In accordance with Brigade Regulation 335-8, the following report is submitted.

1. **General:** This report covers the operations of TF Schnoor within AO Schnoor from 14 September to 26 September 1968.

2. **Name of Operation:** Operation Walker/Task Force Schnoor.

3. **Type of Operation:** Search and Destroy.

4. **Date of Operation:** 14 September to 26 September 1968.

5. **Location:** AO in boxes BR3537, BR1137, BR1123, Southern boundary-Binh Dinh, Phu Bon Province boundary.

6. **Control or Command Headquarters:** 1st Bn (M), 50th Inf, 173d Abn Bde.

7. **Reporting Officer:** John B Carter L/C, Infantry, Commanding.

8. **Task Organisation:**
   a. B/2-503d
   b. C/1-503d
   c. TF Control
      (1) A 3-319th Arty
      (2) 1/E-17th Cav
      (3) 1 Sqd, 173d Engrs
9. **Supporting Forces:**

a. A/2-17th Arty 105mm, 4 guns.
b. B/2-17th Arty 105mm, 5 guns.
c. A/5-22nd Arty 175mm, 1 gun.
d. A/6-84th Arty 155mm, 2 guns.
e. TAC Air Support: 2lst TASS.
f. Army Aircraft:
   
   (1) 134th Avn Co.
   
   (2) 61st Avn Co.
   
   (3) 196th Avn Co (Hvy Lift).
   
   (4) D Trp, 2-1 Air Cav.

10. **Intelligence:**

   a. Special intelligence received from a normally reliable source indicated the presence of 95B Regiment CP (BR285265). It was suspected that the Regiment CP was coordinating the movement of supplies and attacks upon allied personnel in AO Walker. 95B Regiment CP was reported to have the strength of at least a reinforced company.

   b. During the operation contact was made with NVA groups of from 2 to 12 men. The enemy appeared to be dispersed and trying to avoid contact.

   (1) Units identified consisted of:

   (a) K-7 Co (BR285265) 70 men - 60 NVA and 10 Montagnards. CO: Bay, XO: Nam.

   (b) K-2 Co (BR160316) 80 men, CO: Thong.

   (c) K-3 Co (BR160316) 80 men, CO: Nam.

   (d) K-6 Co (BR160316) 70 men, CO: Hai.

   (2) Enemy morale was not good due to lack of food and Allied activity in their area.

c. Terrain was interspersed with numerous small waterways. The Song Ba in this area presented no obstacle to foot troop movement. Concealment from both air and ground was good. Cover was fair.

d. The Montagnards in this area supported the NVA either through their
own volition or because of coercion.

e. 172d MI Det provided support in interrogating a NVA captured in the operation.

f. VC/NVA losses:
   (1) Person: (BG) 5, (EST) 2.
   (2) Weapons: 1 AK-56
   (3) Clothing: The NVA were dressed in either khakis or black pajamas.
   (4) Food: 2.1 tons of rice was confiscated.
   (5) Medical: An NVA corp man’s kit was captured. (An NVA doctor was believed to have been killed).

11. Mission: To combat assault into AO, interdict enemy movement from South to North and conduct search and destroy operations within AO.

12. Concept of Operations: TF Schnoor conducted operations in assigned area of operation within AO Walker from 14 Sep to 26 Sep 68. TF Schnoor employed 2/2-503d and C/1-503d and controlled the operation from FSB Redcliff. Maximum utilization was made of J Troop 2-5 Air Cav and all available supporting fires.

13. Execution: TF Schnoor arrived at Camp Redcliff by Helicopter 140800H Sep 68. At this time they became OPCON to 1st A/Bn (H), 50th Inf. The remainder of this day consisted of briefings, issuance of the order and preparation for C/A into assigned AO.

d. Due to the intelligence received confirming that regimental CP of 95th was in the area southwest of AO Walker, the following action took place. Opn Phu Bon 142 consisting of two ARVN companies and two PF companies started to the Southwest of AO Walker, and TF Schnoor was alerted to conduct operations in the Southwest portion of AO Walker and north of operation Phu Bon.

e. 15 Sep 68 - At 1040 hrs, B/2-503d began C/A from Camp Redcliff to LZ vicinity coordinates HR29709. PZ time 1041, closed 1107 hrs. LZ time 1119, 1400 hrs. Arty and gunsips were used to prep the LZ which was green. From the LZ B/2-503d moved Southeast to an FSB site vicinity HR22-2506 with negative contact during movement. Remainder of TF Schnoor continued preparations for C/A at Camp Redcliff.

f. 16 Sep 68 - TF Schnoor was deployed by C/A into FSB Brigadoon HR27535. Tra C/A, arty and gunsips were used to prep the LZ. A/S: TOT 161210 Sep, Gunship: TOT 161220 Sep, PZ time: 1310 hrs, LZ time: 1230 hrs, LZ Green. C/1-503d moved from the FSB to the Southeast and B/2-503d moved South from their FOB to TF Schnoor.
proper, C/1-503d while moving SouthEast made contact with an NVA element. Results: Friendlies - no casualties. NVA - 4 KIA, 1 CIA, and 16 civilians (Mongards) detained. B/2-503d continued movement into AO Schoor with negative casualties. FSB Brigadoon was secured by one platoon C/1-503d and 1 platoon E-17th Cav.

d. 17-20 Sep 68 - Units of TF Schoor continued operations in assigned AO with C/1-503d making contact on 20 Sep. They engaged 3 NVA in the vicinity of BR268293. Results: Friendlies - 2 WIA. Enemy - 1 NVA KIA.

e. 21-24 Sep 68 - Units of TF Schoor continued operations in assigned AO with B/2-503d preparing for movement to FSB Brigadoon, and C/1-503d preparing for movement to LZ Uplift. Preparation was evening of 24 Sep 68.

f. 24-25 Sep - B/2-503d was lifted to FSB at 251030 Sep 68. C/1-503d was lifted from FOB BR203308 to LZ Uplift at 250930 Sep 68. 1/E-17th Cav was lifted from FSB Brigadoon to LZ Uplift on 251100 Sep 68. Remaining elements prepared for extraction.

g. 25-26 Sep - A/3-319th Artillery was extracted from FSB to an Khe 260800 Sep 68. TF Schoor personnel extracted to LZ English 261300 Sep. B/2-503d conducted C/A from FSB Brigadoon to vicinity LZ BR330387, to continue S/S operations to the north in assigned AO.

14. Combat Services Logistic and Administration:

a. Personnel: Administration for the TF was handled by the 1/50th S-1 section in conjunction with the Brigade AG Section. Casualty reports were handled by S-1 1/50th while all other personnel action and services were handled by Brigade AG.

b. Medical: All casualties evacuated from TF Schoor were handled initially by 17th Field Hospital, Camp Radcliff. The TF surgeon remained at Camp Radcliff and worked in conjunction with the 1/50th Aid Station in the treatment of personnel with minor wounds from TF Schoor.


(1) KIA: 0
(2) WIA: 0
(3) MIA: 0


(1) KIA: 5
(2) WIA: 0

4
(3) POW: 1
(4) Captured:
   (a) S/A: 1 AK-50
   (b) C/S: 0

e. Logistics:

(1) Class I: The two maneuver elements of the TF were provided
    three days rations (6 C-rations and 3 LRP rations) per individual
    as a basic load. One hot meal was provided for these companies
    every third day. The mess section from A/3-319th Arty was moved
    to the FSB and provided meals for the TF Headquarters, A/3-319th
    Arty, 1/5-17th Cav and the Engineer Squad at the FSB. No signifi-
    cant problems were encountered in providing Class I support.

(2) Class II and IV: The expendable items requested by the TF that
    were on hand were issued immediately. All other items, expend-
    able and non-expendable, were ordered through the liaison officer
    from the brigade supply office. Hand receipt for certain items
    were issued by 1/50th PD.

(3) Class III: Gasoline for the TF’s Mess Section was hooked to
    the FSB. Class III supply presented no problems.

(4) Class V: Two company sized basic loads of ammunition for three
    days were delivered to the log pd by 173d Transportation.
    Ammunition was issued upon request. Artillery ammunition was
    drawn from the ASP as needed. Special items such as bangalore
    torpedoes were shipped from Qui Nhon.

(5) Aircraft Sorties: A total of 137 sorties were flown for the
    Task Force for resupply and backlog. UH-1H and CH-47 aircraft
    were used to carry internal and external loads.
    (a) Resupply: 112 sorties - 76 UH-1H and 36 CH-47.
    (b) Backlog: 25 sorties - 7 UH-1H and 18 CH-47.

15. Special Equipment or Techniques: None.

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