kits are all that is needed to repair the pods. These kits are supposedly on order by the 560th Light Maintenance Company.

(3) Air transportation of supplies for the Battalion and units under its operational control for the period were as follows:

- (a) October: 30 resupply sorties  
5 backlogs
- (b) November: 85 Resupply sorties  
21 backlogs  
2 emergency resupply missions (class V)
- (c) December: 2 resupply sorties

c. During the past quarter the Battalion Maintenance changed the PLL from Battalion control to company level, thereby authorizing a larger PLL. At the end of the period the PLL percentage of fill is 61%. The Maintenance platoon also constructed a wash point in order to keep the vehicles cleaner and eliminating the need to leave the Battalion area to be washed.


d. Medical:

(1) The primary health problem in the battalion, accounting for most days lost from field duty, has been malaria. There are gratifying trends in the malaria rate. These have been accomplished through enforcement of personal protective measures and oral malaria prophylaxis. Responsibility for malaria control has been emphasized at unit level. It is felt that the single greatest factor in motivating unit leaders to emphasize oral malaria prophylaxis has been weekly chloroquine urine testing. This function has been totally assumed by the battalion medical platoon. It is anticipated that urine surveys will be expanded following initial familiarization of the medical platoon with the test.

(2) Sanitation in the battalion area is enforced by weekly sanitation inspections by the medical platoon. It is felt that sanitation in the battalion area is at an acceptable level.

(3) Venereal disease continues to be a health problem, although accounting for a negligible number of duty days lost. The commonest venereal disease is gonorrhoea. Of particular note is the discovery of 2 cases of primary syphilis in the battalion in December. In both instances, contacts were identified and treated. It is felt that the incidence of syphilis in the An Khe area is still at a low level. Other local health facilities at Camp Radcliff have not seen cases of syphilis in recent months. Continued emphasis on treatment of contacts will hopefully continue to keep disease at low incidence.

(4) Testing of Chlorine residual of the water consumed in the battalion area has been assumed by the medical platoon on a weekly basis. No unacceptable chlorine levels have as yet been discovered.



(5) Marijuana smoking has continued to represent a threat to combat preparedness and effectiveness of the battalion. Lectures have been designed to acquaint each newly arrived member of the battalion with the hazards of marijuana consumption as it concerns the soldier.

(6) The medical platoon has been intimately involved in MEDCAP activities, coordinating with the S-5 and MATS units of this battalion. The battalion surgeon and a complement of medics have accompanied almost every MEDCAP program conducted during the past quarter.

(7) The number of permanent and temporary profiles in the battalion area has been reduced by approximately 50% in the past quarter.

(8) In an effort to provide medical care as far forward as possible, sick call has been instituted daily at LZ Schueller. A well equipped dispensary has been set up there.

(9) The shortage of manpower in the medical platoon represents a potentially serious compromise of medical care for the soldier in the field. Field units are seriously understaffed with medics. Due to the low level of enemy contact during the past quarter, the field units have been provided adequate medical care by the meager resources of the medical platoon. If significant further demands are made on the medical platoon for medics it shall not be able to respond.


(10) In summary, it is felt that the health status of the battalion is presently at the highest level of any point in the year.

#### 6. Civic Action and Psychological Operations:

a. During the period covered by this report, a coordinated plan of civic action was initiated and carried out by this command. Due to the fact that AO Walker covers more than one third of Binh Dinh Province one maneuver battalion could not adequately conduct civic action activities. With the battalion being based at Camp Radcliff RVN, the S5 drew up a plan to make maximum use of all military sources on Camp Radcliff.

(1) Units under direction of this command began civic action projects on 13 October 1968 in the following areas:

- (a) Tu Thuy - BR4953, 4956, 5253, 5256, 173d Spt Bn.
- (b) Cuu An - BR5250, 5253, 5650, 5653, 2-17th Arty.
- (c) An Kinh - BR5048, 5050, 5248, 5250, 504th MP Bn.
- (d) Song An - BR5245, 5247, 5745, 5747, 8-26th Arty.
- (e) Tan Cu - BR4044, 4045, 4444, 4445, 5-22d Arty.
- (f) An Son - BR4142, 4144, 4442, 4444, 6-84th Arty.
- (g) Song Tan - BR4240, 4242, 4640, 4642.



- (h) Tu Lucung - BR4040, 4042, 4240, 4241.
- (i) An Khe - BR4541, 4544, 5041, 5044.
- (j) All other units were used in general support of all civic action programs.

(2) During the reporting period units in the assigned areas were concerned primarily with weekly MEDCAPS, however instructions in sanitation, irrigation, road work and general construction projects were conducted. A total of 52 MEDCAPS were run during the reporting period in AO Walker under direction of this command, with approximately 2,330 Vietnamese civilians being treated.

(3) The largest community relations project conducted in AO Walker during the reporting period was the construction of a market place for the An Tuc District. This project is the pinnacle of S5 activities because it initiated self help projects in AO Walker. With only supervisory and logistical help (600 bags of cement, tin roofing 100 sheets) the Vietnamese of the An Tuc District have built an attractive and sanitary market place which suffice the needs of the people of An Tuc.

(4) Since 18 September 1968 the S5 has worked closely with the An Tuc Farmers Cooperative. This is another self help project and the only one of its type in all of Binh Dinh Province. The S5 has coordinated needed transportation and supervisory aid within the cooperative. This cooperative is now selling vegetables to the Vietnamese populace and US installations from Pleiku to Qui Nhon.

b. Psychological operations conducted in AO Walker during the reporting period have been twofold; Chieu Hoi Leaflet and loudspeaker missions and volunteer informants program.

(1) Chieu Hoi leaflet and loudspeaker missions have been closely coordinated between the S2 and S5 officers of this battalion, in which a weekly schedule is drawn up to cover areas in which intelligence indicates enemy movements. Twenty five Chieu Hoi missions were run during the reporting period, 20 by the 8th Psyops Group and 5 missions by aircraft in direct support of this battalion. These missions have resulted in 2 VC Chieu Hoi.

(2) Volunteer informant leaflets were distributed by maneuver companies along QL 19 to villagers and woodcutters in the vicinity of Bridges and Strong Points. These leaflets were also distributed by Hawkeye aircraft in densely populated areas and along QL 19. Primary use of VIP leaflets was to gain information of impending attacks on QL 19. Results of this activity have resulted in the following information and equipment:

- (a) An American assault boat location - 1,000 piasters.
- (b) A mortar site position - 1,000 piasters.
- (c) A box of 40mm ammunition - 1,000 piasters.

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SECTION II



## Personnel

### Item: Personnel Rotation.

Discussion: A records check of all personnel in the battalion indicated that 213 personnel will rotate out of the battalion in May 1969. In August 1968, the battalion experienced a similarly large rotation which resulted in significant loss of operating ability and severe administrative problems in replacing the lost manpower. Previous infusion programs in March and May 1968 did not alleviate the large rotational lump in August.

Observation: Manpower losses due to rotation of over 150 personnel per month cannot be efficiently handled by the battalion. An infusion program has been initiated to alleviate the projected losses of May 1969. In addition, an infusion program will be initiated to alleviate rotational losses for August 1969.

### Item: Non-Battle Losses.

Discussion: In September and early October the battalion experienced numerous non-battle losses to accidental injuries and malaria. Non-battle casualties and malaria losses reduce foxhole or fighting strengths. Past experience shows that these losses can be controlled by stringent and effective command measures.

Observation: An active accident prevention and malaria prophylaxis program can significantly reduce these non-battle casualties.

### Item: Profiles

Discussion: After comparing records on profile from the medical platoon with S1 records, it was discovered that there was a large discrepancy. The S1 had recorded more profiles than could be substantiated on the health charts.


Observation: Profiles should be maintained as an administrative function of the medical platoon. However, close coordination still should be maintained by the companies, medical platoon, and S1.

## Operations

### Item: Minesweeping

Discussion: It has been noticed that even though the entire length of QL 19 through AO Walker is well paved, this does not restrict mining incidents on the shoulders and turn off points along the highway. Both manual and electronic mine sweeping capabilities have been used along likely mining areas. This type of apparatus must be augmented by careful visual checks at all times.

Observation: Employ mine detection devices of any available by-pass whenever the terrain/situation permits such mining by enemy forces. Do not wait to discover the first one too late.



Item: Manning the Strong Points

Discussion: The constant manning of particular Strong Points during the entire day results in inattention on the part of the individual occupying the Strong Point due to the limited activity, and also results in a pattern being established. By having the vehicles occupying the Strong Points rotate at random times throughout the day the pattern is broken. It also creates activity along the road and keeps the track crews alert.

Observation: That maximum effort will continually be made to prevent creating a pattern while still keeping US troops alert in the performance of their mission.

Item: Obtaining Clearance for Artillery Fire

Discussion: Present regulations prohibit the firing of DEFGONS within 600 meters of friendly troops unless the troops are actually in contact.

Observation: Observed fire may be brought in to any requested distance upon the approval of the unit commander. This is to be reserved for situations where friendlies are believed to be in imminent danger.

Item: Coordination with ARVN, RF/PF, NPFU Units.

Discussion: There existed doubts as to the thoroughness of the extracting of intelligence matter during cordon operations conducted on nearby villages by US troops due to lack of knowledge of the language and customs. The utilization of ARVN intelligence teams and NPFU have greatly increased the intelligence gathering effectiveness of US troops. The Vietnamese troops actually carry on the search with US troops providing the security.

Observation: Careful coordination with ARVN, RF/PF, NPFU units should be encouraged. Only by doing so, can the US forces exploit their value completely.

Item: Reinforcing Bridges at Night


Discussion: The APCs that reinforce the bridges at night are instructed to be in position before dark. Although 2 APCs on 29 December 1968 left for the bridge that they were to reinforce in sufficient time to reach the bridge before dark, one broke down. Due to this delay the APCs were still on QL 19 just prior to darkness resulting in one APC being hit by a B-40 rocket and reaction during available daylight restricted.

Observation: Certain bridges will be "beefed up" as a normal status making it unnecessary to reinforce them at night with APCs.

Intelligence

Item: Snoopy Missions

Discussion: Snoopy missions are normally flown with 2 slicks and 2 gunships. If many hot spots are found, only limited ordnance can be put on each target.



Observation: Flying Snoopy with D/2-1 Air Cav, when they are attached, enables more ordnance to be employed on hot spots.

Item: Safe Combination Breaking While Safe is Closed

Discussion: The safe containing classified documents became inoperable while locked due to a faulty combination mechanism. Documents in the top drawer were in danger of being burnt when the top drawer was torched in opening the safe.

Observation: Place the lowest level classified and least important documents in the top drawer. If the combination mechanism becomes inoperable while closed and has to be torched, the most important documents will not be in danger.

Item: LRP Insertion and Extraction

Discussion: For several days due to inclement weather, which grounded aircraft, LRP teams could not be employed.

Observation: In periods of prolonged bad weather, LRP teams will be given AOs where they can be inserted and extracted by track vehicle (AFV M13), or on foot.

#### Others

Item: Loudspeaker mission

Discussion: Loudspeaker missions within AO Walker that were conducted with the use of 1,000 watt speakers in helicopters were evaluated as fair or ineffective. When helicopters fly at 1,500 feet, the message cannot be understood on the ground.

Observation: This command is now using aircraft from the 8th Psyops Group which have been evaluated as effective due to their ability to give complete coverage to areas requested.


Item: Civic Action

Discussion: Programs of this nature must be a coordinated effort by all commands at an installation such as Camp Radcliff. It was noted by this command that all civic action projects in the An Tuc District were being centralized completely in the city of An Tuc with little or no support to the outlying areas of the district.

Observation: A coordinated program has been established by this battalion through the Installation Coordinator to make maximum utilization of all resources at Camp Radcliff.

Item: Radio Shortages

Discussion: The battalion is short a total of 28 RT-524s and RT-505s. If the



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trend continues this figure will increase. Although there are enough radios on hand to perform the mission, there are not sufficient on hand for a back up. Consequently a radio cannot be taken out of service for preventative maintenance as long as they are operational.

Observation: The Signal Officer is currently attempting to assemble a signal float consisting of 2 - 3 radios each of RT-524s and RT-505s. Through the use of this float, radios requiring maintenance could be replaced while the necessary maintenance was performed.

*James R Woodall*  
JAMES R. WOODALL  
Major, Infantry  
Commanding

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Authority: NND 974225  
BY: *MA* NSA Date: 10/6

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DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 974885  
By SA NSA Date 10/6

ANNEXES

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Authority MND 974285

By *PA* NARA Date 10/16

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED), 50TH INFANTRY  
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE  
APO San Francisco 96250

AVBE-BE

9 November 1968

SUBJECT: After-Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 30 Oct 68

Commanding General  
173d Abn Bde  
ATTN: AVBE-SC/MHD  
APO 96250

1. General: At 00200 October 1968, Camp Radcliff came under a mortar and sappers attack. The sapper actions were confined to the 560th Maintenance Shop Area, the 58th Field Depot Storage Yard, the 86th Engineer Operation Area, and the vicinity of Tower #1 along the Greenline (BR48455). An estimated five (5) or six (6) sappers were able to penetrate the perimeter. Indications were that they entered and exited from the same location in the vicinity of Tower #1.

2. Sequence of Events:

- a. 0200 - Guards change on Tower #1, mortars and S/A fire reported by 3d Provisional Company and the 504th MPs located at the main gate.
- b. 0204 - Quick Strike TOC sounded alert to all on Camp Radcliff.
- c. 0215 - LZ Schueller reports under mortar attack, flare ship and gunships on station vicinity of Tower #1.
- d. 0220 - Mortar attack ceased.
- e. 0230 - Reinforcing company prepared to deploy.
- f. 0240 - Reinforcing company in position in supplementary positions at 3d Provisional Rifle Company.
- g. 0335 - CO 1/50th reported large fire in the QNSAC area.
- h. 0336 - Called for damage assessment from all tenant units on Camp Radcliff.
- i. 0505 - Quick Strike TOC terminated alert with exception of QNSAC reinforcing company.

0620 - Reinforcing company released from 3d Provisional Rifle Co.

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ANNEX-A

AVBE-BE

9 Nov 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 30 Oct 68

k. 0700 - All units on Camp Radcliff began sweep of their areas.

3. Casualties and Damages.

a. Casualties:

- (1) US - WHA (11)
  - (a) 2 WHA 3d Provisional Rifle Company.
  - (b) 1 WHA 647th QM.
  - (c) 2 WHA 15th Admin Company (1st Air Cav Div R).
  - (d) 6 WHA R & R Detach (1st Air Cav Div R).
- (2) VN - WHA (1) 3d Provisional Rifle Company (Greenline Guards).
- (3) US - KHA (1) 3d Provisional Rifle Company.
- (4) VN - KHA (2) 3d Provisional Rifle Company. (Greenline Guards).
- (5) Injured - Five (5) US personnel sustained injuries while moving from their billets to the available bunkers.

b. TO&E Property Damage or Loss:

- (1) 560th Maintenance Company:
  - 2 each, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$  Ton Truck Cargo (Destroyed)
  - 4 each, 1 $\frac{1}{2}$  Ton Trailer (Destroyed)
  - 1 each, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$  Ton Truck Van (Destroyed)
  - 1 each, 3/4 Ton Trailer (Destroyed)
  - 1 each, Adding Machine (Destroyed)
  - 1 each, Shop Office (Destroyed)
  - 1 each, Electric Shop (Damaged)
  - 1 each, Maintenance Shed (Damaged)
- (2) 647th QM Company:
  - 1 each, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$  Ton Cargo (Damaged)
- (3) QNSAC TMP Annex:
  - 1 each, 37 passenger bus (Damaged)
  - 1 each, 37 passenger bus (Destroyed)
- (4) 58th Field Depot:
  - 43,784 Barrels MC 70 Asphalt (Destroyed)
  - 1,923 Barrels Soil Binder (Destroyed)

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AVBE-BE

9 Nov 68

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 30 Oct 68 (cont)

(5) 86th Engineer Detachment:

- 1 each, Carpenter Shop (Damaged)
- 1 each, Vietnamese Labor Lounge (Damaged)
- 1 each, Plumber Shop (Damaged)

(6) 1st Air Cav Div:

(a) 15th Admin Area:

Building #1, #2, #3, #11, F-080, F-099, and XO's (Damaged)

(b) R & R Area:

2 Buildings (Damaged)

(c) DEROS Area:

1 Building (Destroyed)

(d) Battalion Area:

Field Grade BOQ - 3 rooms (Damaged)

4. Discussion:

- a. By stealth, an estimated squad of sappers managed to penetrate four (4) lanes of defensive wire in the area of Tower #1. They were believed to have been carrying explosive charges, RPG rockets, and AK-47 rifles. By an unknown prearranged signal, they hit their targets and Tower #1 simultaneously. About this time, approximately eighty (80) each 82mm mortar rounds started falling in the 504th MP area, 1st Cav Div Rear, and the Qui Nhon Sub Area Command (Provisional) areas, covering the enemy's withdrawal route. At this time, the lighting system at Tower #1 was destroyed by a RPG round.
- b. Approximately twenty (20) minutes before the attack was initiated, the OIC, 3d Provisional Company, and NCOIC had been in the location of Tower #1 and tried to return when the attack started, but were hindered by mortars and S/A fire. Tower #1 was in the process of changing guards when hit, resulting in there being only one man in the tower at the time. While trying to use the radio, he was hit by a RPG round and fell out of the tower. The sleeping area for the tower was destroyed and the men inside were subjected to small arms wounds as well as the explosion. One American was wounded while trying to reach the tower, later dying of wounds. Of the other three personnel in the sleeping area, 2 Vietnamese were killed and one seriously wounded.
- c. As the reinforcing company was moving into position, gunships were firing into the area where mortar flashes had been spotted. Flare ships were used at this time.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 30 Oct 68 (cont)

- d. Word was also received at this time that LZ Schueller was under a mortar attack in which they received approximately fifteen (15) each 82mm mortar rounds, all landing outside the perimeter. Negative damage was reported. One patrol of the Short Range Ambush Platoon, 1-50th at an ambush site (BR348458) in the vicinity called in artillery fire on the enemy mortar position.
- e. The 3d Prov Reinforcing Co remained in position until daybreak when the 3d Provisional Company conducted a sweep of the area. Findings reported were four (4) explosive charges with firing devices found in the entry lane, the cut wire was confirmed, and from the locks of the wire, a portion of the outer row of wire had been cut approximately two (2) weeks prior to the attack. Several empty AK-47 shell casings were found in the vicinity of Tower #1, a B-40 rocket within the 2d row of wire and, one undetonated mortar round. All units on Camp Radcliff conducted sweeps in their areas with negative findings reported

5. Conclusion:

- a. The sappers had cut a portion of the wire approximately two (2) weeks prior to the attack.
- b. The sappers were able to enter Camp Radcliff without being detected.
- c. The sappers positioned themselves so as to damage all the targets at the same time.
- d. The enemy mortared LZ Schueller as a diversionary attack.
- e. The enemy used approximately eighty (80) each 82mm mortar rounds, small arms fire, and approximately five (5) RPG rounds during the attack and as cover to withdraw.

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 BY: [Signature]  
 NARA Date: 10/16

s/ Anthony J. Juliano  
 t/ ANTHONY J. JULIANO  
 MAJ, INF  
 S3

This is a true copy

OFFICIAL:

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*Juliano*  
 JULIANO  
 S3

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED), 50TH INFANTRY  
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE  
APO San Francisco 96250

AVBE-BE

22 November 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Attack on Camp Radcliff, 11 Nov 68

Commanding General  
173d Abn Bde  
ATTN: AVBE-SC/MHD  
APO 96250

1. At 111528H November, Camp Radcliff and the An Tuc District Headquarters came under a combined mortar and recoilless rifle attack. The enemy was reported to have come into An Tuc the night before and held the civilians in their area captive during the attack.

2. Sequence of Events:

a. 1528 - City of An Tuc, District Headquarters MACV, An Tuc Dispensary, Bridge 20, the old market, and Camp Radcliff came under attack with mortars and 75mm recoilless rifle fire.

b. 1532 - Alert sounded at Camp Radcliff.

c. 1532 - Hawkeye on station.

d. 1533 - Quick Strike TOC deployed reaction element of B/1-50th to Bridge 20.

e. 1535 - D/2-1 Air Cav alerted, moved to orbit SE of An Khe, received A/W fire from BR490418.

f. 1538 - Mortar fire ceased.

g. 1540 - Artillery began firing counter-mortar fires under direction of Hawkeye. Upon completion, Hawkeye directed D/2-1 Air Cav into the area.

h. 1547 - Reaction element arrived at Bridge 20.

i. 1605 - D/2-1 Air Cav was relieved by A/7-17th Cav. Hawkeye then moved to check area north of An Khe.

j. 1617 - Hawkeye spotted 2 mortar tubes in vicinity BR498418 although the area was obscured by smoke from artillery fire. Eight personnel were also spotted and taken under fire by 4 Huey-Cobras. One Cobra from the A/7-17th Cav took 2 hits.

ANNEX B

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVAL  
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AVBE-BE

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Attack on Camp Radcliff, 11 Nov 68

k. 1625 - A/7-17th Cav inserted an Aero-rifle platoon to check area at BR498418. They found 6 expended recoilless rifle cases, 4 B-40 cases and some NVA pieces of cloth. At 1730 hours they were extracted because of weather and closing darkness.

l. 1800 - Alert terminated by Quick Strike TOC.

3. Casualties:

a. Friendly:

- (1) 4 KHA WN in An Tuc
- (2) 29 WIA WN in An Tuc

b. Enemy:

- (1) KIA - 1
- (2) WIA - unknown.

4. Damages:

- a. An Tuc Dispensary (Damaged).
- b. District Headquarters (Damaged).
- c. 647th QM: 13,643 barrels POL, 5 transfer pumps, and associated pump equipment (Destroyed).

5. Discussion:

a. Based on intell gathered by MACV from civilians that in four (4) days, elements of the Main Force Battalion (Gia Lia Prov) moved from their last location (BR459315) to the vicinity of An Tuc (BR495428) with the mission of destroying the District Headquarters.

b. When the attack on the District Headquarters started, 3 each 82mm mortars rounds and one (1) 75mm recoilless rifle round hit the dispensary and adjacent area, killing two (2) Vietnamese civilians. Approximately nine (9) rounds impacted vicinity An Khe Market Place killing two (2) Vietnamese and inflicting slight building damage. Upon receiving notification of the attack, the reaction platoon from B/1-50th (M), located at LZ Schueller, deployed to Bridge 20.

c. Moments after the reaction element reached Bridge 20, gunships were on station reporting contact with the enemy. While engaging them, the gunships reported a fire in the POL storage area of the 647th QM.

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AVBE-BE

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Attack on Camp Radcliff, 11 Nov 68 (cont)

d. The 647th QM area received approximately twenty (20) of mixed 82mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle, starting a large fire. The District Headquarters received thirty to forty (30-40) 82mm mortar rounds, some impacting as close as one hundred (100) meters from Bridge 20.

e. At 1625, the ground troops of A/7-17th Cav were combat assaulted into the area east of the 48 grid line, discovering several blood trails, expended ammunition, but no personnel.

f. The reaction element, located at Bridge 18 where they had been deployed to secure the convoy which had stopped there, reported a pipeline fire at location BR505460.

g. The convoy started moving again at 1700 hrs with negative incidents being reported. Quick Strike TOC terminated the alert at 1800 hrs.

6. Conclusion:

a. The enemy was able to move a considerable distance within a short period of time without our knowledge.

b. The enemy mortared the 647th QM area in an effort to conceal their real objectives, the District Headquarters, An Tuc Dispensary and An Tuc Market place (the latter two being American sponsored activities).

c. The enemy used approximately 60 each 82mm mortar rounds, 10 each 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, and small arms to conduct their attack and withdrawal.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/ Harry B Wilson  
t/ HARRY B WILSON  
1LT, Infantry  
Adjutant

This is a true copy

OFFICIAL:

*Juliano*  
JULIANO

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BY: [Signature]  
NASA Date: 10/16

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED), 50TH INFANTRY  
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE  
APO San Francisco 96250

AVBE-BE

19 November 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 12 Nov 68

Commanding General  
173d Abn Bde  
ATTN: AVBE-SC/MHD  
APO 96250

1. General: At 122200 November 1968, Camp Radcliff came under mortar and sapper attack. An estimated 5 sappers were seen in the vicinity of A Battery (Rear) 2/17th Arty just prior to the landing of the first mortar rounds on Camp Radcliff. Explosive charges were implaced in the A Battery area which resulted in considerable damage to weapons and equipment.


2. Sequence of Events:

- a. 2200 - Arty informed 1/50th TOC of incoming mortar rounds in northern portion of Camp Radcliff.
- b. 2204 - General Alert sounded to all units in Camp Radcliff.
- c. 2205 - A Battery (Rear) 2/17th Arty reports that Battery is unable to fire at this time due to explosions in vicinity of equipment and ammunition. 4.2 mortars at Camp Radcliff and B Battery 2/17th Arty (LZ Schueller) began firing counter-mortar targets for Camp Radcliff.
- d. 2210 - Mortar positions were sighted from towers at BR460510, 446496, and 471501.
- e. 2245 - All incoming mortars ceased. Spooky on station, Camp Radcliff.
- f. 2305 - Tower 10, Greenline reported receiving S/A fire, R/300, AZ4200, BR448482.
- g. 2308 - Tower 6, Greenline reported lights BR438482.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
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ANNEX C

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 SUBJECT: After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 12 Nov 68 (cont)

h. 2310 - 2/17th Arty reported at time of initial mortar attack personnel near gun positions of A Battery (Roar) saw 5 individuals in loin cloths throw explosive charges at targets in 2/17th Arty area. These personnel were later seen running toward Hon Cong mountain.

### 3. Casualties and Damages:

#### a. Casualties:

- (1) US - MHA (1), 2/1 Air Cav.
- (2) US - WHA (18).
  - (a) 3 WHA, 15th Admin Co.
  - (b) 1 WHA, 15th Replacement Det.
  - (c) 2 WHA, R & R and Transit.
  - (d) 3 WHA, A Battery 2/17th Arty.
  - (e) 9 WHA, D Trp, 2/1 Air Cav.

#### b. Damages:


- (1) One (1) 105mm Howitzer - destroyed.
- (2) One (1) 105mm Howitzer - damaged.
- (3) Two (2) UH1H Helicopters - moderate damage.
- (4) Six (6) LOH Helicopters - light damage.
- (5) One (1) Huey-Cobra - light damage.
- (6) One (1) M151A1 - destroyed.

### 4. Discussion:

a. At 122200 November 1968, 4-5 sappers dressed in loin cloths were seen running from the vicinity of the A Battery (Roar) 2/17th Arty heading for Hon Cong mountain. This activity was observed at the same time the more northern portion of Camp Radcliff (vicinity D-2/1 Cav) was being mortared. How long the sappers had been inside the perimeter of Camp Radcliff, and exactly where entrance was made is still unknown.

b. The purpose of the attack appeared to damage or destroy the Howitzer

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of A Battery (Rear) 2/17th Arty and the aircraft of D Trp 2/1 Air Cav. This mission was temporarily accomplished with the total destruction of one (1) 105mm Howitzer and damage to another. The explosion of an ammunition storage area in the immediate vicinity of the battery added to the disruption of counter-mortar fires from A Battery.

c. With the acquisition of additional guns and ammunition, A Battery (Rear) resumed fire approximately 2245 hours.

d. It is believed that the 120 - 130 rounds of mortar that hit within Camp Radcliff served a dual purpose of distraction and destruction so as to permit sapper activity in the artillery Battery area.

e. Searches have been, and are continuing to be conducted for sappers that may possibly still be within the confines of Camp Radcliff.


FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/ Harry B. Wilson  
t/ HARRY B. WILSON  
    1LT, INF  
    Adjutant

This is a true copy

OFFICIAL:

*Juliano*  
JULIANO  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED), 50TH INFANTRY  
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE  
APO San Francisco 96250

AVBE-BE

26 December 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 18 Dec 68

Commanding General  
173d Abn Bde  
ATTN: AVBE-SC/MHD  
APO 96250

1. General: At 180115Dec68 Camp Radcliff took an estimated 21 82mm mortar rounds. All the rounds landed in vicinity of 3d Provisional Rifle Company's area. The attack was a stand off attack of short duration that was over within four (4) minutes.

2. Sequence of Events:

a. 0115 - 3d Provisional Rifle Company informed Quick Strike TOC that they were receiving incoming mortar rounds.

b. 0116 - Counter mortar was fired on the suspected mortar position and previous employed mortar positions in vicinity of the suspected position.

c. 0117 - Gun and flareships were alerted to go airborne on order.

d. 0117 - 3d Provisional Rifle Company reported no incoming at this time.

3. Casualties and Damages:

a. Casualties: US - WHA (16).

(1) 10 WHA - 304th S&S.

(2) 3 WHA - 89th Finance.

(3) 3 WHA - 593 GSP.

b. Damages: Visable damage as of 241400Dec68.

(1) One (1) 5,000 gallon water tank had severoꝝ holes.

(2) Minor damages to five (5) billets and one (1) mess hall.

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E.O. 11652, Sec 3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)  
By *S/lt* DAMil, Date 5 APR 1976  
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AVBE-BE

SUBJECT: After Action Report (cont)

4. Discussion:

a. The attack on Camp Radcliff appeared to be an harrassing attack. No attempt was made by ground troops or sappers to penetrate the Greenline.

b. The quick reaction time of the artillery and 4.2 mortar section in firing counter-mortar prohibited the enemy from continuing his attack.

c. The PMI was .05 during the period of the attack.

d. The area of the suspected mortar site was swept by elements of the 3d Provisional Rifle Company. The suspected position was confirmed as the actual mortar position. Since there are many trails in the area, the enemy's direction of retreat could not be determined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/ Carl L. Messinger  
t/ CARL L. MESSINGER  
1LT, ARMOR  
Adjutant

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OFFICIAL:

*Juliano*  
JULIANO  
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AUTHORITY: NND 974285  
BY: [Signature]  
NASA Date: 10/16

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED), 50TH INFANTRY  
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE  
APO San Francisco 96250

AVBE-BE

30 December 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff, 22 - 23 Dec 68

Commanding General  
173d Airborne Brigade  
ATTN: AVBE-SC/MHD  
APO 96250

1. General: At 222253Dec68 Camp Radcliff received a sapper attack. An estimated 5 sappers attacked the 1st Cav R&R Center with satchel charges and B-40s. At 230130Dec68 Camp Radcliff came under a mortar attack. Sixteen (16) minutes later LZ Schueller received a mortar attack. Camp Radcliff received ten (10) 82mm mortar rounds while LZ Schueller received 15-20 82mm mortar rounds.

2. Sequence of Events:

a. 222253Dec68: 2-17th Artillery A(Rear) reported hearing an explosion. Sounded their Battalion alert. Battalion SOP requires the sounding of alert siren when a mortar attack is suspected to be occurring.

b. 222320Dec68: 1st Cav reported 6 buildings in R&R Center had 12 satchel charges placed in them. The mess hall in the R&R Center was hit by a B-40. 1st Cav reported seven (7) US wounded but not serious.

c. 222321Dec68: Ready reaction force (Scouts) notified.

d. 222334Dec68: 1st Cav reported R&R Center receiving S/A fire, possibly AK-47 from Hon Cong Mountain.

e. 222336Dec68: 504th MPs reported one of their patrols was receiving S/A fire near Cav R&R Center.

f. 222343Dec68: D/2-1 Cav Aero Rifle Platoon reported ready to go.


g. 222350Dec68: Scout Platoon/1-50th reported ready to go.

h. 222351Dec68: 1st Cav spotted movement at base Hon Cong. Engaging with S/A. Illumination being fired.

i. 222359Dec68: Scouts coming to TOC for briefing.

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ANNEX E

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS,  
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AVBE-BE

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Attack on Camp Radcliff (cont)

- j. 230003Dec68: "Cocked Hat" in effect at this time.
- k. 230003Dec68: Scout Platoon committed to area of R&R Center.
- l. 230046Dec68: Activity near Hon Cong and R&R Center ceased. Scouts remained in the vicinity.
- m. 230130Dec68: 2-17th Arty reported hearing explosion to their north.
- n. 230134Dec68: 2-17th Arty reported shooting all counter-mortar targets.
- o. 230135Dec68: 1st Provisional Rifle Co reported receiving approximately 10 incoming mortar rounds. (BR450491)
- p. 230145Dec68: 4-60th Arty reported receiving 1 unknown mortar round. Three (3) US wounded.
- q. 230146Dec68: B/1-50th reported LZ Schueller receiving an unknown number of an unknown type of mortar rounds. Rounds landed outside of perimeter.
- r. 230203Dec68: B/1-50th reports approximately 15-20 82mm mortar rounds fired at LZ Schueller, 2 landed inside perimeter. 2 casualties (minor).
- s. 230212Dec68: 1st Prov reported Tower 14 received sniper fire from rear. Checking it out at this time.
- t. 230215Dec68: All enemy activity ceased.

3. Casualties and Damages:

a. Casualties:

- (1) US - MIA 17, 1st Cav.
- (2) US - MIA 3, 4-60th Arty.

b. Damages (as of 28 Dec): 1st Cav mess hall, light damage.

4. Discussion:

a. The sappers came from and returned to Hon Cong mountain. Extensive patrolling and Hawk operations on Hon Cong after the attack indicate that the sappers are probably not within the compound at this time.

b. The sapper and mortar attacks appeared to be poorly coordinated. This indicates either a lack of communications between the two elements or that the original plans were thwarted.

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AVBE-BE

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Attack on Camp Radcliff (cont)

c. The quick reaction of the counter-mortar radar in plotting the location from which the enemy's mortar was firing enabled artillery to fire counter-mortar fires with a minimum of delay. This quick reaction prohibited the enemy from firing more than 10 rounds.

d. The mortar attacks on Camp Radcliff and LZ Schueller were well coordinated. The mortar rounds were fired at LZ Schueller when there would be maximum activity due to firing counter-mortar for Camp Radcliff.

e. Artillery S-2 plotted the enemy mortar position at BR446495. One round impacted in 4-60th Arty area (BR457487), three (3) impacted in 5-22d Arty area (BR457486), and an estimated six (6) impacted behind Tower 13 (BR457488-9).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/ Carl L. Messinger  
t/ CARL L. MESSINGER  
1LT, ARMOR  
Adjutant

This is a true copy

OFFICIAL:

*Juliano*  
JULIANO  
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Authority: NND 974285  
By: [Signature] NARA Date: 10/16

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