affendix D TO miclosure 1

GUBJECT: AFTER ACTIUNS REIORT - TET OFFEISSIVE FOR FHU MY DISTRICT

- 1. (0) OFRLDION: PEDSHENG II

2. (U) FENIIOD COVERED: 31 January 1968 - 4 February 1968.
3. (U) LOCiTION: Thu My District, Binh Dinh Frovince, RWN.
4. (U) COMLIND HU: 1st In (if), 50th Inf, 1st Air Cav Div.
5. (U) REFORTING OFFICER: Lieutenant Colonel Cheney L. Bertholf Jr, Comanding Officer, lst Battalion (Mechenized), 50th Infantry, 1st Air Cavalry Division.
6. (c) TASK GiGiNIZATION:
$310800 \mathrm{Jan}-311730 \mathrm{Jan} A, \mathrm{~B} \& \mathrm{D}$ Co $1 / 50$ (C Opeon 2/8, a Opcon 2d Bde UFLIFT).
$311730 \mathrm{Jan}-020714 \mathrm{Feb} \mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B}, 1 / 50$, C $2 / 5$.
03 Feb B $1 / 50$, Elements lst in 4lst AFVN is co $1 / 50$, D $1 / 50$, i $2 / 5$.
7. (C) SUPFORTING FORGES:

| 2d Bde Aviation | E 2try 7/15 Arty | 41st ARVN Regt |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| B Etry 7/13 irty | L Co 227th Mm ma | Fegional Forces |
| i Troop 1/9 Cav | 15th Med Bn | of Thu ly Dist |
| 2/20 Arty ins. | If Co 8th Engr |  |

8. (C) Mindeligence:
a. The enery's offensive on Ehu Miy District Headquarters was the locel effort in the nation wide coordinated Tet Offensive. In spite of this fact, no information concerning the offensive was made available to our tactical units prior to the fact. In this liattalion, virtually all enemy infomation was obtained from the advisors to 4ist wiNf Hegiment and Thu ly District. This intelligence begen to flow in only after the enemy had quite blatently moved, in force, to within striking distance on three sides of the district Headquarters of thu My.

b. On the nights of 29 and 30 Jan , the eneny first projected his intentions with morter herrassment and linited ground probes of thu liy District and, to a lesser degree, of 41 st miling Fieginental Hq a.t LZ Crystil.
c. On the morning of 31 Jan , the enemy night activities continued into the day and it appeared to the Fhu ly District adisor that he was about to receive a deylight grcund attack. Civilians were evecuating several hamlets around ihu My, it 075531 Jan, the road between LZ Uplift and Ihu My was closed to non-tactical traffic.
c. is Fopular Forces fatrol made contact with an enenv force, unknuwn size, moving towerds Thu liy, at Tan in ( $C_{R} 028692 \bar{F}_{\sim}$ )nd the lst in (M), 50th Inf begen deploying its forces in preparation to deliver yet another disaster to the enery.
9. (C) MISiLON: To fix and destroy in turn the enemy elenents poised for an attack on Thu ily District.
10. (C) CNCEFT OF OREMTLIS: Using intelligence gathered by Vietnamese furces, $1 / 50 \mathrm{Mech}$ and several airmbile companies will preenpt the cnemy intentiun to win a great victory at Phu My. P Cnce located by andi, IIF and FF saturation petrcls, the enery will be fixed in place by mechenized forces, prepared by irtillery, ALi and Tacticel hir. Where possible, enomy concentrations will be oncircled by airmobile troops to preciude the enemy's fleeing in the face of the inevitable crushine mechanized attack. This encirclement offort will be comy limented by cartfully planned and cocrdinated artillory blucking fires, illumintion sne ground surveillance. Iriority of supperting fires goes to units in conterct.

## 11. (C) EYNCUTIOIT:

a. Ceneral: his the situation developed, the enemy was to be located in three separate rositions in turn around the Fhu Miy District Hq. In each case, initial intelligence was gained by Vietnamese units, and mechonized units were raridly moved to the scene. In each case, the onemy, once located and fixed, was prepared by supporting arms, then ruthlessly reduced by a viclent mechenizod attack.

## b. Hanuever:

(1) The first of the three encounters tock place to the N.E. of Fhu 鸱.
a. at 1045 on 30 Jan the Batt:licn was notified that the US Forces had terminated the Tet truce effective 0945 that day. mlthough the pattelion had no "hard" intelligence concerning enery locations, available companies were deployed on Search and Clear operaticns without significant findings. Night locations were, as prescribed by CO, 2d Bde, near fit 1, north and south of 12 UFlift. During the night, the enemy conducted various indirect weajons attacks and probes.
b. On the morning of $31 \mathrm{Jan}, 1 / 50$ egain doployed two Kech companies on Eenersi search and cloar missions with no firm intelligence of Fincintec enemy locations. ist 0850 , Thu Wy District Ha reportod that a Fopular Forces patrol wos in contact to the N. W. of Fhu ly District at Tan in (Bi 928691). in serial scout team was imediately requested and dispetched to Fhu Ny. $B$ and D Co's were directed to imodiately move towards the rerorted cuntact. Iy $\$ 100$ koth were in rosition south and north of Fhu ly on highway 1 rospectively. D Co was directed to move east to the northern edge of ten in, and to sweep $\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{W}}$. to fix the rear of the eneny force gethered to attick Phu ky. Co $21 / 50$ was held at 5 Crystal and directod to reconnojtre a counter atteck route arcund the N.E. of Thu My. .it 1238 , Co D $1 / 50$ arrived at the nivthern end if $T e n$ in and began its sweep in a suuth westerly directicn. Contact was made with an estimated eneny compeny as the Co effected its turn. (See Sketch 1)
c. Iiecuest wes immedintely made to $\mathrm{CO}, 2 \mathrm{~d}$ Sde for the release of Co $h 1 / 50$ from base defense of LL Uplift. Co is moved to the right flank of Co $D$ and $C o B$ moved to the South side of Binh Tri (id 912678) where contact wal also made immedintely. During the movement of both companies, $8^{n 1}, 155$ and ARi wore used extensively on both Tan in and Binh Tri hamlets. The enemy force was then estinated to be in battalion strength. Wile Co E contained the enemy to the south side of Dinh Tri, $C C$ is and D leunched a simultaneuus atteck to the S.W. through Tan in. Co D attacking on the left continued to encounter stiff rosistonce from a well entrenched enemy ermed with many automitic and anti-tank weapons. Co encountered sporadic resistance ond muved th the northern eige of Jinh Tri. Throughout this action, tems from the $1 / 9$ Cav and the $2 d$ Exie Scuut secticns were invalumble in scresning the flanks and roar of the sttacking comanies where an undetamined, but significant number of snipers were engaged end eliminated. Of rerticular merit werc the cutstrnding coticns of It Mauldin, Bde Scuut tean loader whe continued to ageressively sereen even aftor his H-13 was hit several times. Co $D$ elininated the enemy resistance, but was prevented by darkness from conducting a thorough colice of the contact area, and could positively identify only 5 NVis KIA prior to moving beck to LZ Uplift for security. Enrcute to Urilft, $1 / 9$ Cav Eunships flying overhend cover for Co D received fire at coordinates $R$ R 9207 Cl . Keturned fire ceused two secondary explosicns and an eneny assessment of 5 KLi . Meanwilie, Co $\mathrm{C} 2 / 5$ was airlifted to Ihu My District Headquarters and was integrated into the defenses to the right. is and B Co's set uf north and scuth of Binh Tri. Spooky provided illumination and highly effective blocking fires throughout the njeght.
d. During the night, both is and $B 1 / 50$ engaged small groups of enemy attempting to escare from the hemlet. Also during the night, LZ Crystal and Fhu My District were Frobed and nortared from the south and west. Appirently, the mein attack on Fhu Ny was to have come from Binh Tri where the enemy was being held and reduced by the comination of Mechanized Units and Spocky.
e. The flan for the final attack un Dinh Tri was fur co C $2 / 5$ to block along the western side of town while $A$ and $I$ moved on line thrcugh from east to woet. This was compluted by noon 1 Feb. The units oncuuntered only spcredic contact as they swept through the hempet. Thu My District rerorted that 100 VC with many Wis had retreated to 240696 . in air strike was requested and delivered to that location. E $1 / 50$ and $C 2 / 5$ were diverted tw search the aroe fron the nurth to south, while $C 0$ is $1 / 50$ policed the bittie area. I $1 / 50$ engaged and hilied 1 NV: whe in turn killed three of his curades with a grenade intended for his exccutioners.
f. The followinf is a breakdown of oneny and friendly lusses fcr the Tan $\mathrm{m} / \mathrm{Binh}$ Tri contact:

|  | ETMT | FETGILY |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| KI: | 42 | 1 |
| WIa | 1 | 7 |
| CI. | 1 | 7 |
| S/2 | 29 | $\cdots$ |
| c/s wris | - | - |

(2) Fullowing the contact at Einh Tri, Co $B$ conducted saerch and cloar operaticns to the East of Dinh Tri. Intilligence had roforted an onomy force in Trung Thanh, but the day of 2 Feb nettod no findjags. Co a wes deployed to the North of 12 Uilift and likewise netted nothing. A visit with the commaning officor, 41 st inVi yielded intelligence indicating a Feginent enery Ln vicinity $\operatorname{Sk} 946623$. A flen wes agreed upon. Frcm 4 ist inVN, two En's respuctively wore to cunduct dismunted sweops towards the ubjuctive fres East and Wost respectively while one Mech Co would simultaneously sweep dow from the lk rth and establish a block on the North. (See sketch Map 3)
a. ist 07453 Feb , Co B moved towards its assigned objective and was in rosition at 1024. it 1047 , 1st Bn 41 st invN elements reported contact with an enemy force of urknown size in Vinh liohn, Br 940610. Imodintely, Us sirtillory was directed on the cloarly visible onemy from the $1 / 50 \mathrm{CC}$ helicopter. Co $B$ was muved Est to e pusition directiy North of the enomy sighting. The 41 st invi cxecutive officer was picked uf in the $1 / 50$. CC, and a joint attiack was courdinatcc and injtiatod by Co B at 1202 hrs.
b. Within 20 minutes, $C$ a had located and angaged sevoral eneny squads dug in on the turth side of town. While the iRNM wero initially qujtc involved in the attack, they withdrew priur to its completion.
c. Co $n$ sufferoc soveral casualtios during the initial phases of the atteck. is the Compeny ruached the $\mathfrak{s i}$ uth edgo of town it enculunterecl an onemy which had boun scattorud and confused by the intinsjive and accurate irtillery fires which had ioun adjusted by the $1 / 50$ CC helicuptor.
d. The fillowing is a break dow of enemy and friendly losses fer the Vinh ihon engagument:

MIT US

| KI: | 21 | 1 |
| :--- | ---: | :--- |
| WLii | 3 | 1 |
| $C L i i$ | 18 | - |
| $S / A$ | 21 | - |
| $C / S W N S$ | 5 | - |

(3) Before Co 2 had finishod expluiting the tow of Vinh Nohn, the third sicie of Thu Hy Listrict whs threatened, and another alenent of $1 / 50$ Inf (M) was cilled into action to climinato this menace. it 1253 on 3 Feb, two FcFuler Forces rintoons made contict with un estimeted Ni. Battalion at Kif7e703. Co a $1 / 50$ whs released frem its bridge security mission and begen m.ving towards the contact area at 1449. itt 1503 , Co is $2 / 5$ wes made GEGi: to $1 / 50$ and was directed to begin moving to the cuntect area cil foot, with the mission of blocking Nin of the hamlet to impode the escere of the enery force into the mountains."
a. int 1728 , Co i. advancing fron the south side of tho hamlet was heavily oneoged with a well armed anc rumarically supurior enemy which was dug into the hedge ruws ch the adse of the hamet ited $f$.
b. Co i broke cuntact in minutes and bscked one hundred meters to allow for artillery, air strikes and orgenic fires. fFOWY was requested and confirmed for 1900 arrival.
c. With darkness closing in, Co is $1 / 50$ was directed to move to the S.E. Of the hamlot and A $2 / 5$ was ciructod to block in place. This configuration was favored by the terrain; the tchm was on a fingor running N.W. - S.E. With reddy to the North and South. Thus, the two compenies were readily able to contein the three bruakout ettempts which occurod rricr to SHOKI's arrivel.
d. Throughout the night there were various attempts to breakout, primarily to the Nid of the hamlet. Illumination and blockine fires from Slocky aginin proved invaluabl.

e. The flen for the 4 Fub attick wes to rupare the objective aron with Tacticel air cant artillury rior to the min offort of $A 1 / 50$ from the S.W. Co D $1 / 50$ was kvod into the S.W. wdee to surnort by fire. The attack begen at 0823.
f. is 0 i $1 / 50$ advance, oll three comanies chne under howy cirrect and indirect firc. hil throe eustained casucltics, but 60 i, $1 / 50$ cuntinued to advance te the S.2. edge of town where it came undur viithering eutcmatic and anti-tank wiopons firos. is co is $1 / 50$ advenced, a larya enury fores atteriped to broak out to the Fw. This a.tempit wes readily sriciled by a well due in $12 / 5$.
E. it 1106 a $1 / 9 \mathrm{C}=\mathrm{y}$ gunshif was shit down by onoriy firus. Unly the rapic recetion of the lersonnel Carriers of Co is saved the crow. Co in's hFCls rushod ecress the orw. pady North of the objective, arga to the rescue of the crew of the stricken helicofter. Seconds after the crew were ricked up, the helicopter burst into flames.
h. idditional Tac iir and irtillery were omployod egtinst the enomy and Co i. was directed to agtin attack $\begin{aligned} & \text { a }: ~ t h r o u g h ~ t h e ~ t o w n, ~ t h e n ~\end{aligned}$ to cart wheel right and cuntinue to the North with Co D alone side once the turn to the liorth hed been completed. This maneưver was flewlessly oxccutod by tho two compenius, and in Loc Dong (4) had fallon to the $1 / 50$ by 1525 heurs. (See sketch 5)
i. The following is a broak sow of unomy and friendiy losses. Et in Lec Don (4):

MUT US

| KIA | 76 | - |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| WI: | - | 32 |
| CI: | - | - |
| S/. | 7 | - |
| $C / S$ WNS | 4 | - |

## 12. COnCLUEIUR

-. In 5 cays operations in 3 scrarate contacts, Comanies i., B, and $D$ of $1 / 50$ successfully preemeted the locel oncry's effort to overrun and occupy Ihu My District Hoadouerturs.
b. Resuma of losses:

ETEN US
KI: $139 \quad 2$
CL. 19

Vin.
4
$5 / 4$
57
c/s whs
9
-
40
-
-
 an excellont oprortunity to exurcise its full carabilitios to the maxinum. Their overwhelming firupower was once agein used as the mein punch with dismunted eloments baing used to fix and contain the eneny. Artillery, Tactical iir finh and SFCXKY were successfully integrated into the schome in each case. Of particular importance in these engajements was the manner in which the Allied Units froduced the sound, hard intelligence on which the unit was able to react swiftly and decisively.



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