

HISTORY OF  
1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED), 50TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE

1 APRIL 1969  
to  
30 JUNE 1969

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## PREFACE

I. Purpose: This report is intended to give all interested agencies and personnel a complete and unbiased record of the Battalion's accomplishments and failures during operations conducted in the Republic of Vietnam from 1 April 1969 to 30 June 1969. It is hoped that the events recorded and lessons learned which have been outlined in this report will prove beneficial to other units in the successful accomplishment of their respective missions.

II. Scope: This historical report covers administrative as well as the operational aspects of the Battalion for this reporting period. The information for this report was obtained from the files and daily journals of the 1st Battalion (M), 50th Infantry.

SECTION I

## 1. INTRODUCTION:

a. For the first 13 days of April the Battalion continued operations in AO Marshall with Battalion Hqs located at Camp Radcliff near An Khe. Operations in AO Marshall were primarily concerned with road and bridge security along QL 19, RIF and Hawk operations within the AO.

b. On 13 April, under OPLAN Washington Green, the Battalion began re-locating to LZ Uplift in Binh Dinh Province. Battalion forward TOC was located at the District Headquarters in Phu My. The advance element departed Camp Radcliff on 13 April and the main body closed at LZ Uplift 181225Apr69.

c. Under Washington Green on 19 April the Battalion, in conjunction with GVN forces began the pacification of Northern Phu My District (in the central portion of AO Lee) and assumed responsibility of road and bridge security along QL1 between the Bong Son Pass in the north and LZ Uplift in the South. (See Annex A, Map Overlay)

d. Enemy activity throughout April was light and increased slightly but steadily in May and June. Forms of enemy activity included the following:

- (1) Light mortar and sapper attacks directed against company/platoon field CPs.
- (2) Small, sporadic ambush type attacks along QL1, primarily during dusk hours.
- (3) Extensive use of booby traps, heavy pressure type mines and command detonated claymore mines throughout the AO.
- (4) Sniper attacks and sporadic harassment attacks conducted by squad size and smaller teams equipped with small arms, grenades, and M79s were directed primarily against units in the field.

e. In accordance with OPLAN Washington Green, TF 1-50th was composed of the following elements :

- (1) HHC, 1-50th Inf (M)
- (2) Co A, 1-50th Inf (M)
- (3) Co B, 1-50th Inf (M)
- (4) Co B/1-503d Inf (Abn)
- (5) One squad from 173d Engineers OPCON to HHC, 1-50th Inf (M)
- (6) Co C(-), 1-50th Inf (M) became OPCON to 4-503d Inf (Abn). One platoon C/1-50th OPCON to 2-503d Inf (Abn).
- (7) One platoon from either A/1-50th or B/1-50th, depending on which company was securing QL1, became OPCON to 1-503d.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS,  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

## 2. TACTICAL OPERATIONS:

a. 1-30 April 1969: Enemy activity for the first 13 days of April was characterized by ambushes and harassment attacks along QL19. Between 13 and 18 April, the Battalion completely relocated from Camp Radcliff in An Khe to LZ Uplift, Phu My District, Binh Dinh Province. On 19 April, the Battalion initiated "Washington Green" with a cordon & search of Chanh Khean(1) hamlet BR952816, My Trang BR951837, and Van Thieu(3) hamlet BR943854 on the 27th. While conducting pacification operations elements of 1-50th killed two VC/NVA.

### (1) 1 April 1969:

(a) At 0140 hours Pump Station 7 received two rockets which detonated in the wire and came from vicinity of BR309487. There were negative casualties.

(b) At 1110 hours Co C had a vehicle hit a mine in vicinity BR279465. Results: Two Friendly WIAs. Dustoff requested and completed.

(c) At 1020 hours 54th Transportation Bn convoy was hit from the north and south sides of QL19 with SA and mortar fire. There were negative casualties or damages.

(d) At 1855 hours Mobile Strike Force found a platoon base camp at BR333418. (Sixty fires and three protected bunkers) They destroyed approximately 1,000 lbs of rice which was booby trapped. Found three fatigue shirts, US Army type, tropical jacket with name tag (Stokes).

### (2) 2 April 1969:

(a) At 1130 hours D/2-1 Cav spotted 12-20 hooches (20x40) connected with trenches and bunkers with overhead cover, livestock and animal pens (BR300560).

(b) At 1200 hours Co B received eight single shots from vicinity BR299563. At the same time their flank element spotted two individuals and engaged them with AW fire. There were negative results.

(c) At 1305 hours Co B/1-50th found 100 lbs of rice, two pounds of documents, and two rucksacks at BR283359.

(d) At 1307 hours Strong Point #5 received 15 rounds AW fire from the north, negative casualties (BR325465).

(e) At 2330 hours guards spotted two people on the Golf Course. Guards tried to halt them and fired at them. AW fire was returned and the people disappeared. The area was searched (BR468477). They found in the area a place where 2-3 people had been staying for quite a while.

(3) 3 April 1969: At 1010 hours Strong Point #6 reported finding 6-8 hooches large enough to hold nine men each. Also found were three knives, and one hatchet at BR362433.

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(4) 4 April 1969:

(a) 1125 hours 2/B/1-50th made a CA to conduct a BDA of an air-strike at BR195410.

(b) At 1555 hours Co C CP track hit a mine at BR235485. Results eight US WIA, one serious. Dustoff requested and completed.

(5) 5 April 1969:

(a) At 0855 Co A assumed responsibility of Bridges 21 & 24.

(b) At 1110 hours Strong Point #3 received ten sniper rounds from BR344458. Fire was returned with negative casualties.

(c) At 2040 hours Hawk 54B spotted light approximately 350 meters south of their location. 81mm WP was fired. Results were unknown.

(d) At 2220 hours Bridge 24 had a trip flare go off. When the enemy was engaged, the pipeline was damaged. POL sprayed on the bridge and bunkers. Pipeline was turned off until repairs could be made.

(6) 6 April 1969:

(a) At 1405 hours 35 Montagnards emerged from the woodline 300 meters west of Bridge 27. They came from the south and were without food. They were taken into custody.

(b) At 2150 hours Bridge 24 received 20-30 rounds SA from BR372468. Fire was returned with unknown results.

(7) 7 April 1969:

(a) At 0945 hours Co C assumed control of AO Central and Bridge 23 at 0752 hours.

(b) At 1105 hours LZ Action received approximately 15 SA rounds from NE at approximately 200 meters. There were negative casualties.

(c) At 1345 hours Co B/1-50th received AW fire at BR361442. Fire was returned. There were negative casualties.

(8) 8 April 1969:

(a) At 0855 hours 284 RF Co reported finding three huts, 4x5, and 8x10. They also found a bunker 4x5 at BR310522. They destroyed the fortifications.

(b) At 1600 hours Co C reported receiving two 57 RF rounds from the north of Strong Point #7 (BR293508). MSF Recon element (BR310522) received 12-20 rounds SA. There were negative casualties.

(9) 9 April 1969:

(a) At 1120 hours MSF Recon 1st platoon made contact with

enemy of unknown size at BR305567. The enemy was engaged and fled to the east and west. One enemy personnel was KIA and one friendly was WIA. There was also one pair of chicken binoculars CIA.

(b) At 1555 hours a convoy passing Pump Station #8 received 3-5 mortar rounds. There was negative damage and also negative casualties.

(c) At 1900 hours Tower 15 spotted five VC in the open. They engaged with M16, M60. Arty was also fired with unknown results.

(10) 10 April 1969:

(a) At 1025 hours MSF Recon platoon engaged four VC with SA fire. The enemy fled to the NE. There were no enemy casualties. One friendly was WIA but did not require dustoff.

(b) At 1705 hours 2d platoon MSF Recon found a large cache at BR305566. Five lbs of documents, 35 lbs of clothes, three NVA rucksacks, assorted SA ammo, two platoon size medical kits. There was evidence of a recent removal of approximately 3,000 lbs of rice that had been stored in the area.

(11) 11 April 1969: At 1910 hours Hawk 52A received SA rounds from the south while moving into position. They spotted two possible VC/NVA. A reaction element moved out from LZ Action, shot up and swept the area. There were negative results and negative casualties.

(12) 12 April 1969:

(a) At 0900 hours D/2-1 Cav found one hooch (10x12), 10 pigs, baskets and small amounts of rice at BR329331. At BR320281 they found one hooch (15x20), and one bunker (4x6), and fishing poles in the creek area. At BR245278 they found two campfires (remains) some fresh cut bamboo and some footprints. At BR313276 they found a dam, one hooch, fire wood, a few chickens and some pots and pans.

(b) At 1420 hours Co A's maneuver element found two 60mm mortar rounds with charges and many footprints in vicinity BR241473.

(c) At 2300 hours the 1st Cav Training Center reported two men missing who were believed to be still out in front of Tower 14. 1st Prov Rifle Company was notified to check fire and artillery was informed. A patrol was taken and found the missing men at 0030 hours. They were not injured.

(13) 13 April 1969:

(a) At 0945 hours Co A's maneuver element found 35-40 bunkers at BR283479. They were very old, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ x2 $\frac{1}{2}$ , and waist deep. They were destroyed.

(b) At 0955 hours at BR348455 a five ton truck from the Engineers hit a mine. The truck was totally destroyed and was recovered for salvage. The mine was a 24 lbs black plastic anti-tank mine.

(c) At 1510 hours the advance party of 1-50th arrived at LZ Uplift in preparation for the Battalion move under OPLAN Washington Green.

(14) 14 - 15 April 1969: 1-50th was relieved of operational responsibilities and prepared for and conducted move from An Khe to LZ Uplift.

(15) 16 April 1969: Communications was established at LZ Uplift at 1600 hours.

(16) 17 April 1969: 1-50th continued its movement to LZ Uplift.

(17) 18 April 1969: 1-50th continued its movement to LZ Uplift with the last elements closing Uplift at 1225 hours. Battalion TOC was located and permanently established at Phu My District Hqs.

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(18) 19 April 1969: Operation Cordon and Search of Chanh Khoan began at 0600 hours. At 0830 hours Co B/1-50th detonated a booby trap at BR953818. Results: negative casualties. At 0925 hours the SRAP element, during the cordon and search, received AK fire from the SE and SW 100 meters away. They also received three B4Os that were aimed for the middle of the column. The SRAP platoon leader was wounded in the leg by an AK round and was extracted by Medevac. At 1120 hours the 2d platoon Co B/1-50th received a burst of AK rounds from the north of the Chanh Khoan hamlet. There were no casualties. Results of the entire operation were three detainees, and one US MIA.

(19) 20 April 1969: At 1535 hours the Scouts escorted B/1-50th to LZ Ollie in preparation for cordon and search of Van Thiet(1).

(20) 21 April 1969: The Initial movement for the operation cordon and search of Van Thiet(1) began at 0215 hours and all elements were in place by 0700 hours. During the operation four persons were detained and taken to 172MI. At 1600 hours Scouts found a bunker complex with overhead cover. Bunker complex was 12'x 6'x 10'. There were also some dud firecracker rounds (BR946864). Also found documents consisting of a notebook & propaganda.

(21) 22 April 1969:

(a) At 1200 hours one man hit a booby trap (frag grenade type) and was wounded in the arm and leg. Dustoff was requested and completed.

(b) At 1617 hours BR937838 a sniper fired at RF/PF personnel on the road and hit a nine year old boy in the stomach. At the same time the RF/PF made contact with an estimated two squads of VC armed with M79 and AK47s. Results: one PF KIA, and one radio destroyed. Enemy casualties were unknown. The nine year old boy was extracted by Medevac.

(22) 23 April 1969:

(a) At 0345 hours at BR914843 two to three mortar rounds landed wounding four Vietnamese civilians. It was not determined where the rounds came from. Dustoff requested and completed.



(b) At 0910 hours 3/2/B/1-503d received three M79 rounds and sniper fire from BR934852. There were negative casualties or damage.

(c) At 1100 hours a civilian brought a 175 mm round to Bridge 8. EOD was dispatched to the scene. The round was destroyed.

(d) At 1900 hours LZ Uplift received 10-15 rounds of 81mm mortar rounds. The Greenline was also receiving sniper rounds. Rounds came from SW near the village. Counter mortar artillery was fired, .50 cal, and other organic weapons returned fire. One personnel from 1-50th was wounded, eight from 1-503d were wounded, all not serious. The grid where the fire came from was BR908735.

(23) 24 April 1969:

(a) At 1445 hours a VTR hit a mine on road 504. Results, negative casualties. A road wheel and a track was blown off. The vehicle was recovered and towed back to LZ Uplift.

(b) At 1700 hours Bridge 2 received two sniper rounds from the west in the vicinity of Phuoc Chanh(1) hamlet. There were negative casualties. Fire was not returned.

(c) At 1835 hours Co A reported that the Vietnamese interpreter on Bridge 3 (BR932814) stated that a squad of VC were operating in the area. The VC were armed, according to the interpreter, with AK47s, M2 carbines, and M16 rifles. The interpreter scouted around the area and the RF/FFs started at BR927808 (last known position of VC squad) and worked north with negative results.

(24) 25 April 1969:

(a) At 1315 hours Co B/1-50th had five people wounded by a booby trap (frag grenade type) BR948822 inside the FOB. Light wounds in the arms, chests, and stomachs were incurred by these personnel. All were dusted off.

(b) At 1420 hours two vehicles reported receiving about 10 AW rounds from BR934775. There were negative casualties or damage.

(c) At 1550 hours Phu My's MACV advisors reported that two individuals were telling Vietnamese people not to work for MACV. This has caused MACV's work force to be out in half. The two individuals live at BR967791. They also have a child who was seen in the area where Co B hit the booby trap.

(d) At 1709 hours B/1-503d initiated contact with two VC 700 meters away. The VC were dressed in yellow and green and carrying carbines at BR939861. There were negative results.

(e) At 2145 hours operation AEGIS 4 (Search operations of Van Thiet(1)) was postponed for 24 hours because of faulty plans from district. The operation was rescheduled for the 27th.

(25) 26 April 1969:

(a) At 0500 hours operation ARSIS5 initiated involving provisional company from 1-50th. Mission: Provide security in northern Phu My during the district popular elections.

(b) At 1320 hours a man from the Scout platoon stepped on a booby trap resulting in two WIA (US). Injuries received were frag wounds and broken ear drums to both individuals (BR909824). Dustoff requested and completed.

(c) At 1930 hours an intelligence report from MACV; two platoons of VC (unknown unit) were giving out leaflets. Also trying to keep the people from voting (BR905802/BR813800). Bridge 2 (BR933778) was alerted to watch this area. Nothing further was reported.

(26) 27 April 1969:

(a) At 0805 hours, B/1-50th conducted a cordon and search operation of My Trang(H) BR951837. Results: 7 detainees and no contact with the enemy.

(b) At 1200 hours MACV reported the 982 RF Co had contact with an unknown size enemy force. This contact occurred during operation ARSIS5 around 0945 hours and lasting till 1045 hours. The enemy was engaged with SA fire and artillery resulting in one enemy KIA and one chicom carbine CIA. There were negative friendly casualties. The enemy broke contact at 1100 hours and fled in an unknown direction from BR815824 and BR850813.

(c) At 1240 hours eight female detainees were apprehended at BR943837. They were turned over to the NFFF with results unknown.

(d) At 1505 hours B/1-503d conducted a cordon and search operation with the 675 RF Co. For the 2d time, the area cordoned was Van Thiet hamlet. The cordon was complete at 0900 hours. Results of the operation; interrogated 15 people and detained 11. Three were taken to 172MI and eight to Phu My district.

(27) 28 April 1969: At 1130 hours at BR946855 the C&C ship/1-50th spotted three VC, one dressed in black FJs and two dressed in green fatigues. One of them had a weapon and they ran to BR942858. A sweep was conducted by B/1-503d with negative results.

(28) 29 April 1969:

(a) At 1130 hours B/1-503d at B<sup>4</sup>938867 spotted one VC and killed him. The victim was wearing fatigues, had no weapon, but he did have a wallet with some papers. He also had a poncho (NVA type). B/1-503d believed he was an outpost. There were negative friendly casualties.

(b) At 2044 hours B/1-50th reported that the village chief of Chan Khoan (1) received a radio message stating that two VC companies were moving from BR9979 to BR9481 to attack LZ Salem and RF Co 45. The

VC picked up supplies and equipment from My Phu hamlet. No sighting or contact with the enemy was made.

(29) 30 April 1969:

(a) At 1430 hours B/1-50th found rice supplies for two days at BR967828. They also detained two people.

(b) At 1635 hours B/1-503d engaged one VC at BR927855. The VC had one M1 carbine and wore blue shorts, white hat and white shirt. He was engaged at 100 meters. There were negative results. Also there were three detainees taken.

(c) At 2055 hours Bridge 1 reported spotting 16-20 people approximately 350 meters away and moving toward the bridge. The people were watched and when they moved closer they were engaged. Artillery was fired, a reaction force from LZ Uplift moved out. The reaction element consisted of one platoon from A/1-50th and the SRAP from Uplift and an element from the Scouts. A sweep was conducted of the area with negative findings.

b. 1-31 May 1969: The Battalion continued road and bridge security along QL1 and pacification efforts in northern Phu My District. Enemy activity continued to be limited sporadic ambushes along QL1, light mortar/sapper attacks on LZs Uplift and Salem and Phu My District Hqs. During this period, the SRAP element received motorized rubber boats and commenced amphibious patrol operations on Lake Dam Trao, establishing a permanent amphibious patrol base (APB Carol) at BR966829. Elements of 1-50th killed 24 VC/NVA and captured three VC/NVA, eight small arms, approximately 5,000 lbs of rice, and 20 lbs of documents.

(1) 2 May 1969: At 0705 hours B/1-503d received approximately 100 rounds of AW fire from BR997821. Gunships were called. B/1-503d found an SKS, took one VC PW who was wounded during the fire fight. Also a blood trail was found leading SSE. This was lost at BR997821. Punji stakes were found at CR014813. This was the original LZ for B/1-503d. The combined mission was ended (Sky Trap) at 1045 hours.

(2) 3 May 1969:

(a) At 0830 hours B/1-503d initiated contact with five VC at a distance of 200 meters at BR935854. The enemy were dressed in assorted civilian clothing. They were armed with carbines and M1 rifles. They fled to the north. There were negative friendly or enemy casualties.

(b) At 1747 hours 12 VC were spotted at CR014810. They had rucksacks, and weapons and were heading for the village. At 1751 hours three slicks and three gunships were scrambled for a CA. The 1st platoon from B/1-503d, 21 men from the Scouts, and  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the SRAP were inserted into grids CR018810, and CR018804. One VC was killed, one carbine CIA, and four males were detained. The mission ended at 2050 hours. The units were extracted on the morning of the 4th.

(3) 4 May 1969:

(a) At 0830 hours B/1-503d at CRC09805 detained one male, age 25 years old. He was hiding in a rice paddy. He was wounded in the arm by a warning shot from 3/B/1-503d.

(b) At 2040 hours 3/B/1-503d spotted four VC carrying weapons. The third platoon initiated the contact from 240 meters. The VC were carrying wood and weapons. There were negative friendly casualties and unknown enemy casualties.

(4) 5 May 1969:

(a) At 0915 hours the 2/B/1-503d was checking some boats and saw two Vietnamese civilians in two boats. One started paddling away. They yelled for him to stop. The men of the 2d platoon fired a warning shot. The Vietnamese person fired back and the platoon returned fire killing the man. The man dropped his weapon and it fell into the lake. The other man was detained.

(b) At 1830 hours 3/B/1-503d while moving into ambush location, spotted three VC. One had a weapon looking like a carbine. They were moving NE on a trail; contact was initiated from 350 meters away. One VC was wounded CIA, and the others escaped to the NE.

(5) 6 May 1969:

(a) At 0620 hours B/1-503d had three men wounded by a M26 grenade booby trap. Men were wounded in the face, back, and arm. They also found an anti-personnel mine at BR934867 (US made).

(b) At 0950 hours a MEDCAP team was inserted in Chau Truc (BR940841). They treated 50-60 people. The people told them that there were VC in the village planting booby traps and punji stakes. MEDCAP was extracted at 1300 hours.

(6) 7 May 1969: At 1545 hours B/1-50th's OPCON element 1/B/1-503d sent an element to investigate some booby traps and punji pit area at CR 022796. They received 30-40 rounds of AK and other SA fire. There were negative casualties. Fire was returned with negative results.

(7) 8 May 1969:

(a) At 0700 hours 2/B/1-503d spotted two VC. They killed one and the other got away. The one that got away had a weapon. The two were moving from east to west at BR932842.

(b) At 0830 hours B/1-50th spotted one VC with a rucksack. Warning shots were fired but the VC ran then stopped and threw a grenade. He was wounded in the back. Dustoff was called.

(8) 9 May 1969:

(a) At 0712 hours to 0810 hours 1/B/1-50th while checking

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out a village at BR942790 heard an explosion and spotted four VC. VC were attempting to set up a booby trap. The 1st platoon opened fire resulting in two VC KIA and 1 PW. Action resulted in seven US WIA, none serious.

(b) At 1055 hours BR990834 an element of 1/B/1-503d was hit by a command detonated mine. Three were wounded and dusted off.

(c) At 1115 hours at BR998844 2/B/1-50th killed one VC who was fleeing the site of the command detonated mine.

(d) At 1838 hours B/1-503d made contact with three VC who were heading east at BR932863. Results: two enemy KIA, one WIA CIA.

(9) 10 May 1969: Twenty one detainees were taken this day by various elements of the battalion.

(10) 11 May 1969: At 1650 hours B/1-50th stopped 16 women carrying rice, beer, whiskey, and potatoes into the mountains. (BR964903). They were extracted to Phu My and were released the next morning. There were four other detainees picked up during the day.

(11) 12 May 1969:

(a) At 0100 hours LZ Uplift started receiving mortar rounds. About 0105 hours Phu My started receiving rounds. It was reported that M79 rounds landed near the Phu My perimeter. Also 20-25 rounds of SA fire was reported coming from 100 meters north of Phu My. Artillery was fired on the suspected enemy location. The village at Phu My was hit. The District Hqs had negative damage or casualties. There were 10 civilian KIAs, 20 WIAs, 87 homes destroyed, two damaged, and 50% of a school damaged.

(b) At 1610 hours a young Vietnamese boy showed a patrol from B/1-503d where a 20 lb satchel charge and two five lb satchel charges were. The boy was paid from the VIP fund.

(c) At 1855 hours 3/B/1-503d engaged VC at 100 meters. They had no weapons. They were dressed in assorted civilian clothing. They fled to the south.

(d) At 2155 hours Co A on Bridge 5 reported two green star clusters go up 200 meters west of Bridge 5 (BR921855). The Scouts and Co A dispatched reaction elements. A village 200 meters west of the bridge received AW fire from all sides. Two tracks from Co A went to the scene while eight Scout tracks remained at Bridge 4. There were negative casualties or damages. The reaction force was released at 2310 hours.

(12) 13 May 1969:

(a) At 0920 hours B/1-503d had a man killed accidentally (US personnel) when an M26 grenade went off (BR948840).

(b) At 1245 hours 2/B/1-503d spotted four VC, one with a weapon at BR972879. They engaged the VC and the enemy fled into some brush. They were engaged from 400 meters away. They wore assorted civilian clothing. There were negative results.

(13) 14 May 1969: At 1103 hours children in vicinity of Bridge 3 showed US guards the location of a 155mm HE round at BR938812. They also found four M33 grenades and a bandolier of ammunition at BR945817.

(14) 15 May 1969:

(a) At 1555 hours one squad of VC entered a village and grenaded an RF hut. One RF KIA, four WIA. One man was detained, believed to be the VC who threw the grenade. The VC were armed with AK47 and carbines and frag grenades.

(b) At 1755 hours 3/B/1-503d made contact with three VC. Results one KIA, one WIA (enemy). One got away with a carbine BR953864.

(c) At 1930 hours B/1-50th reported that the RD element at Chau Truc had 20 of 28 personnel assigned go AWOL. They left their weapons behind.

(15) 16 May 1969:

(a) At 0755 hours Bridge 3 bought under the VIP program two 60mm HE, two 81mm illum, one 155mm HE, one 105mm HE and three M79 rounds.

(b) At 0930 hours two people from B/1-50th, 2d platoon were wounded by a booby trapped M26 grenade. They were dusted off.

(c) At 1210 hours a small boy (8 yrs old) set off a booby trapped 175mm round consisting of wood boards and C-ration cans with batteries. It was a pressure type mine. The mine was set near a location where APCs cross a stream BR944831. The boy was killed instantly.

(d) At 1808 hours a 3/4 ton truck from B37/11 arty (ARVN) was ambushed 1 1/2 kilometers south of LZ Uplift. There were three friendly KIAs and three WIAs. The Scouts 1-50th reacted from LZ Uplift with negative results.

(e) At 2210 hours Bridge 3 reported that a green star cluster was seen SE of Bridge 3. A/1-50th had a reaction force from Bridge 3 & 4 go to the scene. The RF compound at BR936813 received 3-4 sniper rounds. The RFs thought the star cluster meant for everyone to wake up. There were negative results.

(16) 17 May 1969:

(a) At 1255 hours a small boy at Bridge 3 stated that he knew the location of a crate of rockets beside a downed chopper. Further report stated five 2.75 rockets were found.

(b) At 1441 hours a man on Bridge 7 was wounded by a dud M79 round which was brought to the bridge under the VIP program. It went off accidentally.

(17) 18 May 1969:

(a) At 0908 hours B/1-50th, 2d platoon patrol at BR982801 detained one female who was on the National Police blacklist. They also detained one male VC who tried to escape in a sampan across the lake. He was picked up by a LOH and taken to LZ Uplift.

(b) At 1145 hours B/1-503d at BR922868 found the front of a claymore mine. Also the rigging for a mined 155 round which consisted of a piece of 1 1/2" x 5" bamboo, and a paper with 14 names were found. They also detained one male who was without an ID at the same location.

(c) At 2210 hours LZ Uplift reported 15-30 VC coming into the perimeter. Bunker guards opened up with .50 cal and M60 machine guns with unknown results.

(18) 19 May 1969:

(a) At 0120 hours the village outside of LZ Salem started receiving SA fire and Salem received satchel charges. One US personnel received wounds in the leg. Three ARVN's were KIA, and one woman was dusted off due to wounds. There were negative enemy casualties.

(b) At 0700 hours a fire fight was observed 200 meters west of Bridge 4. Two APCs from Salem were sent to investigate the area where a VC company was supposed to be (BR901824). They swept the area with negative findings.

(c) At 1745 hours B/1-503d found a base camp at BR908975 with one large shelter with a large bed. Also two green uniforms, one ammo can, one sand bag filled with rice, and four bottles of kerosene were found.

(19) 20 May 1969:

(a) At 1025 hours B/1-503d BR910865 found a tunnel complex large enough for 50 people, 5'10" x 3' and 100 meters long. In the tunnel they found 2 lbs of C4, and two blasting caps. The complex was destroyed.

(b) At 1447 hours B/1-503d heard some firing and went to investigate. Two men started to run away. They were engaged from 400 meters away, resulting in one VC KIA and one detainee (BR937839).

(c) At 2300 hours, A/1-50th's hawk received frag grenades and SA fire from the NE about 30 meters away. Results: two US KIA, one US WIA, and one man in shock. A patrol was sent out into the contact area with negative results. (BR968699).

(20) 21 May 1969:

(a) At 0710 hours B/1-503d engaged one VC at BR969855. Results: one VC KIA, one SKS and six rounds CIA.

(b) At 0930 hours B/1-503d wounded one VC at BR967853. He was hiding in a tunnel and carrying a thompson machine gun. He was dusted off.

(21) 22 May 1969: At 0845 hours a hamlet chief said that there was one platoon of VC at BR957792. The chief stated it was the same platoon that ambushed the ARVN 3/4 ton 5-7 days ago. The Scouts/1-50th were alerted to move to the area. LOHs were requested and A/1-50th set up a blocking force at BR958798 SE to BR961790. There were negative results.

(22) 23 May 1969:

(a) At 1500 hours A/1-50th picked up three detainees, one carrying documents indicating she ran a supply point for the VC. The other two were suspected VC wives. They were taken to Uplift.

(b) At 2105 hours Co A ambush spotted three people moving up in their rear (BR966800). They opened their ambush at 2115 hours and followed up with company reaction force. The area was searched with negative results.

(23) 24 May 1969

(a) At 0410 hours A/1-50th initiated an ambush on one man, 50 meters away (BR960808). They swept the area and found blood stains. Support: 20 illum 81mm, one illum 105mm. Results unknown, no friendly casualties.

(b) At 0615 hours 3/B/1-503d made contact with three VC at 300 meters moving north. They fled in all directions. They were wearing black PJs and had one unknown type weapon.

(c) At 1400 hours A/1-50th had one detainee, muscular, sweating with no ID. Another detainee was picked up 20 minutes later. Both had North Vietnamese money. Seven additional detainees were apprehended by 1-50th elements during the day.

(24) 25 May 1969

(a) Co A/1-50th received small arms fire, one satchel charge and four RPG rockets. There were negative casualties. 105mm round illum were fired and there were negative results. Seven RPG rockets came in from the east & southeast. They shot up the area at 200-300 meters. Negative casualties & results.

(b) At 0630 hours 3/B/1-503 spotted 4 VC at BR971861 and initiated contact at 50 meters. Three VC KIA, one fled north. CIA one M1 carbine, two pistol belts, and five M26 grenades. The VC who fled had an automatic carbine.

(c) At 0750 hours A/1-50th detained one male 40 years old who had no ID but had a 2½ year old captivity card. The 1st plat patrol also found 1500 lbs of rice in one hooch near by BR992785. 2/A/1-50th had one female detainee age 50 with no ID. She lives next door to a VC Pick up point BR985786.

(d) At 0800 hours B/1-503 had five detainees, 1 male, 4 females. National Police questioned them and they admitted to being VC sympathizers.



(e) At 0830 hours the Scouts 1-50 were ambushed. There was one friendly WIA. They swept the area with negative results. There were at least five VC in the ambush (BR942791).

(f) At 1815 hours one US jeep and three personnel from 2/47 advisor team were ambushed at BR921728 (not in 1-50th AO). The Scouts/1-50th were alerted at Uplift. Two tracks left from Phu My to go to assist. A sweep was made of the area with negative results. One squad of VC had initiated the ambush from both sides of QL1.

(25) 26 May 1969

(a) At 0930 hours 1/A/1-50th reported finding a bunker complex at BR963772. CS was thrown into the tunnels with negative results.

(b) At 1130 hours B/1-503d found ten foxholes at BR957885 which had been used recently. They could hold 20-30 people. There were two cooking fires, one straw hooch 3x6, and one pair black PJs. They were all destroyed.

(c) At 1550 hours a track from 4/A/1-50th hit a mine on highway 505. It was a command detonated 155mm mine. Eight people were dusted off with two of them seriously wounded. The track was destroyed. The village adjacent to the track caught fire as a result of exploding ammunition from the track. (BR986788)

(d) At 2005 hours Bridge 1 reported spotting 70 people with weapons moving into a village BR935767. They were moving north to NE. A provisional element was heli-lifted near the village at BR935767. PZ 2030 hours. B/1-50th set up as a blocking force along the road between Bridge 1 and 2. Village area was checked out. The Scouts and 2/B/1-50th cordoned the village overnight and checked it in the morning with negative findings.

(26) 27 May 1969:

(a) At 0555 hours cordon of An Giang hamlet began. It was completed at 0725 hours with negative results.

(b) At 1320 hours B/1-503d had four men seriously wounded when a booby trap was tripped at BR919873. Dustoff was called and completed.

(c) At 2035 hours A/1-50th, on a joint ambush with RFs, engaged and killed one VC. During the firing an ARVN Lieutenant was shot. He was dusted off.

(27) 28 May 1969:

(a) At 0732 hours B/1-503d caught 10 detainees at BR961857 and seven at BR975850. Most of them were males of military age.

(b) At 0825 hours A/1-50th captured one female at BR992801 with one bottle of penicillin and six empty 105 rounds.

(c) At 0225 hours A/1-50th at BR950802 walked into a VC ambush resulting in two US KIA, four WIA. The ambush was a command detonated claymore (US type).

(28) 29 May 1969:

(a) At 0800 hours B/1-503d found two frags that were thrown at the RFs in a previous day's contact. One of the grenades was booby trapped.

(b) At 1020 hours B/1-50th at Bridge 5 reported one 15 year old civilian boy came to the bridge. He had two holes in his body which were thought to be bullet holes. Further readout provided the following information: the boy tripped a booby trap approximately 200-300 meters east of the bridge.

(c) At 1816 hours Operation Sky Trap began aimed at a VC political meeting to be held at Hoa Ninh and My Phu. Troop C 7/17 Cav was OPCON for the operation. LZ 1 - BR995783; LZ 2 - CR006781 were both cold. At 1840 hours 100 meters north of LZ 2, contact was made with two VC armed with AK47s. One VC was wounded.

(d) At 1925 hours B/1-503d at BR947864 engaged one VC resulting in one VC KIA.

(29) 30 May 1969:

(a) At 0600 hours the official truce began (Buddha's birthday).

(b) At 0730 hours the point element of Ranger 7 (provisional element of Sky Trap) had a claymore blown on them at CR002805. Seven US soldiers were dusted off; two KIA, five WIA one of whom died later. The element fired on two individuals. One VC KIA, one VC CIA plus two grenades from the dead VC BR997804.

(c) At 0930 hours B/1-503d received fire from two VC. Fire was returned resulting in one VC KIA, one M1 rifle CIA.

(30) 31 May 1969:

(a) At 0705 hours 3/B/1-503d at BR977866 detained four males ages 19-45. They had no IDs.

(b) At 0710 hours B/1-503d received AW fire from 100 meters. They saw at least ten young men running SE. After the contact villagers brought out two wounded women and dustoff was called. BR981851.

(c) At 0834 hours 3/B/1-503d received AW fire from an estimated seven VC resulting in one friendly WIA. During the ensuing fire fight the four detainees were shot and killed by VC fire. Dustoff was called. *5 man patrol, patrol leader KIA*

(d) At 1820 hours BR980867 Hawks Nest reported spotting one

individual with a rucksack. B/1-503d was informed. They proceeded to the location and spotted two individuals. They shot the one who had a rucksack. He was dusted off. The one that got away had an M1 rifle (BR931867). He fled to the south.

c. 1-30 June 1969: There was relatively no change in the type of enemy initiated incidents. During this period an additional platoon was put under OPCON to 2-503d Inf, this requirement being met by rotating platoons from the companies at specific intervals. The Battalion initiated several platoon size combat assaults in the early hours of the morning, with moderate results. Emphasis was placed on combined operations with GVN forces throughout the AO. SRAP operations on Lake Dam Trao proved effective in denying the lake to the enemy as a safe haven and route of escape. During June, 1-50th elements killed seven VC/NVA, captured three VC/NVA, one small arm, and 9,350 lbs of rice.

(1) 1 June 1969:

(a) At 1145 hours 2/B/1-503d tripped a booby trap (M26 grenade). There was one KIA, and one WIA dusted off (BR935850).

(b) At 2040 hours A/1-50th reported receiving an intelligence report from the hamlet chief of Chanh Khoan(?) stating an NVA/VC platoon was operating in our AO. The leader's name was Lee Duc Huong Dam. No further information was given.

(c) At 2120 hours 2/A/1-50th received some SA fire from 200 meters east of their location. There were negative friendly casualties or damages, although two villagers were wounded and dusted off.

(2) 2 June 1969:

(a) At 0010 hours 1/A/1-50th ambush spotted one VC 100 meters from their location. The element initiated contact with SA. The individual threw a grenade and fled in an unknown direction. There were negative friendly casualties (BR972797).

(b) At 0730 hours 1/1-50th found a cave at BR993792. Requested an EOD team and the cave was destroyed.

(c) At 0833 hours the Scout platoon received sniper fire from village at BR934792. There were negative casualties. The Scouts conducted a sweep of the area and detained 13 people.

(d) At 0907 hours Inferno Lead (mini Cav) spotted two individuals at BR934782 in a hole. One had a weapon. The chopper received fire and returned fire resulting in two males slightly wounded, and one female KIA. All were civilians.

(e) At 1120 hours 3/B/1-503d found a tunnel complex at coordinates BR996796. An EOD team was requested and the complex was destroyed.

(f) At 2330 hours A/1-50th received 2-3 satchel charges from the north. Fire was returned with SA and AW. There were negative friendly casualties or damages (BR980794).

(3) 3 June 1969:

(a) At 0750 hours an amphibious patrol from the SRAP hit a booby trap 200 meters east of their patrol base. There were negative casualties.

(b) At 1430 hours B/1-50th at Bridge 1 had some Vietnamese children bring 12 US claymores, two chicom grenades, twelve M79 rounds, and two M26 grenades. The children saw VC bury the above ammunition. They dug it up and took it to Bridge 1 and were paid under the VIP program (BR931766).

(4) 4 June 1969:

(a) At 1225 hours SRAP picked up two detainees ages 20 and 28 years old. Both were females. They had no IDs. The National Police said their husbands were VC BR967830.

(b) At 1405 hours 2/A/1-50th picked up one male detainee (age 58) at 1400 hours at BR951815. They found 1,000 lbs of rice in his hooch.

(c) At 2010 hours B/1-503d received M79 rounds from a village at BR968878. There were negative casualties. They conducted a sweep of the area and found nothing.

(5) 5 June 1969:

(a) At 0845 hours A/1-50th reported that two old women came and told them that three days before about 20 VC came into their village and took three boys ages 14-16 with them (BR965815).

(b) At 1255 hours (BR993793) A/1-50th found ten B40 rockets. They continued to search the area and found four 60mm mortar rounds, two chicom grenades, five rifle grenades, one claymore, and one bag of AK ammunition.

(6) 6 June 1969:

(a) At 0730 hours B/1-503d and B/1-50th exchanged missions, B/1-503d moving from AO Fork to Bridges and B/1-50th moving from bridges to AO Fork. The Scout element (one section) was OPCON to B/1-503d to act as mobile reaction force on the bridges.

(b) At 0830 hours Co A/1-50th found 2,500 lbs of rice at BR958170.

(c) At 1240 hours, at Bridge 1, a Vietnamese boy brought in two 81mm WP rounds, three 81mm HE, and six 60mm HE.

(d) At 1300 hours another Vietnamese boy brought one 4.2 HE round to Bridge 2. Ten minutes later another brought in one 90mm tank round.

(e) At 1630 hours B/1-503d at BR915783 reported that a small boy brought two 81mm rounds to them and said he knew where there were more. He asked him to bring them to the bridge and he returned with nine more 81mm and one 60mm HE rounds. A patrol from Bridge 1 went with the boy but found nothing. The boy was paid VN \$4500 under the VIP program.

(7) 7 June 1969:

(a) At 1035 hours 3/A/1-50th spotted four people at BR993791. Two of the individuals had weapons. They were engaged with SA fire at 100 meters. There were negative results, and negative casualties.

(b) At 1250 hours 3/A/1-50th found 16 AK magazines, 13 AK rounds, one VC poncho, one flashlight hidden in the bushes at BR992789.

(c) At 1530 hours 1/B/1-50th had a man hit a M26 pressure type booby trap. He received frag wounds in one arm and both legs. He was dusted off.

(d) At 1735 hours 2/B/1-503d made contact with five VC at a range of 100 meters. They were carrying two AK47s, one M16, and two carbines. Two were wearing fatigues, one with khakis, and two with civilian clothes. BR905818. The VC fled to the west. There was one US WIA.

(e) At 1843 hours the Scouts/1-50th at BR913794 received two B40 rockets, and several AK rounds. They spotted 12-15 people wearing blue shirts. Two were killed and one detained. There were negative friendly casualties or damage to US vehicles.

(f) At 2359 hours LZ Ollie reported hearing a VC yelling outside the perimeter. It appeared to be a PSYOPS operation of some kind. The area was fired up with negative results.

(8) 8 June 1969:

(a) At 0053 hours LZ Uplift received approximately 8-10 incoming mortar rounds which landed between the Greenline and the motor pool/1-50th. There were negative casualties or damages. The fire came from an unknown direction. Counter mortar artillery was fired with unknown results.

(b) At 0105 hours LZ Salem received approximately three mortar rounds in the SW corner of the LZ. There were negative casualties or damages. Counter mortar artillery was fired with unknown results. The enemy fire came from an unknown direction.

(c) At 1205 hours a Vietnamese boy brought three 155mm rounds, five 105mm rounds, and three M79 rounds to Bridge 3. He was paid VN \$4100.

(d) At 1620 hours Bridge 8 reported taking sniper fire from the NE and west. At the same time a Scout track reported receiving fire at BR895865. Both elements returned fire with SA and AW. A convoy south of Bridge 8 also received fire resulting in two wounded; both were dusted off. The area was swept with negative findings.

(e) At 2355 hours on a request from A/1-50th, Hawkeye aircraft flew a mission to check on the village at GR003848. A large amount of movement was spotted. It appeared to be fishing orientated activities.

(9) 9 June 1969:

(a) At 1200 hours at BR948851 B/1-50th found a booby trapped M26 grenade. They blew it in place.

(b) At 1330 hours, elements from B/1-503d and the Scouts/1-50th conducted a CA. PZ - LZ Uplift at 1330 hours, LZ BR887806 at 1336 hours. Results of the CA: three detainees were picked up at 1408 hours. At 1415 hours approximately 2,200 lbs of rice was reported found. At 1430 hours one VC was KIA at BR887796.

(c) At 1724 hours 1/A/1-50th had a man wounded by a frag grenade booby trap. He was dusted off.

(d) At 2030 hours the SRAP LP heard voices on the lake approximately 100-150 meters away. They fired M79s and M60s in the direction the voices came from. The LP then received approximately 10-15 rounds of SA fire from 150 meters east. Area was shot up with SA and illum. The area was searched with negative findings.

(10) 10 June 1969:

(a) At 0118 hours the Scouts/1-50th were dispatched from LZ Uplift to check on a hamlet at BR956787. SA fire was reported and MACV received a report that VC were in the hamlet. Scouts had negative enemy contact but picked up three wounded RFs and returned them to Uplift.

(b) At 0930 hours A/1-50th reported a cow tripped an anti-tank mine which killed the cow and wounded a little girl in the face and arms. Dustoff was called for the little girl.

(c) At 0940 hours the S3/1-50th spotted two dead bodies near Bridge 1 as a result of the contact at 0118 hours. 1/A/1-50th picked up the two bodies at BR943768.

(d) At 2041 hours LZ Uplift received two mortar rounds near the motor pool. There were negative casualties or damages. Counter mortar artillery was fired with negative results.

(11) 11 June 1969: At 1025 hours 2/B/1-50th at BR972873 found a bunker with overhead cover (3'x4'x3'). They found 20 expended M16 cartridges in the bunker. The bunker was destroyed.

(12) 12 June 1969:

(a) At 0645 hours a 45 year old male came into B/1-503d's camp and told them that there were ten VC in the village at BR903852. The VC took 14 villagers captive at BR900850. They were moving to BR897857. They were armed with M16s.

(b) At 1030 hours a message was sent to A/1-50th, B/1-50th, and B/1-503d concerning VIP stating the following: "We have information that some RFs are giving rounds to people to turn in under the VIP for money. We will not pay for these rounds. Explain to these people why we won't pay them."

(c) At 1130 hours a track from A/1-50th hit a mine at BR958799. There were five US WIA (one very serious), one US KIA, and one RF WIA. The mine was believed to be a pressure detonated 175mm round. The track was destroyed.

(d) At 1240 hours 2/A/1-50th was moving to the location where the track hit the mine when they were ambushed at BR950815 by seven to eight VC with SA. There were negative friendly casualties, unknown enemy. 2/A/1-50th swept the area and picked up three male detainees ages 50, 30, and 19. They had no weapons. Gunships and mini-Cav provided air support during the operation.

(e) At 1800 hours the SRAP found an NVA poncho pegged down with a lump under it. They suspected it was a booby trap and destroyed it in place. Location was 200 meters SW of BR992812.

(f) At 2120 hours 3/A/1-50th ambush opened up on two people at a 100 meters to their SW. They searched the area with negative results.

(13) 13 June 1969:

(a) At 0910 hours B/1-503d received information from MACV team at Phu Ninh that a platoon of VC was located at BR899849. The area was checked out by a patrol from B/1-503d. There were negative results.

(b) At 0911 hours while on a routine patrol A/1-50th found 15-20 NVA coins and 150 lbs of wheat at BR979790.

(c) At 1825 hours RF Co 291 made contact with an estimated VC squad at BR969790. One platoon from A/1-50th reacted to the contact. Results: two WIA RFs. Dustoff was called and completed.

(14) 14 June 1969:

(a) At 0930 hours B/1-50th engaged five VC at BR976860 which resulted in one VC, two female suspects, and two M26 grenades CIA.

(b) At 1140 hours B/1-50th, 2d platoon track hit a mine at BR976860 resulting in four US WIAs. The track was damaged but was recovered and repaired.

(c) At 1550 hours a village chief reported to B/1-503d that there were 100 VC at BR957754 and 40 VC at BR951784. B/1-503d checked out the area with negative findings.

(d) At 1645 hours C&G ship/1-50th captured two detainees at BR947748 and two more at BR955792. They all had no IDs.

(e) At 1945 hours two LOHs received fire from BR929782 and returned fire resulting in two civilians WIA.

(15) 15 June 1969:

(a) At 0915 hours 2/A/1-50th picked up 11 draft dodgers wanted by the ARVNs, three persons wanted by the PPs, 23 persons wanted by the PPs, and two VC informants. The draft dodgers and informants were extracted to Phu My.

(b) At 1928 hours 1/B/1-50th received SA fire from BR963867 and returned fire. They made a sweep and had negative findings.

(16) 16 June 1969:

(a) At 1056 hours 2/A/1-50th apprehended one female age 28 at BR950815 who stated that she was a Chieu Hoi. She stated she was in charge of 11 VC. She was later classified a VC PW.

(b) At 1210 hours B/1-50th killed one male VC at BR965863 and later detained two females who were in the vicinity. They were later released.

(c) At 1500 hours 3/B/1-50th tripped a booby trapped M26 grenade resulting in two US WIA. A dustoff was requested and completed.

(17) 17 June 1969: At 1130 hours 3/A/1-50th found a covered wall at BR981788 with two empty 8" shells nearby and two 81mm rounds with charges on them. EOD was called and the rounds were destroyed.

(18) 18 June 1969:

(a) At 1730 hours Hq 93, 173d Abn Bde 3/4 ton truck was ambushed at BR903857. One person was KIA, one WIA, and one injured when he was thrown out of the truck. Dustoff was called and completed. The Scouts/1-50th reacted from LZ Salem with five trucks and swept the area, under air cover provided by two gunships, with negative findings.

(b) At 2235 hours Phu My District Hqs received three to four B40 rockets or 57 RR rounds approximately 75 meters NW of the compound. There were negative casualties or damages. Fire was returned from the compound with negative results.

(19) 19 June 1969:

(a) At 0600 hours the SRAP received fire from BR978833 while carrying out a search and clear operation of An Quang(H). There were negative casualties. Results of the operation: SRAP found 20 lbs of documents at BR983838 which were forwarded to the 172MI.

(b) At 1340 hours 15-20 individuals were spotted at BR885864. Dusters from nearby Strong Point 1 and artillery fired into the area. There were negative results.



(20) 20 June 1969:

(a) At 0600 hours 2/A/1-50th picked up a Chieu Hoi at BR951816 age 37, male and brought him to the company CP. He was transported to 172MI at LZ Uplift for further interrogation.

(b) At 2005 hours B/1-50th, 3d platoon picked up one male detainee while enroute to their night location BR936844. He then led the 3d platoon to a hut where they picked up another detainee who National Police said was a VC. Both men were taken to E/1-50th CP and turned over to 172 MI the next day.

(c) At 2006 hours B/1-50th, 2d platoon captured one VC at BR956855. He confessed to the National Police that he was a VC. He reported that four other VC were in the area. A sweep of the area later produced nothing further.

(d) At 2000 hours artillery and 81mm mortars fired at lights observed by B/1-503d at BR884863. There were negative results.

(21) 21 June 1969:

(a) At 0628 hours 2/A/1-50th reported that the village chief at BR966808 knew the location of three VC. A joint sweep with an element of the 291 RF Co produced negative results.

(b) At 1200 hours gunships were requested for a RF element at BR879840 who was in contact with estimated force of one platoon VC/NVA. The Scouts/1-50th linked up with the RFs to form a joint operation. A sweep of the area was conducted with negative results.

(c) At 1405 hours the Scouts reported finding the body of a dead VC at BR888840. The kill was credited to artillery. They also found two ammo boxes with two sets of fatigues, a poncho, and 400-600 lbs of rice.

(d) At 1725 hours 3/B/1-503d initiated contact with two VC moving west to east at BR889856. The VC were wearing green khakis and hats and were carrying packs. The enemy fled east and a sweep of the area brought negative results.

(f) At 2001 hours Bridge 1 reported that three boys turned in some ammo found in hamlet Phu Quang at BR959797. The boys reported to them that 30 VC come into the village every night from the Tiger mountains and are armed with M1 carbines & M79s. The boys said that the VC killed one boy for turning in ammo. This report could not be substantiated.

(22) 22 June 1969:

(a) At 0100 hours A/1-50th began receiving B40s from the east, west, and north. Also M79 rounds from the east and automatic weapons fire from the east and west were received. There were negative casualties or damages. A sweep of Phu Ninh(4) resulted in finding a deserted village. The results of the sweep were negative.

(b) At 0840 hours A/1-50th found a bunker at BR987788 with a rucksack, some AK rounds and approximately 100 lbs of rice in the bunker. All of it was extracted.

(c) At 1115 hours 2/B/1-50th received one round M79 at BR975894 from 140-200 meters distance. They chased the VC for 250 meters and received two more M79 rounds. Results: three friendly WIA, enemy unknown.

(d) Between 1115 and 1350 hours, Hawks Nest reported seeing 20-30 people in and around a hamlet at BR969894. An element from the 1-50th was GA'd by C Troop 7/17 Cav into the area. There were negative results

(23) 23 June 1969: At 0615 hours a combat assault was conducted by 1/A/1-50th and a sweep of the village to the west along with the SRAP resulted in 16 detainees taken from the hamlet located at BR984821.

(24) 24 June 1969: At 0905 hours a hamlet chief reported that there were VC in his hamlet at BR904854. B/1-503d checked out the hamlet with negative results.

(25) 25 June 1969:

(a) At 0940 hours Hawks nest spotted four people at BR962897 with rucksacks and weapons. The area was checked out by Hawkeye with negative results.

(b) At 1735 hours 1/A/1-50th found five haystacks each concealing a cache of rice and seven pots of potatoes (BR989832).

(c) At 2145 hours 1/A/1-50th received SA fire and explosive devices from southwest at a distance of approximately 150 meters. They returned fire with organic weapons with negative results.

(26) 26 June 1969:

(a) At 1235 hours A/1-50th assumed control of QL1.

(b) At 1530 hours B/1-503d assumed control of AO Thor & Coron.

(c) At 1855 hours 3/B/1-503d engaged one male and ten females (VC) resulting in one male VC KIA at BR978792, two rucksacks, with miscellaneous equipment and two AK clips of ammunition CIA.

(d) At 1952 hours 2/A/1-50th on Bridge 3 received 80-100 SA rounds and AW fire. There were negative damages or casualties.

(27) 27 June 1969:

(a) At 0815 hours 1/B/1-503d engaged three VC at 200 meters resulting in one VC KIA at BR988796.

(b) At 1005 hours A/1-50th purchased the following under VIP at Bridge 1: four 105 rounds; Bridge 3: one M79 rounds; Bridge 7: one 60mm round and one M79 round.

(c) At 1015 hours 2/B/1-503d found 4 punji pits and two booby traps which they destroyed.

(d) At 1150 hours B/1-503d had 70 detainees; 20 females, 50 males at BR988796. An IPW team from 172 MI was sent out to the location. Seven detainees were held and extracted to Uplift and six were sent to English.

(28) 28 June 1969:

(a) At 1225 hours an interpreter tripped a booby trap at BR968794, resulting in one friendly WIA.

(b) At 1500 hours three VN boys were setting a booby trap at BR920817 and accidentally set it off. Results: one VN boy KIA, two WIA.

(29) 29 June 1969: At 1500 hours 2/B/1-503d found two booby trapped M26 grenades at BR998793 which they blew in place at 1728 hours.

(30) 30 June 1969:

(a) At 0710 hours 3/B/1-503d spotted a man and woman coming toward the ambush. Results: one male WIA at BR998823.

(b) At 0737 hours B/1-50th, 3d platoon received 15-20 AX rounds wounding one GI at BR955862. The third platoon picked up three detainees and C&C ship/1-50th got one. 3/B/1-503d picked up one male detainee at BR962808 and found one anti-personnel mine, two 81mm rounds, one 105 round. They were blown in place at BR975785.

(c) At 0927 hours 3/B/1-503d found one Mark II type grenade booby trap at BR992800.

(d) At 1015 hours 3/B/1-503d found one M26 booby trapped grenade and at CROO2806 made contact with one VC at 50 meters. Results: one VC KIA.

(e) At 1035 hours the SRAP was ambushed with one claymore at BR984840. Results one US WIA.

(f) At 1346 hours 3/B/1-503d at CROO6792 made contact with one VC at 150 meters. Results: One VC KIA.

(g) At 1424 hours SRAP spotted five people running away (BR985843). They fired a warning shot and made a sweep. They found one dead female and apprehended one male detainee. Later the SRAP found one claymore at BR983838.

### 3. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy OB: Most of the movement of the VC/NVA forces seems to be based on the accomplishment of two basic functions. One is to avoid contact with US units and the other is to transport rice, in addition to collecting taxes. Our AO supplies a tremendous amount of rice for the 18th NVA Regiment, Phu My District Force Battalion, Hoai Nhon District VC, in

addition to feeding all the local guerillas in our AO.

(1) Movement: So far there has not been any indication of a pattern in any VC/NVA movements. Most movements appear to be from East to West and West to East crossing QL 1 in the following three places:

- (a) Loc Thai BR900863
- (b) LZ Salem 300-500 meters south of the LZ
- (c) Bridge 1 300-500 meters north of the Bridge

(2) State of Readiness:

(a) The VC appear to have the necessary equipment to accomplish their mission of attack by fire on friendly installations utilizing mortars and ground attacks of short duration.

(b) The VC are partially supplied with munitions and weapons by the 18th NVA Regiment. This assumption is based on the fact that RPG 7s and RPG 2s, and 82mm mortars have been employed against the Battalion by VC units. Also a recently captured VC document indicated that there are at least four NVA advisors assigned to Northern Phu My District VC units.

(c) The VC have also an unknown amount of US claymores that they took off a Navy barge. Confirmation on two lot numbers on claymores captured from the VC has confirmed this fact.

(d) The VC appear to be able to co-ordinate, rehearse, and launch harassing ground attacks with one or two days notice due to their familiarity with the local area.

(3) Quality:

(a) It is very difficult to assess the quality of the VC in the area, but it is believed to be fair at this time. They have at times shrewdly employed mines and booby traps. They have continued to move their vast amounts of rice through the AO without much interference from FWF (Free World Forces) due to their sophisticated intelligence system and a complex system of guides and scouts preceding the main party. Their tunnel systems and ability to evade FWF once they are spotted has proved to be amazingly uncanny.

(b) Due to recent US operations which resulted in the elimination of at least one VC village platoon leader in our AO, it is believed the quality may deteriorate unless the VC have qualified replacements ready to assume the vitally important positions as they become vacant.

(4) Combat Efficiency: Due to a lack of direct contacts with VC units it is very difficult to assess their efficiency, but based on their ARF (attack by fire) on US elements utilizing indirect fire weapons and recoilless rifles and the poor accuracy of these attacks, it is assumed

that their efficiency is fair to poor.

(5) Morale: Based on documents and PW interrogation reports the morale of the VC is poor, but they cannot Chieu Hoi due to fear of death to themselves or their families.

b. Nature of Terrain and Weather Conditions: The 1-50th Infantry's portion of AO Lee is surrounded by rugged mountain regions on the north, south, & west. To the east lies a coastal plain. The predominant terrain feature in this area is a shallow lake which encompasses 15 square kilometers. The central portion of the AO is generally open rolling terrain consisting mostly of cultivated year around rice fields and thickly vegetated hill areas which have shrub bushes and trees ranging from three to ten feet high. The rice fields are generally negotiable by track vehicles from April to August. The monsoon season which runs from September to January makes track vehicle movement extremely difficult if not impossible and foot traffic difficult. During this period vehicle movement is mostly confined to well used trails and roads. The northern area of the AO consists of the southern slopes of the Cay Giap mountains, which are rugged mountains covered with vegetation ranging from a moderate to closed canopy forest. The foot hills of these mountains have moderate to thick vegetation ranging from five to fifteen feet high. At the base of the foothills the rice paddies characteristic to this area begin. In the north-east portion, the Song Chai Truc river runs generally northward south and varies from 20 to 100 meters wide and is not negotiable by tracks but is negotiable by personnel using sampans or other river craft. The river area has rice paddies on the west bank and a sandy beach area on the east bank. The western area consists of the eastern slopes of the Nui Go Chai mountains. The remaining western area is very similar to the northern & central portions except for the river. The southern area consists of the northern and western slopes of the Mieu Mountains. The mountains drop off steeply and the rice paddies run right up to the base of them. The foothills characteristic of the northern and western area are conspicuously absent in the south. The eastern area consists of the Dam Trao Lake which covers an area of approximately 17 square kilometers. It is a fresh water lake and provides much of the irrigation for the east and central areas. Immediately adjacent to the lake is a low area consisting of rice paddies, a marshy area, and moderate to dense brushy vegetation. In the high area immediately adjacent to the low area there are rolling sand dunes with sparse vegetation and then next to that is the flat beach area. The only other major geographical feature in the area is the Nui Loi mountain just south of the lake. It is densely vegetated in some areas and have huge boulders in other areas. It is rather steep and there are rice paddies and hamlets at its base.

#### 4. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

##### a. Strength:

(1)	Authorized	Assigned(1 Apr 69)	Assigned(30 Jun 69)
EM	863	899	747
OFF	40	37	48
WO	2	1	2

(2)	<u>HHC</u>	<u>Co A</u>	<u>Co B</u>	<u>Co C</u>	<u>Svc Co</u>	<u>Total</u>
Gains	160	27	11	24	72	294
Hosp Rtn	10	20	3	18	7	58
XHA	3	8	0	3	0	14
WHA	7	20	16	8	0	51
NBD	0	0	0	1	0	1
NBW	27	11	18	18	7	81

(3)	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Total</u>
Co Art 15s	16	21	31	68
Bn Art 15s	3	3	2	8
Court Martial	0	1	2	3

b. At the beginning of the period the Battalion experienced a shortage in wiremen, supply personnel and aidmen. At present this shortage has been corrected.

c. The Battalion is presently very low on the combat military occupational specialties, infantrymen, mortarman, reconnaissance specialists and operations and intelligence specialists.

d. With the move of the Battalion to LZ Uplift and the subsequent move of the Brigade rear to Phu Tai, administration, coordination and cooperation have become quite difficult. Processing for leaves, awards, promotions and personnel actions have experienced a noticeable, and at times, serious slow down. Most action now requires written correspondence.

e. During the reporting period, members of the Battalion received one silver star, seven bronze stars for valor, 137 bronze stars for meritorious service, 51 bronze stars for achievement, 24 army commendation medals for service and 28 army commendation medals for achievement. Also, there were 98 air medals and 71 purple hearts awarded.

f. On 12 June 1969, Major Oren R. Culpepper succeeded LTC James R. Woodall as Battalion commander.

### 5. LOGISTICS:

a. During the period 1 April to 30 June 1969, the Battalion relocated from An Khe to LZ Uplift. The move to LZ Uplift was completed without incident.

b. There have been great changes in support operations as a result of the move to LZ Uplift. The nearest support for normal operations now, is in LZ English or Qui Nhon. Direct Maintenance Support is received through the 593-1 Task Force in LZ English and then through the 5th Maintenance Battalion in Qui Nhon. All equipment and supplies have to be

requisitioned from Qui Nhon and picked up at LZ English, Qui Nhon, Phu Tai or Cha Rang Valley. All Class V expendables must be ordered and picked up from LZ English. Although it takes them only a day to order and receive, they are unable to meet with our needs.

c. The majority of problem areas are due to the fact that support facilities are not presently geared to the needs of a Mechanized Infantry Battalion. Major items and supply shortages are due to limited stocks available in country.

d. At present the Battalion is short the following major items:

<u>Qty</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>
5 ea	Carrier, personnel M113A1
4 ea	Carrier, Flame M132A1
1 ea	Carrier, mortar M125A1
2 ea	81mm mortar
5 ea	Generators
3 ea	Rifle Recoilless 90mm

e. Medical:

(1) A reduction in the malaria rate continues. Three cases have been observed in this quarter, in comparison to six from the previous quarter. All cases thus far have been P. Falciparum type. Enforced weekly administration of the C-P tablet and weekly screening of urines for qualitative chloroquine content continue.

(2) The venereal disease rate has decreased from the previous quarter, although it has been noted to increase in the past month. No cases of primary syphilis have been observed.

(3) Environmental sanitation is at an acceptable level in most areas. Field sanitation teams have been trained under the aegis of the 172d PMU at LZ English. Inspection is conducted on a weekly basis of the rear area by the medical platoon.

(4) Medical efforts in the pacification program have been extended to the present point of having scheduled MEDCAP operations in the target hamlets. When possible, these are conducted with the assistance of Vietnamese medics and nurses.

(5) Personal sanitation, since the Battalion moved to LZ Uplift, has been problematic under field conditions. An increasing number of dermatologic conditions accruing from poor personal hygiene are being seen. Conditions such as various fungal disorders, miliaria rubra, and furunculosis.

(6) Immunizations have been kept current by periodic screening of personal records and visiting field units to administer shots.

(7) Several cases of diarrheal disease have been observed in this quarter, most of them caused by consumption of contaminated water.

Some of the cases were documented as shigella enteritis. Through command emphasis on water purification measures, diarrheal disease incidence is diminishing.

(8) Since moving to LZ Uplift the medical platoon has built an aid station which fully serves the needs of the Battalion. Acute casualties are managed at the aid station of the 1-503d.

(9) The medical platoon is at TO&E strength regarding enlisted men, and five men are expected as ninety day losses.

#### 6. CIVIC ACTION, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, AND VOLUNTARY INFORMATION PROGRAM:

a. Civic Action projects undertaken by the S5 section during this quarter are as follows:

(1) The primary school at An Tuc near An Khe had been partially destroyed by fire. Materials provided through the 173d Abn Bde S5 and other sources, and aid and assistance from the S5 section/1-50th enabled the people of An Tuc to rebuild the school.

(2) The bridge at Tra Thung had been badly in need of repair for quite some time. With materials provided through the S5 section, 1-50th and technical assistance from 173d Abn Bde Engineers, the needed repairs were effected.

(3) On or about 5 June 1969 a van from 173d Abn Bde backed over the Phu My District sign in the town of Phu My. Since the sign has a great deal of religious significance it was made a priority project. Within four days, due to the efforts of the S5 section/1-50th the sign was completely repaired.

(4) Prior to the arrival of the 1-50th in the Phu My District, the local VC had burned down the school at Van An hamlet. With materials provided through the S5 section, the people of Van An rebuilt the school.

(5) In close coordination with personnel from the Phu My Dispensary, the S5 section developed a program of Medical Civic Action Projects (MEDCAP). As a result some 1,466 people were treated during this quarter and some hospitalized on the advice from the Battalion Surgeon.

(6) Commodities and supplies distributed during this quarter:

- 1,050 lbs of captured rice
- 500 lbs of soap
- 20 bags of cement
- 3,120 board feet lumber
- 200 school text books
- 150 lbs of candy

b. During the quarter covered by this report, the S5 section/1-50th conducted numerous Psychological Operation Missions amassing a total of eleven hours speaker time. Primary emphasis was placed on the Chieu Hoi



and Voluntary Information Programs. Total number of each type of leaflets dropped during these missions are as follows:

70,000 VIP  
 274,000 GVN  
 235,000 Chieu Hoi  
 90,000 Safe Conduct Passes

Of all these programs the VIP was the most effective. During the quarter \$462,900 VN was paid to personnel providing information and/or arms and ammunition. A list of the type and quantity of arms and ammunition turned in under the VIP follows:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
175mm round	9
155mm round	28
105mm round	289
82mm round	9
81mm round	164
75mm round	1
60mm round	194
57mm round	16
4.2" round	12
M79 rounds	412
Frag grenades	113
Claymores	74
Rockets	20
Booby traps	9
Friendly SA rounds	3496
Machine Gun	1 (Thompson)
AF/Arty Bomblet	9

In contrast to the spectacular results obtained under the VIP, the Chieu Hoi program produced only four Hoi Chanks during the entire quarter. A partial explanation for the limited success of the Chieu Hoi program is that the majority of the VCI in Phu My District are hard core Viet Cong and thus less susceptible to existing PSYOPs themes than their less extensively indoctrinated NVA. It is doubtful if any PSYOPs program could be developed that would produce greater results than the current program. Still different programs will be used in an attempt to increase the number of Hoi Chanks.

c. During this quarter the Security Training Assistance Group (STAG) was formed and began operations. As the quarter ended a Peoples Self Defense Force (PSDF) had been formed and trained for the hamlet of Chau Truc. In addition another PSDF had been formed and was in training. The concept of STAG-PSDF is basically a sound one but a greater effort should be made to insure that all parties cooperate toward realization of the program's objectives: giving the people the organization, training and weapons with which to defend themselves. In the case of Chau Truc, all of these objectives were realized, except that the weapons promised by MACV were not forthcoming. The reason given was that the Revolutionary Development Cadre Platoon leader decided that he could not yet trust the

people to have weapons. More effective coordination would have brought out this element of doubt prior to training and a great deal of wasted time, effort, and embarrassment could have been avoided.

SECTION II

## LESSONS LEARNED

1. Personnel: None
2. Operations:

### Item: Impact Grids for Illumination Rounds

Observation: It has been noted that when elements securing bridges along QL1 detect movement or experience sniper fire that there is an undue delay when calling for artillery illumination. Reasons cited for this is that there are many small hamlets along the highway, thus preventing illumination because the impact would endanger the hamlets.

Discussion: Although illumination grids must constantly be cleared, pre-planned grids have been coordinated with the District Forces in relationship to hamlet locations. Consequently when illumination is desired, a preplanned target is available and the only careful clearance procedures necessary is the location of friendly troops.

### Item: Determining Direction of Fire from Unlocated Sources

Observation: Often when a friendly position comes under mortar and/or rocket attack only one or two people or units have the launch site under observation. The immediate tendency of all personnel is to open fire in all directions. Almost invariably everyone in the area come up on the radio making it very difficult to establish communication with the person or persons who have visual contact with the enemy.

Discussion: Fire control is necessary. Prior instructions should be given to all friendly units that only those positions which can observe enemy locations should open fire. The first act of the commander should be to request that all units which have observed the enemy positions report all pertinent information to him.

### Item: Mines

Observation: On 14 June 1969 an APC from 2d platoon hit a mine while on a mine sweep. They had just completed their sweep and were heading back to a new location using the same trail they came out on. However, one of the APCs hit a mine which seriously wounded the driver and completely destroyed the track.

Discussion: Even though an APC may ride over a certain area one time, it is not safe to deem this area void of mines. If at all possible, an APC should never ride over the same spot twice. If this is not possible then troops should dismount and use a mine detector or probe the area.

### Item: Platoon Operation

Observation: On 23 June 1969, 3/A/1-50th was conducting a search and clear operation at the hamlet of An Quang in the vicinity of coordinates BR983838. The 3d platoon's Sergeant entered a bunker which, upon first

glance it appeared to be empty. However he continued to search through it by striking the sides of the bunker. By doing this the Sargeant discovered several loose boards and pulled them away discovering two confirmed VC armed with M26 and Chicom grenades.

Discussion: Henceforth members of this unit will when searching bunkers, make every effort to discover hidden chambers by striking walls, pulling loose boards down and probing the floor.

### 3. Training and Organization:

Item: Armored Personnel Carrier M113A1

Observation: Personnel reporting for duty at this station have had little or no training on the APC M113A1. They are ignorant of its capabilities, the maintenance required, and the different methods of employment.

Discussion: Each unit acknowledging these deficiencies, should incorporate a familiarization course for the new arrivals into the reception and briefing schedules. Each new arrival should have at the minimum of one week intensive training with the M113A1.

### 4. Intelligence

Item: Enemy Detection of US Operations

Observation: It has been observed that when planning for combat operations air reconnaissance is flown over the target area. This not only warns the VC/NVA that something is about to take place, it also gives him an opportunity to prepare likely landing zones with booby traps and punji stakes.

Discussion: Once an area has been programmed for combat operations, all aircraft operating should avoid circling, flying over, or flying too near the target area. If a VR is absolutely necessary, a covert method of accomplishing this should be worked out. An example would be to fly at two or three thousand feet, staying at least one kilometer away from the area and fly in a straight line avoiding any circling.

Item: Proper Utilization of NFFF

Observation: During cordon and search operations, the US units cordoned while the RF units went into the hamlets for the initial search. Once the RF units moved into the hamlet, the National Police were inserted by aircraft. Results of the operation were marginal due to the fact that the RF units gathered the detainees for the National Police to question, often missing or overlooking certain key personnel who should have been detained.

Discussion: In order to preclude any confusion during the initial search and gathering of personnel, the NFFF should enter the hamlet at the same time the RF units do, enabling proper "on the spot" interrogating and classifying of detainees.

Item: VIP (Voluntary Informant Program)

Observation: On 18 June 1969, four VN boys brought approximately 15 artillery and mortar rounds to a bridge to receive payment under the VIP program. A check of the rounds revealed that the explosives had been removed and replaced with mud.

Discussion: Recommend that rounds purchased on VIP be inspected before payment is made.

Item: Booby Traps

Observation: It has been observed that a unit encounters very few booby traps when it first moves into a new area of operation. After the unit has worked the area for two or three days, the booby traps begin to appear. This indicated that the enemy studies the modus operandi of the unit before the emplacement of the booby traps.

Discussion: Recommend units avoid establishing patterns of movement and move their FOB sites frequently.

5. Logistics: None

6. Others

Item: Support Maintenance for Battalion Communication

Observation: It is essential that support maintenance units have the capability to support subordinate units. Presently however, the maintenance unit supporting the 1-50th does not possess the capability, neither in personnel or resources to adequately support a mechanized infantry battalion.

Discussion: A more realistic appraisal of the unit's need could have possibly prevented the serious decline rate of communication equipment that is developing.

Item: Civil Affairs Project

Observation: Recently a rifle company in the Battalion whose mission was to secure a hamlet which was undergoing pacification, initiated the project of rebuilding a bridge near the hamlet. They performed all the work themselves with the materials being furnished by the Battalion S-5.

Discussion: In all projects of this type, the US military personnel should act only as advisors and to help supply the needed materials. The actual work should be done by the VN people, i.e. RF/PF and ARVN personnel. By following this procedure, the image of the GVN forces will be improved.

Item: Psychological Operations

Observation: Recently two VC and two Civil Defendants turned themselves in under the Chieu Hoi program to RD teams located in the 1-50th AO. The individuals were then turned over to Vietnamese officials. This unit received no opportunity to question the Hoi Chanhs or exploit them in any way.

Discussion: The ability to exploit Hoi Chanh soon after they rally could greatly increase the possibility of influencing other members of their units to Chieu Hoi. A definite procedure should be set up so as to insure that all units concerned are able to exploit the Hoi Chanh to the utmost.

Item: Company MEDCAP

Observation: On 10 May 1969, a company MEDCAP was run at the Cho Van Phu Schools. After the children were examined by the company Medic, candy was distributed to them. It was observed that the teachers felt they lost face or were left out.

Discussion: Henceforth, all candy will be given to the teachers to be distributed so that they will maintain their authority and control over the children.

Item: Medical PSYOPS

Observation: It is observed that MEDCAP operations, when conducted with the assistance of Vietnamese nurses and health workers, seem to evoke more interest from the local civilians than when American personnel conduct the operation without such help.

Discussion: Because it is desirable to emphasize the Vietnamese role in medical efforts toward pacification and because the people seem more responsive to the efforts of Vietnamese personnel, they should be included in MEDCAP operations as frequently as possible.

Item: Medical

Observation: Since moving to LZ Uplift one of the most persistent medical problems has proven to be common heat rash, miliaria rubra, severe enough at times to incapacitate persons from serving at full duty.

Discussion: Since this condition results from constant exposure to hot conditions, as well as poor hygiene, troops who show a tendency to develop this condition should be encouraged to diligently follow personal hygiene measures, as well as wearing as little or light clothing as the situation permits.

Item: Malaria Pills

Observation: It has been observed that returnees from R&R and leaves commonly report back to the Battalion without having taken malaria tablets during their absence.

Discussion: All returnees from R&R and leave should be questioned at their company orderly rooms upon arrival as to whether they have followed oral anti-malarial precautions. If not, pills should be administered immediately.