APPENDIX D TO ENCLOSURE 1

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTIONS REPORT - TET OFFENSIVE FOR PHU MY DISTRICT

1. (U) OPERATION: PERSHING II


3. (U) LOCATION: Phu My District, Binh Dinh Province, RVN.

4. (U) COMMAND HQ: 1st Bn (1), 50th Inf, 1st Air Cav Div.

5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Lieutenant Colonel Cheney L. Bertholf Jr, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 50th Infantry, 1st Air Cavalry Division.

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

   310600 Jan - 311730 Jan A, B & D Co 1/50 (C Opcon 2/8,
   A Opcon 2d Bde UTLIF'T).

   311730 Jan - 02074 Feb A, B, 1/50, C 2/5.

   03 Feb B 1/50, Elements 1st Bn 41st ARVN
   A Co 1/50, D 1/50, A 2/5.

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

   2d Bde Aviation
   B Btry 7/13 Arty
   A Troop 1/9 Cav
   2/20 Arty 30th

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

   a. The enemy's offensive on Phu My District Headquarters
   was the local effort in the nation wide coordinated Tet Offensive. In
   spite of this fact, no information concerning the offensive was made
   available to our tactical units prior to the fact. In this Battalion,
   virtually all enemy information was obtained from the advisors to 41st
   ARVN Regiment and Phu My District. This intelligence began to flow in
   only after the enemy had quite blatantly moved, in force, to within
   striking distance on three sides of the district Headquarters of Phu My.
b. On the nights of 29 and 30 Jan, the enemy first projected his intentions with mortar harassment and limited ground probes of Thu My District and, to a lesser degree, of 41st ARVN Regimental Hq at LZ Crystal.

c. On the morning of 31 Jan, the enemy night activities continued into the day and it appeared to the Thu My District advisor that he was about to receive a daylight ground attack. Civilians were evacuating several hamlets around Thu My. At 0755 31 Jan, the road between LZ Uplift and Thu My was closed to non-tactical traffic.

d. A Popular Forces patrol made contact with an enemy force, unknown size, moving towards Thu My, at Tan An (CP 028692), and the 1st BN (K), 50th Inf began deploying its forces in preparation to deliver yet another disaster to the enemy.

9. (C) MISSION: To fix and destroy in turn the enemy elements poised for an attack on Thu My District.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Using intelligence gathered by Vietnamese forces, 1/50 Mech and several airborne companies will preempt the enemy intention to win a great victory at Thu My. Once located by AVN, RP and FF saturation patrols, the enemy will be fixed in place by mechanized forces, prepared by artillery, ARVN and Tactical Air. Where possible, enemy concentrations will be encircled by airborne troops to preclude the enemy's fleeing in the face of the inevitable crushing mechanized attack. This encirclement effort will be complimented by carefully planned and coordinated artillery blocking fires, illumination and ground surveillance. Priority of supporting fires goes to units in contact.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. General: As the situation developed, the enemy was to be located in three separate positions in turn around the Thu My District Hq. In each case, initial intelligence was gained by Vietnamese units, and mechanized units were rapidly moved to the scene. In each case, the enemy, once located and fixed, was prepared by supporting arms, then ruthlessly reduced by a violent mechanized attack.

b. Maneuver:

(1) The first of the three encounters took place to the N.E. of Thu My.

a. At 1045 on 30 Jan the Battalion was notified that the US Forces had terminated the Tet truce effective 0945 that day. Although the Battalion had no "hard" intelligence concerning enemy locations, available companies were deployed on Search and Clear operations without significant findings. Night locations were, as prescribed by CO, 2d 3rd, near Rt 1, north and south of LZ Uplift. During the night, the enemy conducted various indirect weapons attacks and probes.
b. On the morning of 31 Jan, 1/50 again deployed two Mech companies on general search and clear missions with no firm intelligence of pinpointed enemy locations. At 0630, Thu My District Hq reported that a Popular Forces patrol was in contact to the N.E. of Thu My District at Tan An (SR 928691). An aerial scout team was immediately requested and dispatched to Thu My. B and D Co's were directed to immediately move towards the reported contact. By 1100 both were in position south and north of Thu My on highway 1 respectively. D Co was directed to move east to the northern edge of Tan An, and to sweep S.W. to fix the rear of the enemy force gathered to attack Thu My. Co B 1/50 was held at LZ Crystal and directed to reconnoiter a counter attack route around the N.E. of Thu My. At 1230, Co D 1/50 arrived at the northern end of Tan An and began its sweep in a south westerly direction. Contact was made with an estimated enemy company as the Co effected its turn. (See Sketch 1)

c. Request was immediately made to CO, 2d Bde for the release of Co K 1/50 from base defense of LZ Uplift. Co K moved to the right flank of Co D and Co B moved to the South side of Binh Tri (SR 912678) where contact was also made immediately. During the movement of both companies, 8", 155 and ARA were used extensively on both Tan An and Binh Tri hamlets. The enemy force was then estimated to be in battalion strength. While Co B contained the enemy to the south side of Binh Tri, Co A and D launched a simultaneous attack to the S.W. through Tan An. Co D attacking on the left continued to encounter stiff resistance from a well entrenched enemy armed with many automatic and anti-tank weapons. Co K encountered sporadic resistance and moved to the northern edge of Binh Tri. Throughout this action, teams from the 1/9 Cav and the 2d Bde Scout sections were invaluable in screening the flanks and rear of the attacking companies where an undetermined, but significant number of snipers were engaged and eliminated. Of particular merit were the outstanding actions of Lt Mauldin, Bde Scout team leader who continued to aggressively screen even after his H-13 was hit several times. Co D eliminated the enemy resistance, but was prevented by darkness from conducting a thorough police of the contact area, and could positively identify only 5 FV. KIA prior to moving back to LZ Uplift for security. Enroute to Uplift, 1/9 Cav gunships flying overhead cover for Co D received fire at coordinates BR 920704. Returned fire caused two secondary explosions and an enemy assessment of 5 KIA. Meanwhile, Co C 2/5 was airtifted to Thu My District Headquarters and was integrated into the defenses to the right. A and D Co's set up north and south of Binh Tri. Spooky provided illumination and highly effective blocking fires throughout the night.

d. During the night, both A and D 1/50 engaged small groups of enemy attempting to escape from the hamlet. Also during the night, LZ Crystal and Thu My District were probed and mortared from the south and west. Apparently, the main attack on Thu My was to have come from Binh Tri where the enemy was being held and reduced by the combination of Mechanized Units and Spooky.
a. The plan for the final attack on Binh Tri was for Co C 2/5 to block along the western side of town while A and B moved on line through from east to west. This was completed by noon 1 Feb. The units encountered only sporadic contact as they swept through the hamlet. Chu Ky District reported that 100 VC with many WIA had retreated to En 940696. An air strike was requested and delivered to that location. B 1/50 and C 2/5 were diverted to search the area from the north to south, while Co A 1/50 policed the battle area. B 1/50 engaged and killed 1 NVN who in turn killed three of his comrades with a grenade intended for his executioners.

f. The following is a breakdown of enemy and friendly losses for the Tan An/Binh Tri contact:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KI</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/A</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/S WNS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Following the contact at Binh Tri, Co B conducted search and clear operations to the East of Binh Tri. Intelligence had reported an enemy force in Trung Thanh, but the day of 2 Feb netted no findings. Co A was deployed to the North of LZ Uplift and likewise netted nothing. A visit with the commanding officer, 41st ARVN yielded intelligence indicating a Regiment enemy En vicinity En 946623. A plan was agreed upon. From 41st ARVN, two En's respectively were to conduct dismounted sweeps towards the objective from East and West respectively while one Mech Co would simultaneously sweep down from the North and establish a block on the North. (See sketch Map 3)

b. At 0745 3 Feb, Co B moved towards its assigned objective and was in position at 1024. At 1047, 1st En 41st ARVN elements reported contact with an enemy force of unknown size in Vinh Binh, En 940610. Immediately, US Artillery was directed on the clearly visible enemy from the 1/50 CC helicopter. Co B was moved East to a position directly North of the enemy sighting. The 41st ARVN executive officer was picked up in the 1/50 CC, and a joint attack was coordinated and initiated by Co B at 1202 hrs.

b. Within 20 minutes, Co B had located and engaged several enemy squads dug in on the North side of town. While the ARVN were initially quite involved in the attack, they withdrew prior to its completion.
Co B suffered several casualties during the initial phases of the attack. As the Company reached the south edge of town it encountered an enemy which had been scattered and confused by the intensive and accurate artillery fires which had been adjusted by the 1/50 CC helicopter.

d. The following is a break down of enemy and friendly losses for the Vinh Thanh engagement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIa</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wila</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clia</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/A</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/S WNS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Before Co B had finished exploiting the town of Vinh Binh, the third side of Thu My District was threatened, and another element of 1/50 Inf (K) was called into action to eliminate this menace. At 1250 on 3 Feb, two Popular Forces platoons made contact with an estimated NVN Battalion at Xii 372703. Co A 1/50 was released from its bridge security mission and began moving towards the contact area at 1449. At 1900, Co A 2/5 was made OFG to 1/50 and was directed to begin moving to the contact area on foot, with the mission of blocking NW of the hamlet to impede the escape of the enemy force into the mountains.

g. At 1726, Co A advancing from the south side of the hamlet was heavily engaged with a well armed and numerically superior enemy which was dug into the hedge rows on the edge of the hamlet itself.

b. Co A broke contact in minutes and backed one hundred meters to allow for artillery, air strikes and organic fires. SNAKE was requested and confirmed for 1900 arrival.

c. With darkness closing in, Co A 1/50 was directed to move to the S.E. of the hamlet and A 2/5 was directed to block in place. This configuration was favored by the terrain; the town was on a finger running N.W. - S.E. with paddy to the North and South. Thus, the two companies were readily able to contain the three breakout attempts which occurred prior to SNAKE’S arrival.

d. Throughout the night there were various attempts to breakout, primarily to the NW of the hamlet. Illumination and blocking fires from SNAKE again proved invaluable.
g. The plan for the 4 Feb attack was to prepare the objective area with Tactical Air and artillery prior to the main effort of 1/50 from the S.W. Co D 1/50 was moved into the S.W. edge to support by fire. The attack began at 0523.

f. As Co A 1/50 advanced, all three companies came under heavy direct and indirect fire. All three sustained casualties, but Co A 1/50 continued to advance to the S.E. edge of town where it came under withering automatic and anti-tank weapons fires. As Co A 1/50 advanced, a large enemy force attempted to break out to the NW. This attempt was readily spoiled by a well dug in a 2/5.

e. At 1106 a 1/9 Cav gunship was shot down by enemy fire. Only the rapid reaction of the personnel Carriers of Co A saved the crew. Co A's APC's rushed across the open paddy North of the objective area to the rescue of the crew of the stricken helicopter. Seconds after the crew were picked up, the helicopter burst into flames.

h. Additional Tac Air and Artillery were employed against the enemy and Co A was directed to again attack N/W through the town, then to cart wheel right and continue to the North with Co D along side once the turn to the North had been completed. This maneuver was flawlessly executed by the two companies, and an 1000 Dong (4) had fallen to the 1/50 by 1525 hours. (See sketch 5)

i. The following is a breakdown of enemy and friendly losses at An Lao Don (4):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/S UH-1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. CONCLUSION

a. In 5 days operations in 3 separate contacts, Companies A, B, and D of 1/50 successfully preempted the local enemy's effort to overrun and occupy Thu My District Headquarters.
b. Resume of losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KD</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLA</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ML</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/A</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/S MNS</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. COMMANDER'S RESUME: This series of contact gave 1st Bn 50th Inf an excellent opportunity to exercise its full capabilities to the maximum. Their overwhelming firepower was once again used as the main punch with dismounted elements being used to fix and contain the enemy. Artillery, Tactical Air ARA and SPOOKY were successfully integrated into the scheme in each case. Of particular importance in these engagements was the manner in which the Allied Units produced the sound, hard intelligence on which the unit was able to react swiftly and decisively.

[Signature]

CHERRY L. BERTHOLF JR
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry Commanding
SKETCH MAP 1
1100-1400 31 Jan

--- Map Details ---

- Tan An (4)
- Tan An (1)
- Phu Ky
- Binh Tri
- LZ Crystal
- D 1/50
- B 1/50
- R 504